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Memory Systems of the Human Brain:
Dissociations Among Learning Capacities in Amnesia
John D. E. Gabrieli
Abstract
This thesis aimed to characterize different kinds of memory
that are believed to reflect the functioning of distinct memory
systems of the human brain. Accordingly, the experiments sought to
dissociate spared from compromised learning capacities in patients
with global amnesia, a neurological syndrome associated with
bilateral limbic lesions and marked by a deficit in fact learning
(recall and recognition of events and materials). In contrast,
such patients can learn some skills and can demonstrate some verbal
priming effects. These findings suggest that fact learning depends
upon cortico-limbic pathways, whereas some kinds of skill learning
and priming are mediated by structures of the cerebral cortex,
cerebellum, or basal ganglia.
The main subject of study was H.M., whose amnesia followed
bilateral resection of medial temporal-lobe structures. His case
has contributed substantially to the modern definition of the
amnesic syndrome, and provided the first documentation of preserved
learning despite amnesia. Patients with other etiologies of global
amnesia, such as Korsakoff's syndrome, and with memory impairment
due to Alzheimer's disease, were also examined in some experiments.
The experiments probed the applicability of current theories
about the neural organization of human memory to the amnesia
following bilateral resection of the hippocampus and amygdala. One
series of experiments indicated that semantic learning was not
spared as proposed by the semantic/episodic model of memory. A
second series of experiments found no support for the hypothesis
that amnesia reflects the disruption of automatic mnemonic
processes that record contextual memories. Other experiments
confirmed and extended demonstrations of preserved learning of
motor, perceptual, and problem-solving skills, and demonstrated,
for the first time in H.M., preserved verbal priming. Also, the
first example of preserved nonverbal priming in amnesia was
documented with H.M. The main current theory about spared
learning, the procedural/declarative distinction, provided little
insight into the mechanism of spared capacities, and incorrectly
predicted normal lexical-decision repetition-priming in H.M.
Finally patients with Alzheimer's disease were impaired in
stem-completion priming (a result also incompatible with the
procedural/declarative distinction), but some of those patients
were normal in their ability to learn a motor skill. This was the
first dissociation between two kinds of learning spared in global
amnesia. The results are discussed in terms of prospects for
further advances in discovering the computational properties and
neural substrates underlying dissociable human memory systems.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Amnesic Syndrome
Global amnesia is a neurological syndrome characterized by a
relatively circumscribed deficit in learning and memory; studies of
patients with this disorder constitute a major source of evidence
about the neural basis of human memory. The mnemonic impairment
does not appear to be secondary to any other behavioral incapacity,
as demonstrated by the integrity of perceptual, motor, attentional,
motivational, language, and reasoning abilities (Milner and Teuber,
1968). Amnesia typically follows some precipitating morbidity,
such as brain resection, infarction, trauma, or herpes simplex
encephalitis. Amnesic patients have variable retrograde amnesias
(amnesia for premorbid events) (Scoville and Milner, 1957; Sanders
and Warrington, 1971; Marslen-Wilson and Teuber, 1975; Albert et
al., 1979; Cermak and O'Connor, 1983). All amnesic patients, by
definition, show an impairment in remembering new, postmorbid
events and materials (anterograde amnesia). The severity of that
anterograde amnesia can vary considerably from patient to patient
and still be debilitating. Patients with global amnesia, in
contrast to a material-specific amnesia, have a deficit in
remembering all sorts of new events and materials, irrespective of
the modality and the nature of the event or the type of material
(Milner, 1968). When the anterograde amnesia is both severe and
global, the patient has an amnesia that appears as a "complete loss
of memory for events subsequent" [to the precipitating morbidity]
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(Scoville and Milner, 1957, describing the patient H.M.). The same
patient's subjective description of his memory status concurs with
the clinical observation of a complete anterograde amnesia: "Every
day is alone in itself, whatever enjoyment I've had, and whatever
sorrow I've had." (Milner et al., 1968). In fact, it seems more
likely that every few minutes are isolated in time for H.M.
(Milner, 1970): "Right now, I'm wondering. Have I done or said
anything amiss? You see, at this moment everything looks clear to
me, but what happened just before? That's what worries me. It's
like waking from a dream; I just don't remember." Global amnesia
is believed to result from bilateral lesions of the limbic system,
specifically medial temporal-lobe structures (including the
hippocampal complex, amygdala, and entorhinal cortex) (Scoville and
Milner, 1957; Zola-Morgan and Squire, 1985), diencephalic
structures (including the mediodorsal nucleus of the thalamus and
mammillary bodies) (Victor et al., 1971), or the posterior inferior
medial frontal-basal forebrain structures (Talland et al., 1967;
Corkin et al., 1985).
More recently, the memory disorder accompanying the
degeneration of the brain in AD has gained attention because of its
prevalence and social significance: About 2.5 million Americans
are believed to have AD (Adams and Victor, 1985). The analysis of
memory deficits in AD is difficult because the deficits are almost
always embedded in a dementia, which by definition is a nonspecific
loss of two or more cognitive functions (DSM III, APA 1980).
Nevertheless, for many patients with AD (50% in our experience),
memory loss is the first behavioral sign of the insidious onset of
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the disease; it is often disproportionate to impairments in other
behavioral domains early in its disease course. Postmortem
neuropathological studies of patients with AD have found lesions in
three brain regions that overlap with sites of injury underlying
circumscribed amnesias: the hippocampal formation (Hirano and
Zimmerman, 1962; Woodard, 1962; Hyman et al., 1984), the amygdala
(Kemper, 1983), and the basal forebrain (Whitehouse et al., 1981).
In addition, there are lesions in neocortical association areas
(Corsellis, 1976; Terry, 1980), especially the temporal and
parietal lobes (Brun, 1983), but motor, somatosensory, and primary
visual areas are relatively spared (Brun and Englund, 1981).
Cellular degeneration in the basal forebrain of patients with AD,
especially the medial septum, diagonal band of Broca, and nucleus
basalis of Meynert, (Whitehouses et al., 1981 and 1982) deprives
the hippocampus, amygdala, and neocortex of their major cholinergic
innervation (Pope et al., 1964; Davies and Maloney, 1976; Perry et
al., 1977; Bowen et al., 1983). In addition, patients with AD have
lesions of ascending noradrenergic (Adolfsson et al., 1979; Cross
et al., 1981; Bondareff et al., 1981; Winblad et al., 1982; Yates
et al., 1983) and serotonergic (Bowen et al., 1983) innervation of
limbic and neocortical regions.
Preserved Learning in Amnesia
Current understanding about the neural architecture of human
memory rests not upon the many sorts of things that amnesic
patients forget, but rather upon the few sorts of things that such
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patients remember. A growing body of literature reports intact
learning in patients with even the most pervasive and profound
amnesias (e.g., Milner, 1962; Corkin, 1968; Milner et al., 1968;
Warrington and Weiskrantz, 1968, 1970, 1982; Brooks and Baddeley,
1976; Cohen and Squire, 1980; Cohen and Corkin, 1981; Wood et al.,
1982; Jacoby and Witherspoon, 1982; Graf et al., 1984; Cermak,
1985). The dissociation in amnesia between impaired and preserved
learning capacities strongly implies that separate neural networks
mediate distinct kinds of memory. Although the anatomical and
chemical definitions of these neural networks have not been
specified precisely, they may be considered as memory systems of
the brain. For this thesis, a memory system is defined as a group
of neural structures forming a functional network for the
acquisition and expression of knowledge. The learned behaviors of
healthy people are usually the outcomes of interactions among
multiple memory systems. A method for identifying and
characterizing discrete memory systems is the experimental
isolation of intact from compromised learning capacities in
amnesia. The experiments in this thesis are attempts to discover
what sorts of learning may occur without the contributions of
medial temporal-lobe structures, including the hippocampus and
amygdala. The experiments were designed not only to explore the
range of preserved learning in H.M., but also to address a number
of theories about the brain organization of human memory.
The contrast between what amnesic patients can and cannot
learn has motivated the development of theories about what
distinguishes those two broad categories of learning. The number
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of such theories is nearly as large as the number of documented
cases of preserved learning in amnesia. The theories propose
dichotomies that have been termed episodic/semantic (Kinsbourne and
Wood, 1975), taxon/locale (O'Keefe and Nadel, 1978),
vertical/horizontal (Wickelgren, 1979), declarative/procedural
(Cohen, 1981), working/reference (Olton et al., 1979), with
awareness/without awareness (Jacoby and Witherspoon, 1982),
automatic/effortful (Hirst and Volpe, 1984), semantic/mediational
(Warrington and Weiskrantz, 1982), and cognitive/habitual (Mishkin
et al., 1984) (Table I-1). These theories overlap and concur in
many instances. Recently, Cermak (1985), Squire (1986), and
Tulving (1985) have offered taxonomies explicitly integrating these
various formulations within single frameworks (Figure I-1).
The plethora of theoretical distinctions listed above is not
the result of chaos in a field of research. Rather, the growth of
dichotomies reflects three separate but related achievements in the
study of the neural basis of human learning. First, some of these
theories provide direct relations between the pattern of sparing
and loss of memory seen in patients and in infrahuman primates and
rats following discrete surgical lesions, e.g.,
procedural/declarative (Squire and Cohen, 1984), cognitive/habitual
(Mishkin et al., 1984), taxon/locale (O'Keefe and Nadel, 1978), and
working/reference (Olton et al., 1979). Second, a number of the
theories find parallels between the fractionation of learning
following brain injury and functional modularities observed in
normal learning e.g., episodic/semantic (Kinsbourne and Wood,
1975), and automatic/effortful (Hirst and Volpe, 1984). Such
14
Tatle -1. NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL DICHOTOMIES OF HUMAN MEMORY CAPACITIES IN ANTEROGRADE AMNESIA
TYPE OF MEMORY
IMPAIRED IN AMNESIA
Long Term (consolidation)
Episodic
Locale
Vertical
TYPE OF MEMORY
PRESERVED IN AMNESIA
Short Term
Semantic
Taxon
ANALOGOUS TO
NORMAL
HUMAN MEMORY
y
ANALOGOUS TO MEMORY IMPAIRMENTS
IN ANIMALS WITH EXPERIMENTAL
BRAIN LESIONS
X
X
X
Horl zontal
Declarative Procedural
With Awareness
Mediatlonal
Elaborative
Cognitive
Without Awareness
Semantic
Activational
Habitual X
Jacoby,1984 Intentional Retrieval
Hirst &
Volpe, 1984
Automatic
Incidental Retrieval
Effortful 4
1-This dichotomy reflects a different level of analysis than do the following 10
2-X stands for analogous by way of hypotheses that motivated experients
3-Y stands for analgous by post-hoc reinterpretation of experimental results
4-Effortful memory process ae poor as a consequence of impaired automatic processes
PROPONENT
Mi Ilner, 19571
Kinsbourne 
Wood, 1975
O'Keefe 
Nadel, 1978
Wickelgren,
1979
Cohen 
Squire,1981
Jacoby 
Wi therspoon,
1982
Warrington l
Weiskrantz,
1982
Graf et al,
1982
Mishkin et
al, 1984
Y3
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MEMORY
POCE DURAL DECLAA T IVE
A
/ \ EIODIC ::: TIC
SKILLS PftIMIG A
AWARE U#NAWARE
Figure I-1. A propsed taxonomy of human memory from
Cermak et al., 1985.
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correspondences between animal, patient, and normal learning
promote the possibility of synthesizing knowledge about brain
organization and the neurological foundations of mammalian memory.
Third, the theories have provided a provocative agenda for
research: They motivate new experiments testing predictions about
preserved learning capacities that could not have been imagined
without the theories. For example, it seems unlikely that anybody
would have bothered to find out whether H.M. could learn a 31-step
puzzle (Cohen and Corkin, 1981), with no theoretical question in
view. Indeed, despite the discovery of preserved learning
capacities in H.M. in 1962 (Milner) and in 1968 (Corkin; Milner et
al.), it was not until the introduction of these theories, over a
decade later, that other intact learning capacities were sought and
revealed in H.M. Another advantage of a theoretical approach is
that it has forced a rapprochement among kinds of learning that are
usually studied separately, e.g., motor, perceptual,
problem-solving, language, and fact learning. Their separate
academic study does not mean that these kinds of learning
necessarily operate separately, either in terms of psychological
mechanism or neural circuitry. Thus, theories about the neural
organization of human memory, constructed primarily on the grounds
of preserved learning capacities in patients with global amnesia,
now strive for a broad view of the biological bases of learning
across mammalian species, across normal function and pathological
dysfunction, and across psychological domains usually considered in
isolation and often not related explicitly to memory. This
convergence raises the exciting possibility of discovering specific
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neural mechanisms mediating different kinds of learning that may be
characterized formally in computational terms, i.e., memory systems
of the brain.
Memory Systems: A Definition
Curiously, although researchers now write about memory systems
of the brain (e.g., procedural and declarative memory systems), not
one has defined what such a memory system is. The value of a rigid
definition may be questioned because views on this subject are
changing so rapidly. Even a faulty definition, however, may give
rise to a better one. For this thesis, a memory system is defined
as a group of neural structures forming a functional network for
acquiring knowledge and for the expression of that knowledge.
Thus, the system must include the necessary neural circuitry for
the encoding, consolidation, and retrieval of a long-term memory.
Memory systems almost certainly include subsystems that differ with
respect to function and such structural properties as cell type or
neurotransmitters. However, these subsystems are difficult to
identify and characterize in humans with current experimental
techniques. Systems of this sort are defined by task demands: In
order to accomplish an experimentally induced goal, a set of neural
structures are brought into purposeful play. Finally, we cannot
really find a system; we can only infer that a particular brain
structure is a component of a system if damage to that structure
selectively impairs some kinds of learning but not others. Similar
mnemonic deficits following damage to anatomically related
18
structures, though, may suggest the morphologic outlines of a
system. At this point, however, behavioral research with patients
provides information only about macrosystems of memory.
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II. BACKGROUND
The background for this thesis is the evolution of current
concepts about the role of medial temporal-lobe brain structures in
human memory. A brief review of this evolution will emphasize
three themes. First, implicit definitions of memory guided the
interpretation of relevant facts and sometimes limited the growth
of ideas about the neural basis of human learning. Second, the
remarkable role of the patient H.M. in the evolution of concepts
about the relation between medial temporal-lobe structures and
amnesia is highlighted. He is the main subject of study in most of
the experiments in this thesis; his brain resection and
postoperative course are therefore described in some detail.
Third, the analysis of anterograde amnesia by dissociation of
spared and compromised learning capacities in amnesic patients is
discussed. This approach was taken because it has been a fruitful
one in the last decade of research in amnesia, and because it
permits synthesis with knowledge about normal human memory and the
brain basis of learning in rodents and monkeys.
Memory as a Unitary Engram
Following a series of experiments in which rats' disabilities
to learn maze routes correlated with the size rather than the site
of brain removal, Lashley in 1950 summarized a reasonable view of
the neural substrate of mammalian memory: "It is not possible to
demonstrate the isolated location of a memory trace anywhere in the
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nervous system ... the engram is represented throughout the
region," (Lashley, 1950). The prevalent psychological model of
memory was that of associationism or stimulus-response learning,
which did not provide, or permit, a view of how memory could break
down in parts (Watson, 1925). In a parallel sense, Lashley
searched for an engram that was the memory for running a maze route
in toto: a discrete neurobiological record corresponding to a
discrete association underlying a complex of behaviors. Lashley's
research assumed a unitary, undifferentiated model of memory and
then found a unitary memory that had the entire nervous system as
its unit. Three years after Lashley wrote these conclusions, the
case of a single patient provided strong evidence for a nonunitary
view of memory.
The Case of H.M.
Milner (1966) traced a succession of isolated
clinico-pathological reports, starting from Bekhterev in 1899 and
winding through this century, suggesting to her that limbic
structures embedded in the medial aspect of the temporal lobes,
especially the hippocampal complex, play a vital role in human
memory. Her hypothesis was strengthened when two patients (P.B.
and F.C.) developed global amnesia following left-sided resections
of the medial temporal region (Penfield and Milner, 1958). It was
suspected that these patients had had preoperative damage to the
right medial temporal region, and that the surgical resection had
effectively created bilateral medial temporal-lobe lesions. P.B.
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died 12 years later of a pulmonary embolism, and postmortem
pathological study did, indeed, reveal a deteriorated right
hippocampus (Penfield and Mathieson, 1974). In 1953, however,
Milner's hypothesis lacked firm confirmation.
Then, the case of an epileptic patient, H.M., provided
unambiguous evidence that a severe impairment of recent memory,
both retrograde and anterograde, occurs following bilateral
resection of medial temporal-lobe structures (Scoville et al.,
1953; Scoville and Milner, 1957). Prior to his resection, H.M. had
no obvious difficulty in memory, was able to complete high school,
and, for a while, hold a number of jobs. His childhood medical
history was unremarkable with the possible exception of an
apparently minor head trauma sustained at age 7 when he fell off
his bicycle. Over the next 9 years, H.M. experienced minor
seizures, with the onset of generalized seizures at age 16. H.M.'s
epilepsy was not treatable by medications, and by the age of 27 he
was unable to work and a captive of his frequent and severe
seizures. Neurological, radiological, and EEG examinations failed
to reveal a focal abnormality. Because of the dim prognosis for
this patient, Dr. William Beecher Scoville on September 1, 1953,
performed an experimental surgical procedure, a radical bilateral
medial temporal-lobe resection (Figure I-l). The motivation for
the resection was that medial temporal-lobe structures, especially
the hippocampus, amygdala, and uncus have low seizure thresholds
and are frequently focal epileptogenic sites. Scoville's surgical
approach was through two 1.5 inch supraorbital trephine holes. The
frontal lobes were elevated by flat spatulas inserted through both
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Figure I-i. Schematic depiction of a sagittal view of the
medial temporal-lobe resection in H.M; the structures that
were removed are marked by cross hatching.
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holes, exposing the tips of the temporal lobes. Following lateral
retraction of the temporal lobes for access to their medial
surfaces, EEG recordings were made in another attempt to assess the
integrity of the uncus, amygdala, and hippocampus. No epileptic
focus could be localized. Scoville made incisions that bisected
the tip of each temporal lobe and resected the medial tips of both.
Then, using suction he removed all grey and white matter medial to
the temporal horns of the lateral ventricles. Temporal neocortex
was reported to have been spared. The removal was bilateral, and
was estimated to extend 8 cm back from the tips of the temporal
lobes, including the prepyriform gyrus, uncus, amygdala,
hippocampus, and parahippocampal gyrus. H.M. was awake and talking
throughout the operation. In terms of an experimental treatment
for epilepsy without a focal abnormality, Scoville's procedure was
largely effective. The reductions in severity and frequency of
seizures were immediate and sustained through 35 years, with
continued use of seizure medication.
The surgical procedure, however, also resulted in a profound
and pervasive impairment of what was termed anterograde and
retrograde recent memory (Scoville and Milner, 1957). Upon
postoperative recovery, H.M.'s anterograde amnesia appeared to be
virtually absolute; he forgot the events of daily life almost as
quickly as they passed. His retrograde amnesia was less
comprehensive, and appeared to be dense for the preceding 5 years.
He could no longer recognize the hospital staff, except Dr.
Scoville, whom he had known for many years. He could not remember
the death of a favorite uncle from 3 years before. When informed
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of this event, he became upset, only to forget the matter and ask
periodically when that uncle would visit; when reinformed, the
pattern of grief, forgetting, and awaiting the visit of the
deceased uncle repeated with apparently equal intensity. H.M.'s
awareness of the deaths of his father, in 1967, and his mother, in
1981, is clouded and variable. He still sometimes voices his
regret that he must be a burden for his parents. When asked to
guess his age in 1986 (60), H.M. usually answered 35, indicating a
sense, albeit truncated, of some years having passed since the
onset of his anterograde amnesia 36 years before.
Dissociations in the Amnesic Syndrome
H.M.'s case provided compelling evidence of three
dissociations in the neural organization of human memory. Despite
the severity of his anterograde amnesia, H.M.'s nonmnemonic
abilities appeared intact, including perception, language, and
social behavior. His score on the Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence
Scale rose from a preoperative IQ of 104 to a postoperative IQ of
118 in 1962 (Milner). Thus, there was a distinction between many
aspects of intelligence, which were preserved, and the learning of
new events and materials, which was compromised. Second, H.M.'s
memory for remote events was far superior to his memory for
postoperative events (Milner and Scoville, 1957). H.M. also
retained the general knowledge that he had learned in childhood,
such as knowledge of language, social behavior, and eating habits.
This evidence suggested a difference between the retention of
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premorbid memories (limited retrograde amnesia with intact remote
memory) and the acquisition of postmorbid memories (a complete
anterograde amnesia). Third, H.M.'s immediate memory, as defined
by his ability to repeat a string of digits, was normal. Indeed,
H.M. could remember a string of digits for at least 15 minutes if
not distracted (Milner, 1970). Thus, within his anterograde
amnesia, intact immediate and impaired long-term memory could
coexist. These dissociations were especially clear because H.M.
had had no evident premorbid memory problem, had retained average
general intelligence, and was an eager and motivated subject.
These contrasts remained apparent in many subsequent studies with
H.M. (Corkin, 1984); equally important, they have been corroborated
by the research of other investigators studying other patients
whose amnesias likely arose from other bilateral limbic lesions
(e.g., Baddeley and Warrington, 1970; Cohen, 1981; Cermak, 1976).
Milner interpreted H.M.'s memory impairment as one of failed
consolidation, the process by which new short-term memories (which
were intact in H.M.) convert into enduring long-term memories
(which after his operation never occurred normally in H.M.)
(Milner, 1962). Indeed, the discovery of this dissociation became
one of the foundations of the prevailing model of normal human
memory, a duplex model in which memory is composed of short-term
and long-term memory stores (e.g., Baddeley and Dale, 1966). In
this interpretation, Milner equated memory with the successful
learning of new facts, the prevailing implicit, functional
definition of human memory. H.M.'s intact short-term but impaired
long-term memory for facts was demonstrated for verbal and
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nonverbal materials in all modalities, and extended to a variety of
stimuli, including words, nonsense words, pictures, maze routes,
tones, faces, geometric shapes, paragraphs, names, nonsense
patterns, and clicks (reviewed in Corkin, 1984).
In the 1970s, research on normal human memory moved from a
duplex structural model to a multistage process model that
emphasized encoding and retrieval processes, their
interrelationships, and levels of processing stimulus input (Craik
and Lockhart, 1972; Craik and Tulving, 1975). Most of the research
about amnesia in that decade used the levels or stages of
processing models of memory to discover many interesting facts and
advance new theories about the information-processing deficits
underlying the amnesia in Korsakoff's syndrome (KS) (e.g., Butters
and Cermak, 1980; Warrington and Weiskrantz, 1970). KS typically
follows a psychosis described first by Wernicke in 1881.
Wernicke's psychosis is marked by disorientation, confusion,
ophthalmoplegia, nystagmus, ataxia, and polyneuropathy in the limbs
(Adams and Victor, 1981). It occurs in long-term alcoholics and is
believed to be the consequence of dietary thiamine deficiency. If
treated with thiamine, these patients live, the ocular problems,
ataxia, and peripheral neuropathy diminish, and the confusional
state resolves. The most apparent exception to this general
improvement is the remaining presence, in some patients, of KS in
which the most salient symptom is a dense anterograde amnesia.
Most experimental studies of global amnesia have been conducted in
patients with KS, including the series by Warrington and eiskrantz
in England, Butters and Cermak in Boston, and Squire and his
27
collaborators in San Diego. Butters and Cermak collected a body of
evidence showing that patients with KS employed impoverished
encoding processes that impaired retrieval; poor stimulus analysis
was apparent even for nonmnemonic tasks (e.g., Oscar-Berman, 1973;
Dricker et al., 1978). Warrington and Weiskrantz (1970) put forth
the opposite notion, that the defect in amnesia occurs at the point
of retrieval.
The three explanations of anterograde amnesia (consolidation
failure, encoding failure, retrieval failure) implied that memory
is not a unitary process, but each of the three explanations
provided a unitary view of new long-term learning, in which a
single kind of failure impaired all of anterograde long-term
memory. Furthermore, all three explanations favored a three-stage
linear model of memory: encoding, consolidation or storage and
retrieval.
Dissociations in the Neurological Foundations of Memory
H.M.'s case also offered unusually direct evidence about the
neurological foundations of human memory: Medial temporal-lobe
structures play an essential role in the acquisition of new
long-term memories but are not the repositories of premorbidly
formed long-term memories (i.e., remote memory). Unlike the
degenerative or traumatic lesions underlying the memory disorders
in most patients with global amnesia, H.M.'s removal was performed
with surgical precision. Following reports of H.M.'s case,
physiological psychologists performed similar lesions in animals in
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order to study the role of medial temporal-lobe structures in
memory. Nevertheless, it took 25 years to rediscover in primates
that Scoville's removal was the most damaging lesion possible for
specifically impairing new learning.
The individual contributions of the hippocampus and amygdala
to new learning are still being defined. Milner (1966) had noted
that patients who had bilateral resections of the amygdala did not
have observable memory impairments. Further, a number of
subsequent studies by Milner and her colleagues (Corkin, 1965;
Milner, 1965; Corsi, 1972; Milner, 1978; Smith and Milner, 1981)
documented that the severity of some verbal and nonverbal memory
impairments correlated with the extent of left or right hippocampal
resection in patients who had undergone unilateral temporal-lobe
resection for the treatment of epilepsy. Taken together, these
facts suggested strongly that H.M.'s amnesia was a consequence of
his large, bilateral hippocampal removals and that the additional
bilateral amygdalectomy was noncontributory. In contrast, the
amnesia seen in animals with bilateral hippocampectomy (or more
often a fornix transection, which was believed to have the same
effect by eliminating the major efferent route from the
hippocampus) ranged from mild to none (e.g., Corraland, Scoville,
1955; Orbach et al., 1960). By 1976, Susan Iverson wrote a paper
asking "Do hippocampal lesions produce amnesia in animals?" This
divergence between H.M. and "H.M.-like" animals has been resolved
in two ways due to the efforts of Mishkin (1978), Mahut et al.
(1981), Zola-Morgan and Squire (1984), and their collaborators.
They showed that bilateral amygdalectomy or bilateral
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hippocampectomy each produces a mild amnesia in the monkey, whereas
conjoint bilateral ablations of both limbic structures, as was done
in H.M., produce a devastating anterograde amnesia. More recently,
postmortem neuropathological examination of the brain of a patient
whose amnesia was well documented revealed damage limited to the
CA1 field of the hippocampus, providing evidence that a lesion
restricted to the hippocampus (and sparing the amygdala) can
produce clinically evident amnesia in humans (Zola-Morgan et al.,
1985).
Interest is now focusing on characterizing the separate
mnemonic roles of the structures removed together in H.M.: the
dentate gyrus, subicular cortex, parahippocampal gyrus, amygdala,
and the entorhinal and perirhinal cortex, all of which may be
compromised in the course of resecting the hippocampus (e.g.,
Mishkin, 1978; Mahut et al., 1981; Murray and Mishkin, 1984;
Zola-Morgan and Squire, 1986). For example, evidence exists that
the amygdala plays a specific role in cross-modal memory in the
monkey (Murray and Mishkin, 1984) and perhaps in humans (Corkin and
Preven, unpublished data). Also, it has been proposed that a
lesion to the subiculum underlies the mnemonic deficit in AD; the
lesion may disconnect the hippocampus from temporal neocortex
(Hyman et al., 1984). Studies with H.M. are not illuminating in
this regard because his removal included all the critical limbic
structures.
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Preserved Learning Capacities Despite Global Amnesia
The first report of preserved learning in anterograde amnesia
is attributed to Claperede (1911; translated in Rapaport, 1951).
Claperede performed a clinical experiment with an amnesic woman
whose memory disorder was part of her KS.
I carried out the following curious experiment on
her: to see whether she would better retain an
intense impression involving affectivity, I stuck
her hand with a pin hidden between my fingers.
The light pain was as quickly forgotten as
indifferent perception; a few minutes later she
no longer remembered it. But when I again
reached out for her hand, she pulled it back in a
reflex fashion, not knowing why. When I asked
for the reason, she said in a flurry, "Doesn't
one have the right to withdraw her hand?" and
when I insisted, she said, "Is there perhaps a
pin hidden in your hand?" To the question, "What
makes you suspect me of wanting to stick you?"
she would repeat her old statement, "That was an
idea that went through my mind," or she would
explain, "Sometimes pins are hidden in people's
hands." But never would she recognize the idea
of sticking as a "memory."
Thus, Claperede discovered a fourth dissociation in amnesia
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between the learned consequences of an experience (the patient
learned to avoid his hand) and conscious awareness of that
experience.
A study with H.M. launched modern interest in preserved
learning capacities in amnesic patients. Milner (1962) trained
H.M. on a mirror-tracing task in which he had to trace a
five-pointed star without seeing his hand, the pencil, or the star
directly, but rather as reflected in a mirror. H.M. made
successively fewer errors and decreased the time he needed to trace
the star. Most impressively, he retained and increased his
proficiency across two 24-hour intervals. This report was the
first empirical evidence of a preserved learning capacity in the
face of global amnesia. Furthermore, H.M. evinced no memory for
any aspect of having done the mirror-tracing task before, even as
he reduced his number of errors from 40 on the first trial of Day 1
to 2 on the last trial of Day 3.
Investigators documented more examples in which amnesic
patients forgot to forget. Spared learning capacities were found
for more motor tasks (Corkin, 1968; Cermak et al., 1973; Brooks and
Baddeley, 1976), perceptual tasks (Warrington and Weiskrantz, 1968;
Milner, Corkin and Teuber, 1968; Cohen and Squire, 1980; Nissen et
al., 1981; Martone et al., 1984; Squire et al., 1984; Cermak et
al., 1985), problem-solving tasks (Wood et al., 1982; Cohen and
Corkin, 1981), and tasks on which prior exposure to a word
facilitated subsequent verbal performance, such as spelling
(Warrington and Weiskrantz, 1970; Jacoby and Witherspoon, 1982;
Diamond and Rozin, 1984; Graf et al., 1984; Graft et al., 1985;
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Graf and Schacter, 1985; Squire et al., 1985; Graft et al., 1985).
It was striking that even as the amnesic patients demonstrated
their learned skills, these patients were impaired in their memory
for the experiences and materials with which they had learned their
skills.
The increasing number of reports of preserved learning in
amnesia provoked new views about the limits of anterograde amnesia.
Amnesic patients were impaired in learning facts, such as events
they had experienced or materials they had studied. Such patients
had difficulty in explicitly recalling or recognizing prior
episodes. The same patients, however, had preserved learning
capacities for certain motor, perceptual, problem-solving, and
verbal performance skills, as inferred by changes in performance.
Human memory was not restricted to the conscious recall of facts,
but was extended to any change in performance with experience.
Anterograde learning was now seen as an amalgam of multiple forms
of memory.
Preserved Learning in H.M.
Milner's 1962 report of H.M.'s ability to acquire the skill
involved in the mirror-tracing of a star launched current research
about preserved learning in amnesia, but two aspects of that
experiment limit a clear interpretation of the results. First,
control subjects' performances were not compared quantitatively to
H.M.'s, precluding a documentation of the degree of preserved
learning and validation of its equivalence to that of normal
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control subjects. Second, the dissociation between H.M's inability
to recall having done the task and his excellent mirror-tracing
performance is impressive, but not as convincing as a more
systematic and sensitive measure of fact learning, such as
multiple-choice recognition would have been. Some amnesic
patients, including H.M., are aware of their memory problem and are
likely to answer "No" when asked whether they remember having done
or seen something. ("No" is always the safe answer for someone who
knows he remembers poorly). When H.M. meets people, he often
informs them that, "See, I don't remember."
In 1968, Corkin reported improvements from day to day on
rotary pursuit, bimanual tracking, and stylus tapping tasks for
H.M. (Corkin, 1968). This experiment was the first in which
control subjects were tested for comparison with H.M. However,
H.M.'s improvement was not comparable to that of control subjects.
This finding was difficult to interpret because H.M.'s initial
level of performance was lower than that of control subjects.
Further uncertainty about H.M.'s good (but not normal) learning was
cast by his unique pattern of performance on rotary pursuit. The
goal in rotary pursuit was to maintain contact between a hand-held
stylus and a rotating disc. The main measure was the amount of
time that contact was maintained, but the number of contacts (i.e.,
the number of times contact was broken and then regained) was also
measured. H.M.'s amount of time-on-target began at a lower point
than that of control subjects and improved but never reached their
level. He had a somewhat parallel but clearly inferior learning
curve. For control subjects, the number of contacts decreased as
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the time-on-target increased. For H.M., precisely the opposite
occurred: As his time-on-target increased so did his number of
contacts. H.M.'s unique pattern of increasing contact scores
raises the possibility that H.M. was not showing preserved learning
due to an intact memory system, but rather was showing impaired
learning due either to partial damage of a system or inefficient
performance by another, nonoptimal system brought into play.
Either way, then, H.M. could have been learning something different
from the control subjects. This experiment did not provide clear
evidence of a preserved system operating normally.
In 1968, Milner et al. tested H.M. on the Gollin
Incomplete-Pictures task (Gollin, 1960). Subjects were shown 20
objects in fragmented line drawings, and were asked to identify the
objects. Each object was presented in up to five successively more
complete versions until the subject had identified all 20
correctly. An hour later, the subjects received the same task
again with the same drawings. H.M. and control subjects improved
their performance in the second session by identifying the objects
in earlier, less complete versions. H.M.'s improvement was less
than that of any control subject. Milner et al. noted that, as in
rotary pursuit, H.M.'s initial performance on the task was inferior
to the mean of the control subjects. The authors adjusted for this
disparity by comparing H.M. to a subgroup of control subjects such
that initial performance was equated. Even then, H.M. remained
inferior in the degree of improvement he showed at the 1-hour
delay. Milner et al. pointed out that normal subjects probably had
memories for the names of the objects from the initial session, and
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that they could take advantage of these memories on retesting.
H.M., on the other hand, probably had many fewer or no such
memories. The experiment, however, did not incorporate a direct
assessment of fact learning, such as recall or recognition of the
names of the objects. This experiment did expand the possible
realm of preserved learning in H.M. from motor to perceptual,
raised and dealt with the problem of unequal initial performance,
and offered a possible explanation for H.M.'s less than normal
improvement at the 1-hour retest, including the idea that a task
could invoke more than one memory system.
Since these three reports, several tantalizing abstracts and
book chapters have reported preserved learning in H.M. (Cohen and
Corkin, 198; Nissen et al., 1981; Cohen, 1984). These sources are
hard to evaluate because they lack a complete report of method,
results, and data analysis. Indeed, it was the completeness of the
1968 reports that made them so suggestive. Altogether, then, there
is not a single case of fully preserved learning in H.M. reported
in any refereed journal.
Current Theories About Memory Systems
A model, or taxonomy, of memory systems is shown in Figure I-1
(Cermak, 1985). Cermak's diagrammatic taxonomy is in close
register with figures from Tulving, 1985, and Squire, 1986, and
with reviews by Cohen, 1984, and Schacter, 1985. It is readily
apparent that the models concur first and foremost upon the
distinction between procedural and declarative memory systems
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proposed by Cohen in 1981. Patients with global amnesia are
thought to be impaired in learning declarative knowledge and
unimpaired in learning procedural knowledge. Thus, the distinction
between these two kinds of knowledge or memory systems has been
said to be "honored by the nervous system, as reflected by the
differential susceptibility of the two systems to amnesia" (Cohen,
1984). The terms "procedural" and "declarative" were taken from
the discipline of artificial intelligence (Winograd, 1975; Winston,
1977; Anderson, 1981, 1982).
Declarative memory is explicit and accessible to
conscious awareness, and it includes the facts,
episodes, lists, and routes of everyday life. It
can be declared, that is, brought to mind
verbally as a proposition or nonverbally as an
image ... In contrast, procedural knowledge is
implicit, and it is accessible only through
performance, by engaging in the skills or
operations in which the knowledge is embedded.
(Squire, 1986)
"Just about everyone agrees on the reality of a major division
between procedural memory ... on the one hand and the 'other kind'
on the other," said Endel Tulving in his 1984 American
Psychological Association Award Address. The
procedural/declarative dichotomy has roots in philosophy and
psychology. Ryle (1949) termed the two formats of knowledge as
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"knowing how" and "knowing that," while Bruner (1969) coined the
phrases "memory without record" and "memory with record." The two
kinds of learning can be measured only in different ways.
Declarative memory is measured by an explicit demand for a subject
to remember an event or stimulus. Tasks that evaluate declarative
memory are recall, cued recall (in which part of the stimulus is
given and the subject must recall the whole stimulus), yes/no
recognition, and multiple-choice recognition. Procedural memory is
assessed implicitly by changes in performance as a consequence of
experience. An everyday example may be learning how to play
tennis: Players have little ability to explicate what they have
learned as they progress in their skill at hitting backhands, but
their improvement, if measurable, surely constitutes learning.
This learning must be achieved by a memory system.
A central difference between the two kinds of knowledge is
their encapsulation. The declarative memory code is, by virtue of
its explicit format, suitable for recording and rendering available
the outcomes of all sorts of processes and events. The procedural
memory code may be encapsulated within the processing and action
systems in which the memory occurs: "Experience serves to
influence the organization of processes that uide performance
without access to the knowledge that underlies performance" (Cohen,
1984). A related issue is the relationship of conscious and
unconscious processes to declarative and procedural memories.
Conscious processes appear to be part and parcel of accessing
declarative knowledge, whereas they may be uninvolved in accessing
procedural knowledge.
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A clear dissociation between declarative and procedural
learning was achieved in studies of reading mirror-reversed words
(Cohen and Squire, 1980). Amnesic patients and control subjects
read mirror-reversed words in three days of testing; half the words
repeated from day to day and half were new and appeared just once
(nonrepeated words). The patients and control subjects learned to
read the mirror-reversed words more and more quickly, improving
gradually on each day and maintaining that improvement from day to
day. For nonrepeated words, the amnesic patients improved just as
much as the control subjects: Both groups acquired and retained
the procedure for how to read mirror-reversed words. For repeated
words, the patients showed less learning than the control subjects,
and the patients were far worse on a recognition test when the
words were given at the end of the test. The patients failed to
learn that they had read certain words, and could not declare what
words they had seen. Similarly, in Milner's 1962 study, H.M.
failed to recall any of the details of the episodes in which he
acquired his evident mirror-tracing skill. Like other amnesic
patients, he seemed unconscious of where or when he had learned,
what he had learned, or whether he had learned at all.
Most current taxonomies (Figure I-1) pay heed to the
episodic/semantic distinction originated by Tulving (1972). In the
original formulation, which has since been revised (e.g., Tulving,
1982; Tulving, 1985), episodic memory referred to personal
remembrances for events that occurred at specific times and in
specific places, whereas semantic memory included context-free
knowledge of facts, language, concepts, and rules acquired in the
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course of episodes. Cermak (1984) suggested that episodic memory
required "retrieval of specific events," and semantic memory
"retrieval from generalized knowledge." Amnesic patients are
clearly impaired at recalling episodes. Further, some
investigators have suggested that patients with global amnesia have
a preserved semantic memory system and an impaired episodic memory
system (Kinsbourne and Wood, 1975; Schacter and Tulving, 1982; Wood
et al., 1982; and Cermak, 1984). More recently, Cermak has
reported results supporting the notion that amnesic patients can
only show procedural learning for premorbidly known semantic
knowledge (Cermak et al., 1985), suggesting a special relationship
between semantic and procedural knowledge not articulated in
earlier formulations of the procedural/declarative theory.
Tulving's thinking has gone in a different direction
(Tulving, 1985). He has proposed that semantic memory is a special
subsystem of procedural memory, and that episodic memory is a
subsystem of semantic memory. Unlike the dichotomous taxonomies of
Squire and Cermak, Tulving proposes a three-level hierarchical
model, in which the systems interact as subsystems. He has
addressed the topic of consciousness by claiming that procedural
memory is anoetic (nonknowing), semantic memory noetic (knowing),
and episodic memory autonoetic (selfknowing). By his hierarchical
scheme, semantic memory could not operate without procedural
memory, but the opposite could occur; episodic memory requires the
integrity of both semantic and procedural memory.
Associated with different memory systems are different
learning mechanisms that operate upon different sorts of mnemonic
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representations. Tulving extended Oakley's (1983) three-part
model: A procedural system tunes stimulus-response contingencies;
a semantic system restructures abstract mental models of states of
the world that permit their consideration without their actual
presence; and an episodic system accretes individual experiences
that let us travel back in time. Mishkin (1984) suggested that the
discovery of two learning systems permits a new view of the
behaviorist-cognitivist debate, in which learning was described as
being either stimulus-response associations or more abstract
transformations of mental representations. The procedural system,
or what Mishkin calls the habit system, learns by associating
stimulus and response, or altering the probable relationship
between the two. The declarative, or Mishkin's cognitive memory
system, learns via acquisition of factual knowledge.
The power of the procedural/declarative distinction lies in
its integration of all kinds of learning within a single framework.
For example, the carefully studied habituation of gill-withdrawal
in aplysia (Kandel, 1976), the tuning of visual cortical cells in
the early development of cats (e.g., Blakemore, 1974), and gaining
skill at rotary pursuit or at reading mirror-reversed text in
humans, amnesic or not, become related forms of procedural
learning. This integration of disciplines has provoked
speculations about the phylogenetic and ontogenetic growth of the
two learning systems. In addition, the procedural/declarative
interpretation of H.M.'s anterograde amnesia has promoted the use
of animal models to study more precisely the neuroanatomical
organization of memory. Lesions intended to reproduce the surgical
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removal in H.M. have resulted in monkeys with memory deficits in at
least two modalities (Mishkin, 1978; Mahut et al., 1981; Murray and
Mishkin, 1984) using delayed nonmatch-to-sample tests. This task
is a two-choice recognition test of declarative-like memory that
requires the monkey to recognize the item that had been seen prior
to the delay. In contrast, monkeys with H.M.-like lesions had
preserved learning of procedural-like skills for pattern
discrimination and motor performance, again analogous to spared
learning capacities in H.M. (Zola-Morgan and Squire, 1985).
The third and final distinction between kinds of learning is
that between the two sorts of tasks on which patients with global
amnesia can demonstrate good learning-skills and priming. The
skills are often categorized as motor (e.g., rotary pursuit),
perceptual (e.g., reading mirror-reversed text), or cognitive
(e.g., problem-solving for number series, Tower-of-Hanoi). Priming
refers to the influence upon performance exerted by prior exposure
to the same or a related stimulus. For example, if amnesic
patients and control subjects see the word STAMP and are asked
later to complete STA to the very first word that leaps to mind,
they provide STAMP more often than if they had not seen STAMP.
Moreover, the two groups show equivalent degrees of bias to provide
the recently seen completion (i.e., STAMP). The patients, though,
are impaired when asked to recall or recognize STAMP (Warrington
and Weiskrantz, 1970; Graf et al., 1984). Cohen (1984), Schacter
(1985), Cermak (1985), and Squire (1986) all divided procedural
memory into skills and priming. Cohen did so on these grounds:
"Priming effects and skill acquisition nonetheless seem to differ
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in the specificity with which the beneficial effects of experience
are expressed: Priming effects are restricted to the enhancement
of performance for re-presentation of the identical stimulus
materials, and skill learning is generalizable to all material
handled by the same operations or procedures."
Little is known about the neural substrates subserving the
procedural and declarative, or semantic and episodic, memory
systems. The evidence is overwhelming that limbic structures,
including the hippocampus, amygdala, as well as the diencephalic
structures damaged in KS, play critical roles in the declarative,
or at least the episodic, system. Beyond that, there are only
interesting speculations. Mishkin (Mishkin and Petri, 1984;
Mishkin et al., 1984), motivated by his work with monkeys, has
proposed that the basal ganglia play a major role in a unitary
habit (procedural) system subserved by a corticostriatal circuit.
In his scheme, a corticolimbic circuit underlies the memory
(declarative) system. Cohen (1985) has stressed the role of those
areas that participate in the processes involved in a particular
procedure. For example, a skill in the visual domain could depend
upon areas 17 or TE and a motor skill could involve the cerebellum,
basal ganglia, or pyramidal motor cortex. Thompson et al. (1984)
has found strong evidence for the crucial role of cerebellar nuclei
in classical conditioning in the rabbit (conditioning being an
example of procedural learning). In relation to Tulving's triune
scheme, Oakley (1981) suggested that the neural substrate for
procedural memory is subcortical, for semantic memory neocortical,
and for episodic memory corticolimbic.
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An interesting limit of the current state of knowledge is that
examples of skill learning and priming are, as far as can be shown,
associated in two ways. First, they are all procedural by current
definition and thus associated by kind of knowledge representation,
by learning mechanism, and by relation to consciousness. Second,
because they are preserved together in global amnesia, all may rely
upon a common neural memory system. Mishkin (1984) has
hypothesized that all habit (procedural) learning relies upon a
corticostriatal system. This possibility may seem unlikely, in
that the range of learning from motor to perceptual to
problem-solving skills to verbal priming seems rather broad for a
single memory system. Nevertheless, the range of tasks that cannot
be learned normally following damage to the hippocampus and
amygdala is similarly broad: It covers all modalities, the range
of emotional experiences, verbal and nonverbal materials of every
sort from tunes to faces to paragraphs to tactual mazes. It is
possible that skills and priming also depend upon a second, single
anatomical or chemical memory system. More precisely, a single
lesion could interrupt all skill learning and priming.
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III. RESEARCH PLAN
Issues in Positing a Memory System
The experimental dissociation between preserved and
compromised memory systems must take into account what has already
been learned about the amnesic syndrome. First, even the most
severely amnesic patients are not completely amnesic. For example,
H.M. could identify many faces of public figures who came into
prominence after his operation when he received cues (hints) about
these public figures (Marslen-Wilson and Teuber, 1975). Therefore,
the presence of some measurable learning in an amnesic patient is
not sufficient evidence for hypothesizing the existence of an
intact memory system. Second, amnesic patients tend to show the
same relative pattern of better and worse learning across many
measures of fact learning as do normal subjects, except that the
amnesic patients have a lower absolute level of performance on all
measures. Thus, it would be erroneous to conclude that amnesic
patients have a spared memory system for pictures on the basis that
their memory for pictures is better than their memory for words,
when the patients have abnormal memory relative to control subjects
for both pictures and words. Such a result speaks, perhaps, to
theories about why memory for pictures is better than memory for
words in patients and in normal subjects, but it does not justify
establishing a preserved memory system for pictures. Third,
problems in comparing multiple measures of memory arise because
different measures have varying degrees of sensitivity. This
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difficulty is often accentuated by ceiling or floor performances,
where ceiling performance means that subjects score perfectly and
floor performance that subjects score at chance or not at all. In
both cases, one has lost a quantitative measurement of memory due
to the design of the experiment. For example, amnesic patients
commonly cannot recall any items from a list after a delay, but
given mult7ie-choice recognition they correctly select answers at
a level above chance. On the same task, normal subjects may recall
several items, and then do nearly perfectly on the multiple-choice
recognition. Thus, amnesic patients' scores may rise from 0%
recalled to 75% recognized, whereas control subjects' scores go
from 50% recalled to 100% recognized. An argument could be made
that the patients' recognition memory is preserved relative to his
or her recall memory because the deficit is cut in half (from 50%
to 25%) when tested by recognition. The relatively smaller
recognition impairment, however, is an artifact due to the 0% floor
measurement in the patients and the 100% ceiling measurement in the
control subjects. Though this argument seems obvious, Tulving and
Schacter (1982) have reviewed a number of published reports that
make this or similar interpretive errors. The critical point is
that the amnesic patient is typically impaired in recall and
recognition. If two measures of learning are consistently impaired
together but to different degrees, that evidence supports the
association, not dissociation, of the two types of learning in a
common memory system.
Knowing that amnesic patients remember more than nothing, that
they can show as rich a pattern of varying absolute memory
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performance on different tasks as do normal subjects, and that the
degree of remembrance will depend in part upon the sensitivity of
the measure of memory, one has to consider what constitutes
convincing evidence of a preserved memory system. The conservative
approach is that the memory performance of an amnesic patient, or
group of patients, must be as good as that of control subjects in
order to.provide evidence of a preserved learning capacity (which
in turn implies an intact memory system). Such cases of spared
learning provide unambiguous evidence for the existence of a memory
system. Unfortunately, pure examples of preserved learning in
amnesia are rare. There are several reasons why patients with
amnesia may learn a particular task substantially but still
abnormally. One reason is that the sort of learning being measured
is impaired and that the measurement is particularly sensitive.
Another possibility is that the learning paradigm engages both an
intact and damaged memory system, and that the overall impairment
is accounted for entirely by the damaged system. For example,
amnesic patients are reported to be impaired in learning to read
repeated words but not unique words in mirror-reading tasks (Cohen
and Squire, 1981; Martone et al., 1985). Therefore, reading the
repeated items probably engages a spared system for learning to
read mirror-reversed text and an impaired system involved in
reading repeated items. It is also possible that the paradigm
engages an intact mnemonic system and an impaired nonmnemonic
system. For example, a patient with a language deficit may perform
poorly on a perceptual learning test involving words. This
situation is likely if the amnesic patient performs poorly before
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any learning can take place. Three approaches towards scrutinizing
the significance may be taken in the data analysis. The first is
to analyze the statistical similarity of the two different patterns
of learning, using absolute improvement, percent improvement,
percent retained over a delay, or linear trend analysis. The
second is to analyze the relationship between initial performance
and subsequent learning in normal subjects; if the same
relationship holds for the patients, it seems reasonable to infer
that normal learning has occurred. The third is to equate initial
performance by testing these patients on a less challenging version
of the same task. Equating initial performance has the advantage
of being empirically straightforward but the disadvantage of having
to assume that the different conditions for patients and control
subjects engage the same memory processes in both groups.
To ignore a case of almost normal learning in amnesia because
it is not entirely normal is to reject potentially valuable
information. For example, it was not until the 1980's that
entirely preserved learning capacities were demonstrated in H.M.,
but these demonstrations followed closely on the theoretical heels
of earlier reports of good though somewhat impaired learning in
H.M. (e.g., Corkin, 1968; Milner et al., 1968). On the other hand,
false examples of preserved learning are misleading at a stage of
research when theory follows from empirical results. A desirable
theory is one that explains why false examples of preserved
learning are false, and such a desirable theory is unlikely to
evolve if it is constructed to account for false and true examples.
Compelling evidence for the dissociation of two or more memory
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systems also requires that the intact and impaired learning be
measured under equivalent experimental conditions. Even so, one
must be wary that compromised and preserved learning in amnesia are
measured in different ways. The fact-learning impairment of
amnesic patients is typically measured by free recall, cued recall,
yes/no recognition, or multiple-choice recognition. Preserved
learning in amnesia has been measured by the influence of prior
exposure to a stimulus or task upon subsequent changes in speed,
accuracy, or efficiency of performance when reconfronting the
stimulus or task (e.g., speed of reading mirror-reversed words or
accuracy of rotary pursuit). Such performance, or savings,
measures are thought to be exceptionally sensitive to even small
effects of prior experience (Nelson, 1978). This difference in
sensitivity of measures raises the possibility that an apparent
dissociation between preserved and impaired learning may be due to
differences in the method of measurement rather than to the
existence of two different memory systems. It is, of course,
reasonable that fundamentally different kinds of memory need to be
measured in different ways. However, the most sensitive measure of
fact learning in amnesia should be employed whenever possible, and
that is multiple-choice recognition (Freed, 1986).
Severity of amnesia is a problematic concept because it
confounds several factors, such as etiology, locus of lesion,
nonmnemonic deficits, and types of memory impairment into a single
value (much as an intelligence quotient confounds multiple,
dissociable sorts of intelligence into a single value). Two recent
reviews, however, have concluded that variation among amnesias is
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describable in the single dimension of severity (aside from the
effects of dissociable nonmnemonic deficits): "Thus, it is
parsimonious to assume that there is just one core form of the
amnesic syndrome that is revealed if one selects and equates for
severity and also eliminates dissociable non-obligatory deficits"
(Weiskrantz, 1985, p. 392), and "the tentative conclusion [is] that
the seven different] etiologies of amnesia that we studied differ
quantitatively but not qualitatively with respect to mnemonic
capabilities involved in fact learning" (Corkin et al., 1984, p.
11). Schacter (1985) reported that a particularly intriguing
dissociation between declarative memory and priming occurred only
in patients with mild memory disorders, but that both sorts of
learning were impaired in patients with more severe memory
impairments (who were probably still less amnesic than H.M.).
Hirst et al. (1986) have also reported differences in the relation
of recall to recognition memory impairment in patients with
different severities (and etiologies) of amnesia. It is important
to note that dissociations seen in mildly amnesic patients remain
entirely legitimate dissociations as long as the data support them.
Still, the severity of H.M.'s amnesia makes the presence of any
preserved learning rather simply interpretable in regards to degree
of anterograde amnesia.
Strategy of the Present Research
Despite H.M.'s being an ideal subject from the standpoint of
severity of amnesia, he is nevertheless a single subject;
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single-subject studies may be difficult to interpret with
conviction. Consequently, five strategies were taken in order to
address possible pitfalls of single-subject research. First, for
each of the broad domains of possibly spared learning, H.M. was
tested on multiple experimental paradigms: six for skill learning,
and four for verbal priming. Any conclusion about any broad
domain, therefore, does not hinge entirely upon a particular
experiment. Second, the experiments followed closely in the
footsteps of prior research with H.M., and of experiments performed
by other investigators with other amnesic patients. The results of
the experiments could therefore be interpreted in the context of a
larger body of literature. Third, all of the experiments were
motivated, at least in part, by theories describing what is spared
and what is lost in global amnesia (Table I-1, Figure I-1). Every
experiment tested one or more of the current theories directly.
Proceeding through the experiments in this theoretically driven
fashion made it possible for the results to be drawn together to
bear upon an integrated conclusion. Fourth, some of the
experiments were designed not only to see whether H.M. could learn
normally, but also to examine the mechanism of either successful or
failed learning. For example, words and nonwords were used as
stimuli in a perceptual learning paradigm in order to examine the
relationship between premorbid knowledge of a verbal stimulus and
the acquisition of skill in reading that stimulus. Consequently,
H.M.'s learning failures could bolster the understanding of his
successful learning. Fifth, examination of patients with memory
disorders due to other etiologies of global amnesia or to AD served
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to test some of the notions derived from studies with H.M., and to
broaden the scope of research about the neural basis of memory.
The three other patients with global amnesia, whose memory
disorders followed a bilateral stroke, herpes simplex encephalitis,
or Wernicke-Korsakoff's psychosis, are described in Appendix A.
The experiments described in this thesis were carried out over 4
years, so that H.M.'s age ranges from 57 in Experiment IV-2 to 60
in Experiment IX-4.
The experiments in Chapter IV examined whether the acquisition
of new semantic knowledge is intact in H.M., as hypothesized by
Kinsbourne and Wood (1975). The studies in Chapter V tested the
theory that H.M.'s amnesia is rooted in the failure of automatic
mnemonic processes that record knowledge about the spatiotemporal
context of experience.
Chapters VI through IX report the results of experiments
designed to examine H.M.'s possibly preserved learning of motor
skills, perceptual skills, problem-solving skills, and the intact
expression of priming. Throughout the experiments, two kinds of
measures of memory were taken. Measures of fact learning were
explicit demands for subjects to recall or recognize their prior
experience with a task or materials and stimuli encountered in the
task. Whenever possible, forced-choice recognition tests were
employed because they were most likely to detect the presence of
any fact learning (versus tests of recall or yes/no recognition
that are more sensitive to the responder's bias). Measures of
performance were changes in speed, accuracy, efficiency, or bias
consequent to experience with a task or stimulus. These changes in
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performance over time were taken as implicit evidence for learning
having occurred. Impaired fact learning accompanied by normal
changes in performance as consequences of the same experience were
interpreted as evidence for the dissociation between an injured and
a preserved memory system of the human brain. Thus, the
experimental isolation of intact from compromised learning
capacities in H.M. proceeded along multiple, parallel lines of
investigation aimed at a further understanding of a general model
of memory systems in the human brain.
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IV. ANTEROGRADE ACQUISITION OF SEMANTIC KNOWLEDGE
Patients with global amnesia have a marked impairment in
remembering personal and public events that they have experienced
through any sensory modality, subsequent to the onset of their
amnesia. Although such a pervasive anterograde amnesia may appear
to be total, this loss applies only to gaining new episodic
memories and does not address the status of semantic memory
(Tulving, 1982, 1983). The present experiments examined the
expression of postmorbid semantic memory in H.M.
Tulving (1982) has pointed out that only part of what we know
is stored as episodic memories: autobiographical records for
personally experienced events that occurred at a particular place
and time (temporal-spatial context). Memory for whether a stimulus
was included in a study list is an example of an episodic memory.
Much of our acquired knowledge, however, resides in semantic
memory, which includes organized knowledge of the word in a
context-free fashion. Examples are knowledge of language,
concepts, and history, and the rules, associations, and general
principles governing such knowledge. Memories of an incident at a
disco or of having seen the word "disco" in a list of words are
episodic memories. Knowledge that "disco" is a real word, that it
means a nightclub for dancing to music, and of how to read "disco"
resides in semantic memory. Episodic and semantic knowledge differ
in a number of features, but both sorts of knowledge are acquired
and retained and are therefore forms of memory.
No experiment has attempted to determine whether the
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acquisition of semantic knowledge, especially language, remains
preserved in the amnesia following bitemporal resection. Recent
studies on preserved learning capacities in amnesia and on language
acquisition in children provide several reasons for believing that
an amnesic patient could acquire semantic knowledge in a normal
fashion. Experimental analyses of amnesia have revealed some kinds
of new learning that appear to be normal or near-normal in even the
most severely amnesic patients. Amnesic patients, including H.M.,
have shown preserved learning capacities for certain motor skills
(Milner, 1962; Corkin, 1968; Starr and Phillips, 1970; Cermak et al
1973; Brooks and Baddeley, 1976), perceptual skills (Warrington and
Weiskrantz, 1968; Milner et al 1968; Cohen and Squire, 1980;
Martone et al. 1984; Cermak et al. 1985), and problem-solving
skills (Cohen and Corkin, 1981; Cohen, 1984). Also, exposure to a
word has been shown to influence, and usually facilitate,
subsequent verbal performance, such as completing letters into a
word (Warrington and Weiskrantz, 1970; Diamond and Rozin, 1984;
Graf et al., 1984), spelling homophones (Jacoby and Witherspoon,
1982), or providing examples in a category (Graf et al., 1985) just
as strongly in amnesic patients as in healthy subjects. What is
striking about this last set of results is that the amnesic
patients neither recalled nor recognized the very words that
influenced their subsequent verbal performance.
Taken together, the above experimental results demonstrated
that amnesic patients can show substantial and even normal
learning, as long as the measure is one of performance only
(sensorimotor efficiency, efficiency of perceptual identification,
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problem-solving mastery, or verbal production) and not of explicit
recall or recognition of either previously presented materials or
of the episodes in which those materials were presented. Given
such constraints, it seems possible that an amnesic patient could
learn what a word means (semantic knowledge) or that a group of
letters constitutes a real word (lexical knowledge). In neither
case is the amnesic subject asked to remember explicitly either
previously presented materials or the episodes in which those
materials were presented. Further bolstering the possibility of
intact language acquisition is the fact that many of the preserved
learning phenomena described above are overtly linguistic in
nature; naming words, pictures, and mirror-reversed text, spelling
homophones, completing letters into words, and producing members of
a semantic category.
Current knowledge concerning the acquisition of language in
children, including semantic and lexical acquisition, provides
ample evidence that such acquisition differs from the remembering
of past events or the rote learning of lists of words. Between the
ages of two and five, the average child learns the equivalent of 15
new words a day (Carey, 1978). Yet, such children retain few
episodic memories of events from that period and are not especially
good at rote learning of lists of stimuli. Thus, there must be an
impressive neural mechanism for language acquisition that is
unavailable for explicit recall or recognition of facts and events.
Such a mechanism could remain intact in amnesic patients.
Indeed, at least one theoretical description of what amnesic
patients can and cannot learn predicts explicitly that such
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patients should show intact language acquisition. Kinsbourne and
Wood (1972) proposed that amnesic patients have neurological damage
to brain structures that support the acquisition and recall of
episodic memories but not to those structures mediating the
acquisition and recall of semantic memories. Their proposal did
not distinguish between retrograde and anterograde portions of
amnesia. Rather, they suggested that the impairment of episodic
memory and the sparing of semantic memory apply equally to
premorbid and postmorbid experiences. "The ultimate test [of the
above theory] would be to abandon an amnesic in a foreign country
and see if he learns the language (as a child would, slowly) but
forgets having been there," (Wood and Kinsbourne, 1982 pp.
171-172).
Thus, there are a number of reasons to hypothesize that a
patient with anterograde amnesia could acquire knowledge about the
semantic and lexical status of a word, and there is no evidence
that such a patient could not do so. Perhaps the most interesting
patient with whom to test this hypothesis is the well-studied H.M.,
who has had a profound anterograde amnesia since 1953. His case
demonstrated the critical contribution of medial temporal-lobe
structures to the formation of episodic memories (Milner and
Scoville, 1957), and provided the first documentation of a
preserved learning capacity in amnesia (Milner, 1962). Because he
has manifested a number of preserved learning capacities, he is a
good candidate in whom to demonstrate intact semantic learning
despite amnesia, if semantic learning (as defined by learning the
meaning of words) is mediated by different psychological mechanisms
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and neural circuits from those supporting episodic learning.
The hypothesis of normal language acquisition in amnesia was
tested with H.M. in two different but complementary ways. In one
experiment, he was given extensive training with obscure words
under laboratory conditions. A second set of experiments examined
H.M.'s semantic and lexical knowledge of words that had entered the
English language after his operation in 1953, and that he may have
experienced more ecologically.
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Experiment 1: Learning the Meanings of Words
The question to be answered by Experiment 1 was whether
amnesic patients could learn such semantic knowledge in the face of
their impairment in acquiring episodic knowledge. Accordingly,
these tasks were designed in order to teach amnesic patients and
control subjects the meanings of eight words that are known by few
people. The tasks involved learning by means of definitions, and
semantic context. It is important to note how this experiment met
the formal criteria for showing preserved learning in anterograde
amnesia. Learning was measured implicitly by improvement in
performance with the eight words as a consequence of prior
experience with the same material. Amnesic patients were never
asked to remember whether they had seen the eight words before,
what words they had seen before, or what sessions, if any, had
occurred previously with the eight words, they were never asked to
recall or recognize any explicit, episodic aspect of prior
experience with the eight words. The task was overtly linguistic:
acquiring semantic knowledge about uncommon words.
Method
Subjects
There were two amnesic and seven control subjects. The
amnesic patients were H.M. (60 years old, 12 years of education),
and a woman (patient #7439, Appendix A) with KS (48 years old, 12
years of education). The seven control subjects were men with a
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mean age of 53.9 years (range 46-69), whose mean years of education
was 14.8 (range 10-16).
Materials and Procedure
The stimuli used in this experiment were eight uncommon words:
quotidian, manumit, hegira, anchorite, minatory, egress, welkin,
and tyro. The test was presented on an amber Comrex CR-5600 video
screen controlled by an Apple lie microcomputer. For each word, a
definition, a common single-word synonym, and a semantically
related sentence frame were developed. Testing consisted of three
phases. In Phase 1, each uncommon word was presented individually
with a single definition. Subjects were asked to read each word
and definition aloud, and were warned that they would be tested on
the material. Then, the uncommon words were presented individually
at the bottom of the screen, below the eight definitions. The
subject had to select the correct definition. If the subject made
a correct choice, that definition was removed from the display, and
the next target word appeared. If the subject made an incorrect
choice, the examiner pointed out the error and the subject had to
select another definition. This procedure continued for each word
until the correct definition had been selected. If a subject made
any error in the set of eight word-definition selections, another
set of eight word-definition selections occurred. A subject had to
meet a criterion of matching all eight words in a set to their
correct definitions before going on to Phase 2. In Phase 2,
subjects were presented with the same eight words, one at a time,
and with a common, single-word synonym. Again, subjects were
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warned that they would be tested on the synonyms. Then they saw
one test word appear below a display of the eight synonyms, and had
to select the correct synonym. As in the definition test, correct
answers were removed from the choice list, and the examiner
informed the subject of all incorrect responses. Subjects had to
match all eight words with their synonyms within a single set in
order to complete the synonym-test phase. In Phase 3, subjects saw
all eight uncommon words in a display appearing above a single
sentence in which a word was missing. The semantic content of the
sentence frame indicated which word would best complete the
sentence. If a subject selected the correct word, that word was
removed from the set. If a subject selected an incorrect word, the
subject was informed of the error and asked to select another word.
Subjects had to select all eight words in a set correctly for
testing to end; an error in a set led to another set of sentence
completions.
Results
Performance was analyzed in three ways: trials-to-criterion
(Figure IV-1), total errors (Figure IV-2), and mean errors per
trial (Figure IV-3) made during each phase of the test (Table
IV-1). For normal subjects, the mean number of trials to criterion
was 7.3, mean errors 7.0, and mean errors per trial 0.7. Patient
#7439 did not reach criterion on either of the first two phases;
testing was aborted after failure to reach criterion on 20
consecutive trials in each phase. She did reach criterion Phase 3
after 15 trials. Some learning is evident in her reaching
criterion in the final phase, and in her decreasing number of
errors (296, 256, 122) and number of errors per trial (14.8, 12.8,
8.1) across the three phases. H.M. did not reach criterion on any
phase; testing was aborted after 20 trials in each phase. H.M.
also showed some meager learning across the phases, with his errors
(287, 227, 224) and errors per trial (14.3, 11.4, 11.2) decreasing
across the phases.
The minor learning by the amnesic patients, however, should
not obscure the major deficit that they had in learning the
meanings of the eight words. The magnitude of H.M.'s deficit is
underestimated, because testing was aborted in each phase. If H.M.
had continued to reduce his errors per trial at the same rate, his
estimated number of trials to achieve the criterion reached by
normal subjects in 7.3 trials and by Patient #7439 in 55 trials
would be 335.
Figure IV-1. Trials-to-criterion for normal control
subjects (NCS), H.M., and patient #7439 (KS) in Experiment 1.
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Figure IV-2. Total errors for normal control subjects (NCS),
H.M., and patient #7439 (KS) in Experiment 1.
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Figure IV-3. Errors-per-trial for normal control
subjects (NCS), H.M. and patient #7439 (KS) in
Experiment 1.
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Table IV-1. PERFORMANCE OF SUBJECTS ON WORD LEARNING TEST
Experimental Errors
Subjects Phase Trials-To-Criterion Errors per trial
Control Definitions
Synonyms
Sentences
Total
3.1 (2.3)a
1.6 (2.2)
2.6 (1.3)
7.3 (4.0)
3.7 (4.2)
0.9 (1.9)
2.4 (2.1)
7.0 (7.1)
0.7 (0.8)
0.3 (0.5)
0.7 (0.5)
0.7 ( .57)
Definitions
Synonyms
Sentences
Total
Definitions
Synonyms
Sentences
Total
a standard deviation
H.M.
#7439
(KS)
20.0
20.0
20.0
60.0
20.0
20.0
15.0
55.0
287.0
227.0
224.0
738.0
296.0
256.0
122.0
674.0
14.3
11.4
11.2
12.3
14.8
12.8
8.1
12.5
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The possibility that H.M. learned some words but not others
was considered. H.M. apparently knew the meaning of tyro, because
he selected the correct definition and synonym every time, and the
correct sentence on 18 of 20 trials. However, he never mastered
the meaning of any other word and his errors per word on the final
phase ranged from 20 for egress to 50 for anchorite, averaging at
least one error for each presentation of every word except tyro.
Thus, H.M. did not learn the semantic value of any word that he did
not know prior to testing.
A second source of failure was considered, namely that H.M.
was confused by the large number of choices (eight) at the
beginning of each trial. If H.M. had been affected by the sheer
number of choices, he should have performed more accurately,
relative to chance, as the selections were removed after each
correct answer and chance moved from .125 (one of eight choices) to
.50 (one of two choices). In fact, the ratio of errors to chance
performance did not change as a function of reduced multiple
choices, holding nearly steady at .68 (eight-choice) to .65
(two-choice) in the dfinition phase, .61 to .57 in the synonym
phase, and .68 to .65 in the sentence phase. In other words,
H.M.'s probability of selecting a correct answer was not affected
by the number of choices.
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Discussion
The results provided unequivocal evidence that H.M. could not
learn, in a laboratory setting, the meaning of any word that he did
not already know. The KS patient, while not as impaired as H.M.,
was also severely impaired relative to control subjects. It does
seem, therefore, that amnesic patients cannot acquire semantic
knowledge in a normal fashion. It is important to note that this
experiment addressed only the learning of new semantic knowledge,
and not the status of premorbidly acquired semantic knowledge.
Semantic memory for knowledge acquired well before the onset of his
amnesia appears to be quite intact in H.M. (see the following
experiment).
H.M.'s failure to learn the meaning of a word after an average
of 106 training trials per word is reminiscent of his inability to
learn a 7-digit series despite 25 consecutive presentations
(Drachman and Arbit, 1966), a visual stylus maze after 215 trials
(Milner, 1965), or a tactual stylus maze after 80 trials (Corkin,
1965). The earlier experiments involved recall for nonmeaningful
material, and the present experiment multiple-choice recognition
for meaningful material. H.M. benefitted neither from the change
in method of testing nor from the greater meaningfulness of the
stimuli. Amnesic patients, including H.M., have shown good
learning on tasks involving multiple repetitions of mirror-tracing,
rotary pursuit, and hard-to-perceive figures and words (e.g.,
Milner, 1962; Corkin, 1968; Milner et al., 1968; Warrington and
Weiskrantz, 1968, 1970; Cermak et al., 1973; Brooks and Baddeley,
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1976; Cohen and Squire, 1980). Because H.M. did not benefit from
the multiple repetitions of the digit series, maze routes, or word
meanings, the conclusion is that multiple repetitions per se do not
underlie preserved learning for motor and perceptual skills in
amnesia.
It may be argued that this experiment is not a true test of
the acquisition of semantic knowledge because it is essentially an
eight-item paired-associated learning paradigm and thus a test of
episodic memory. This view may be true, but then the use of the
term semantic to describe a preserved learning capacity that does
not include learning the meaning of words is bound to create
confusion. Although distinctions can be made between semantic and
episodic memory, the present experiment does not support the idea
that those two kinds of memory are differentially susceptible to
brain injury.
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Experiment 2a: Lexical and Semantic Knowledge for Words Entering
the Language After H.M.'s Operation
The results of Experiment 1 suggested that H.M. could not
learn the meaning of a word that he did not already know. The
advantage of such a laboratory paradigm was that exhaustive
presentation and testing of semantic knowledge was conducted in a
strictly controlled fashion. The disadvantage was that H.M.'s
semantic acquisition abilities might not have been ecologically
engaged in the experimental paradigm and thus might have been
intact but unexpressed. People normally learn the meaning of new
words in their language under entirely different circumstances from
those present in the laboratory. The circumstances often include
exposure to an initially unknown word in a variety of meaningful
contexts, in a number of separated episodes, and in the course of
motivated experiences, i.e., people see or hear the word while
pursuing an interest. In fact, several studies showing the
powerful mechanisms subserving language acquisition in children are
not engaged if children are drilled so as to learn semantic values
of nonsense words (reviewed in Carey, 1978). It therefore became
important to discover whether H.M. had acquired some knowledge of
words that were new to the English language since his operation in
1953, and that he may have encountered in daily life. Furthermore,
it was of interest to probe H.M.'s knowledge of new words at a
variety of levels. H.M.'s semantic knowledge was examined in tests
of recall and recognition of word definitions; the latter permitted
him to demonstrate an existent but impoverished knowledge of the
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meaning of new words. Also assessed was H.M.'s lexical knowledge
(the knowledge that a string of letters constitutes a real word in
the English language) of words that came into the language after
1953. It was possible that H.M. knew that a new word was a real
word without knowing the meaning of that word; this experience is
not uncommon in healthy people. Thus, H.M.'s lexical knowledge
could have grown independently of his semantic knowledge for the
same material. In addition, H.M.'s ability to perceive and
pronounce new words was examined in a paradigm in which H.M. has
shown normal long-term learning.
Note that in Experiment 2a, as in Experiment 1, H.M. and other
subjects were never asked to recall or recognize any particular
experience with a word, and that the consequences of experience
were measured strictly in performance with a word that had
presumably been experienced in naturally occurring episodes of
H.M.'s life.
Method
Subjects
H.M. and 7 male normal control subjects took the recall and
recognition vocabulary tests. The control subjects' mean age (53.4
years, range 46-63 years) and years of education (mean 13, range
10-16) were comparable to H.M.'s (age 57, and 12 years of
education). H.M. and 4 of the control subjects (mean age, 56.7;
mean years of education, 12.0) also took the lexical decision test.
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Materials and Procedure
The lexical decision test was given on a Comrex CR-5600 amber
video screen controlled by an Apple IIe microcomputer. The recall
and recognition tests were administered in paper-and-pencil format.
The critical test stimuli were 45 words (new words) added to
the Merriam-Webster Dictionary in supplements published in 1954 (17
words), 1959 (1 word), 1966 (5 words), 1971 (8 words), 1976 (9
words), and 1981 (5 words) (Appendix B, Table 1). These words were
chosen so as to be suitable for lexical decision and definition
tests according to two criteria: (a) that each was sufficiently
common that normal control subjects with a high school education
could demonstrate lexical and semantic knowledge of the words in
the performance tests; and (b) that neither the meanings of the
words nor the fact that they were real words in the English
language could have been deduced logically by analysis of the
apparent root or components of the word. The 45 words that met
these criteria were used in the lexical decision, recall, and
recognition phases of the experiment, in that order. In addition,
H.M. was given recall and recognition tests of definitions of words
and phrases not suitable for lexical decision, e.g., angel dust,
closet queen, cut-offs.
Lexical decision. For every one of the 45 new words (new to
the dictionary since 1953), four old words of equal letter length
were selected. Two of the old words were high frequency
(90/million or higher) and two were low frequency (1/million)
(Kucera & Francis, 1967). For every such set of four old words,
one of the high frequency and one of the low frequency words were
72
converted into pronounceable pseudowords (nonwords) by replacing
one vowel and one consonant with another vowel and consonant.
Thus, five sets of 45 items were systematically generated: new
words, old words of high frequency, old words of low frequency,
pseudowords derived from old high-frequency words, and pseudowords
derived from old low-frequency words. The items were then assigned
pseudorandomly to positions in five blocks with the following
constraints: All blocks contained the same number of items from
each of five sets, the blocks contained the same average word
length, there were never more than five words or nonwords in a row,
and there were never more than three items from the same set in a
row. A practice set of 24 items preceded the test. It comprised
old words, including 6 high-frequency and 6 low-frequency words,
and 12 pseudowords generated as above. At the beginning of the
experimental sessions, subjects were instructed to decide as
quickly and accurately as possible whether a string of letters
constituted a real English-language word. They were told that this
test was not meant to be a difficult spelling test and to treat
slang words as words. The response was a two-choice reaction time
measure: Subjects pressed a button on the keyboard with their
right hand if the answer for a probe was yes, and another button
with the left hand for no. Two cards, with the words Yes and No on
them, remained above the appropriate keys throughout the testing
session. On every trial, subjects heard a warning signal. One
second later, the following display appeared in the center of the
video screen: IS THE FOLLOWING A REAL WORD? After 500 msec, the
probe item appeared in the center of the screen in capital letters.
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The probe remained on the screen until the subject responded, and
then it disappeared. Three seconds intervened between the
disappearance of the probe and the succeeding warning signal. A
one-minute rest period followed after every 45 probes. The entire
testing session lasted about 40 minutes.
Recall of word definitions. Two tests demanding recall of
word meanings were given. The Vocabulary subtest of the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale - Revised (WAIS-R) was administered in the
standard fashion (Wechsler, 1981), whereby the examiner said each
word aloud and asked the subject to provide a definition orally.
All of the 35 words had been in the language well before 1953. A
recall test for the 45 new words seen in the lexical decision test
was given in an identical fashion, except that the subject saw and
heard every word.
Recognition of word definitions. Subjects received a
recognition test for the same 45 new words seen in the lexical
decision and recall tests. For each new word, subjects had to
select the correct definition from among four multiple choices.
The test words and multiple choices were presented in a booklet;
prior to selecting each answer, subjects heard each word read
aloud.
Results
It is likely that some or all of the words that entered the
dictionary during the 1950s were in common usage prior to H.M.'s
operation. Thus, for all analyses, the 45 new words were divided
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into two sets: words that entered the dictionary during the 1950s
(around the time of H.M.'s operation) and words that entered the
dictionary after 1960 (well after H.M.'s operation in 1953).
H.M.'s scores were designated "normal" if they were within one
standard deviation of the mean score of the normal control
subjects; "borderline" if they were more than one but less than two
standard deviations below the mean of the normal control subjects;
and "markedly impaired" if they were inferior by more than two
standard deviations.
Recall of word meanings
For both the WhAIS-R Vocabulary subtests and the 45 new words,
a definition received two points if it was a good definition, and
one point if it was a poor definition that nevertheless revealed
some sense of the word's meaning. Recall for the WAIS-R Vocabulary
subtest was scored as a percentage of the perfect score of 70, and
for the 45 new words as a percentage of the perfect scores of 36
for the 1950s words, and of 54 for the post1950s (1960s, 1970s,
1980s) words (Figure IV-4).
H.M. performed normally on the pre1950s words; his score of
61.4% correct was comparable to the control group's mean score of
67.7% (SD = 15.3). For words that entered the dictionary during
the 1950s, the control group's mean score was 70.6% (SD = 18.3)
compared to H.M.'s score of 38.9%, a borderline deficit and the
lowest of any subject. For words that entered the dictionary since
1960, the control group's mean score was 57.2% (SD = 14.0) and H.M.
scored 13%, a marked impairment.
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Figure IV-4. Mean percentage of word definitions recalled
(top panel) and recognized (bottom panel) by normal control
subjects (NCS), and H.M. in Experiment 2a.
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Recognition of word meanings
The results of the recognition test with the definitions of
the 45 new words were calculated as a percentage of perfect scores
of 18 for the 1950s words and 27 for the post1950s words. Chance
performance consisted of a 25% score. For words entering the
dictionary during the 1950s, the control group averaged 92.8%
correct (SD = 7.6) compared to H.M.'s 55.6% correct (Figure IV-5).
For words entering the dictionary since 1960, the mean percent
correct for the control group was 83.1% (SD = 10.4) compared to
H.M.'s 37.0%. Thus, H.M. showed markedly impaired recognition for
the meaning of words that entered the dictionary after his
operation.
Lexical decision test
The lexical decision data were scored as percent correct
responses, i.e., "yes" responses for words and "no" responses for
nonwords (Figure IV-5). For identification of pre1950s words as
words, H.M.'s 92.2% score was equivalent to the 93% mean score of
the control group (SD = 3). H.M.'s ability to categorize nonwords
as nonwords was borderline; he scored 87.7% as compared to the
control group's mean score of 94% (SD = 3.1). H.M. designated
70.6% of the 1950s words as words compared to the control groups
average of 82% (SD = 10.6). For words entering the dictionary
since 1960, H.M. identified one out of two (50%) words as words,
whereas the control group averaged 76.5% correct responses (SD =
10.8). Thus, H.M.'s ability to recognize a word that entered the
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dictionary since his operation as a word per se was borderline for
the 1950s and markedly impaired for the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.
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Experiment 2b: Identification of Incomplete Words Entering the
Language After H.M.'s Operation
H.M. showed normal long-term learning when asked to reread
words aloud that were presented in a perceptually difficult
condition (Chapter VII, Experiment 2). This same method was used
for presentation of the new words, old words, and nonwords shown in
the lexical decision experiment. H.M. simply had to read the words
aloud as soon as he could perceive them. H.M.'s knowledge of the
new words was measured by contrasting his speed of perceiving and
reading the new words versus the nonwords. The stimuli included
the 45 new words from the original experiment and an additional
block with 9 more recent new words (Appendix B, Table 1).
Method
Subjects
H.M. and a normal control subject, matched by sex, age (59
years to H.M.'s 60 years) and education (12 years for both
subjects).
Materials and Procedure
The stimuli were those used in the lexical decision task of
Experiment 2a, presented in the same order as before. An
additional block with 9 new words, 9 high-frequency words, 9
low-frequency words, and 18 nonwords were added; this block had the
same structure as the earlier blocks (Experiment 2a). The stimuli
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were presented in large, 1/2" graphic letters. A stimulus appeared
initially such that 70% of the display was obscured by a field, or
blanket, of randomly placed dots (or noise). Pilot studies had
shown that no subject could read the stimulus correctly with 70%
noise. The noise was removed slowly in 60 equal steps of 1.2% per
step so that after 15 seconds the word appeared without any noise.
Subjects were seated 1 meter from the monitor, and were asked to
read aloud the word or nonword as soon as they could. Upon a
correct reading, the examiner pressed a key that recorded the time
to read correctly. The stimuli stayed on until the subjects read
them.
Results
The mean times to read sets of words correctly were
calculated, the sets being (a) high-frequency words, (b)
low-frequency words, (c) nonwords, (d) 1950s words and (e)
postl950s words. The normal control subject averaged 5.4 seconds
for the high-frequency words to H.M.'s 5.1 seconds, 6.1 sec to 9.2
sec for low-frequency words, 7.8 sec to 13.6 sec for nonwords, 6.7
sec to 11.4 sec for 1950s words, and 6.5 sec to 14.8 sec for
post1950s words. The control subject was 17% faster in reading for
new words (6.5 sec) than nonwords (7.8 sec), but H.M.'s speed of
identification of the new words (13.7 sec) and nonwords (13.6 sec)
was almost equal. By this measure of semantic knowledge of new
words, a measure that included perceptual identification and
pronunciation, H.M. showed no knowledge whatsoever of the new
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words.
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Experiment 3: Lexical Knowledge for Names of People Who Became
Famous After H.M.'s Operation
A second realm of semantic memory that could have been spared
in H.M. is knowledge of the names of famous people. Knowledge of
this sort is partially linguistic (names) and partially dependent
upon experience with world events. A minimal expression of
knowledge for the names of famous people would be the ability to
recognize a famous name as such. This capacity is somewhat
analogous to recognition of a word as a word (lexical decision).
The participants in Experiment 3 were asked to decide whether a
name they saw was that of a famous person; half of the names were
those of famous people and half were those of nonfamous people. As
in Experiment 1 knowledge of famous names was measured by
performance, and subjects were never asked to recall or to
recognize the prior experiences that formed the basis of their
performance on this test.
Another reason to hypothesize that H.M. would do well on such
a test was based upon his ability to recognize public figures from
news photographs (Marslen-Wilson and Teuber, 1975). H.M. and
control subjects were tested for their unprompted and prompted
recognition of public figures who had become famous in each decade
from the 1920s to the 1960s. The subjects were asked first to
identify the faces of famous people without prompts. H.M.
correctly identified people who came to fame prior to the onset of
his amnesia (in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s) at a normal rate
(Figure IV-6). He was impaired, however, in identifying the faces
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Figure IV-6. Mean percentage correct identifications of
faces unprompted (top panel) and prompted (bottom panel)
in each decade for H.M. and normal control subjects
(from Marslem-Wilson and Teuber 1975).
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of people who became famous after his operation, in the 1950s and
1960s. Subjects were also provided semantic and phonemic prompts
for the public figures whom they had been unable to identify. With
these cues, H.M.'s performance improved and was nearly
indistinguishable from the means of the prompted normal subjects
for all decades (Figure IV-6); a ceiling effect, however, is
apparent for the normal control group. Recently, Weiskrantz (1985)
has cited H.M.'s good prompted performance as evidence that H.M.'s
deficit is primarily one of retrieval; the prompts can only aid in
retrieving knowledge that has been encoded and consolidated.
H.M.'s good prompted performance, irrespective of its mechanism,
suggested that he might have had more knowledge of the names of
public figures then previously suspected.
Method
Subjects
H.M., aged 57, and 4 male normal control subjects (mean age,
51.0 years, mean years of education, 14.1) participated in this
experiment.
Materials and Procedure
The stimuli were names of people who had come to fame between
1930 and 1983. Four names in each of five career categories (movie
stars, athletes, American politicians, foreign leaders, and
writers) for each of six decades (1930s, 1940s, 1950s, 1960s,
1970s, and 1980s), giving a total of 120 famous names. Some of the
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criteria used in assigning the decade in which a person came to
fame were as follows: movie stars were assigned to the decade in
which they first received an Academy Award (Oscar) nomination;
authors to the decade in which they first received a Pulitzer
Prize; baseball players to the decade in which they first won any
sort of batting title or a most valuable player award; football
players to the decade in which they received a Heisman Trophy as
the outstanding collegiate player; tennis players to the decade in
which they first won a Grand Slam tournament; and boxers to the
decade in which they won a title.
For each famous name, a nonfamous name was selected from the
Boston area telephone book that matched the ethnic quality of the
famous name. The famous and nonfamous names were randomly assigned
to four blocks of trials with the following constraints: each
block contained an equal number of famous and nonfamous names;
there were never more than three famous names from the same
category or decade in a row; and within each set of 30 there was
one famous name from each category and decade. A practice set
given prior to the test consisted of the names of 12 people who
were famous before 1920 and 12 nonfamous names. Subjects were
instructed to decide as quickly and as accurately as possible
whether the name they saw was that of a famous person. It was also
explained that the task was not to decide whether a familiar name
was well-known enough to qualify as famous, but rather to treat any
familiar name as famous so long as it was not the name of a
personal acquaintance. If the name was that of a famous person
they pressed a key with their right hand; above the key was a card
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with the word YES. If the name was not that of a famous person,
subjects pressed another key with their left hand; above that key
was a card with the word NO. An auditory warning signal preceded
each trial. One second later, the following display appeared at
the top of the computer screen: IS OR WAS THE FOLLOWING A FAMOUS
PERSON? After 500 msec, a name appeared in capital letters in the
center of the screen. After the subject's response, the name
disappeared and 3 seconds elapsed until a warning signal initiated
the next trial.
Results
H.M.'s ability to reject nonfamous names (72.3% correct) was
comparable to the performance of the normal control group
(mean=81.4%, SD = 13.7). Identification of famous names was scored
by decades (Figure IV-7). H.M.'s identification of people who came
to fame in the 1930s and 1940s (premorbidly) was normal (87.5%
versus control group mean score of 84.2%, SD = 14.7). For people
who came to fame during the 1950s, H.M.'s score of 70% was one
standard deviation (13.8) below the 81.3% mean percentage correct
of the control group. Finally, for people who came to fame in the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, and who were almost certainly unknown to
H.M. premorbidly, his 53.3% performance was about two standard
deviations (14.1) below the 80% mean percentage correct of the
normal control group.
Discussion
0A NCS (n:4)
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Figure IV-7. Mean percentage of names classified correctly by normal
control subjects (NCS) and H.M. in Experiment 2b.
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The main results of Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3 were that H.M.
was normal on several measures of premorbid semantic knowledge,
moderately impaired on semantic knowledge from the 1950s, and
severely impaired for semantic knowledge from 1960 onward. The
more moderate impairment in knowledge from the 1950s may result
from the actual prevalence of some of that knowledge in the 1940s.
Because this possibility is difficult to evaluate, this discussion
will focus on the contrast between H.M.'s memory for premorbidly
known words and names and the post1950s words and names, which he
encountered only after the onset of his anterograde amnesia.
H.M.'s recall and recognition of word definitions for post1950s
words were clearly impaired. His performance on the lexical
decision task, however, was better than might have been expected
from the recall and recognition scores. If H.M. treated post1950s
words as nonwords, he should have categorized only 12.2% (his false
positive rate for nonwords) of postl950s words as words, whereas
his actual rate of correct verification was over four times that
(50%). Also, H.M. was the only subject to score higher on the
lexical decision test than on the recognition test for the
post1950s words: 50% versus 37% for H.M., 76.5% versus 83.1% for
the normal control group. Thus, in two respects H.M.'s lexical
decision performance was better than his word recognition
performance. It should be noted, however, that some of H.M.'s
relatively good performance on the new words may have been due to
the nature of the nonwords. Although the nonwords were constructed
to be pronounceable, the orthographic character of the nonwords was
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almost certainly less approximating that of true English words than
were the new words. Consequently, cues may have been provided that
bolstered H.M.'s performance on the new words. This possibility,
however, does not dismiss H.M.'s better than chance performance,
because normal subjects had the same cues and did not perform
outstandingly on the new words. Even with these possible cues,
H.M. was as likely to call a new word a nonword as he was to call
it a word. Furthermore, his performance on the perceptual
identification task (Experiment 2b) was almost identical for words
and nonwords.
H.M.'s errors on recall and recognition of the meanings of
postl950s words (Appendix B, Tables 2 and 3) revealed not only his
deficit in semantic knowledge of those words, but also an
intelligent approach toward guessing their meanings. Many of his
errors showed efforts to construe literal meanings from the
components of words and phrases. This approach is similar to what
one would expect from a foreigner with schoolbook knowledge of
English who confronts such colloquial terms.
There appears to be some contradiction between H.M.'s impaired
recognition of names of people who became famous after his
operation (Experiment 3), and his ability to provide the names of
famous people when prompted (Marslen-Wilson and Teuber, 1975).
Both tests probed for the maximal expression of minimal knowledge
of the names of public figures. In order to reconcile this
apparent paradox, we examined retrospectively H.M.'s performance on
two later administrations (1977 and 1980) of the same test
involving recognition of public figures from news photographs
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(Sullivan and Corkin, unpublished data); this test also included 14
new photographs of people who became well known in the 1970s (Moon
and Corkin, unpublished data). We also examined the scores of
three normal subjects (mean age, 48 years) tested in the same time
period. H.M.'s unprompted scores on the two later test
administrations were similar to his scores from the two
administrations reported earlier by Marslen-Wilson and Teuber: 50%
(earlier) versus 29% (later) for the 1920s, 71% versus 59% for the
1930s, 68% versus 65% for the 1940s, 13% versus 18% for the 1950s,
1% versus 13% for the 1960s, and 13% for the 1970s (not previously
shown to H.M.). The pattern of intact memory of public figures
from his premorbid period and impaired memory for such figures from
his postmorbid period was again evident (Figures IV-6 and IV-8).
Unlike Marslen-Wilson and Teuber, we scored the semantically and
phonemically prompted identifications separately, each as a
percentage of possible figures identified by that type of cue. As
in the Marslen-Wilson and Teuber procedure, the subjects attempted
to identify the famous people without prompts, then received
semantic prompts for figures not identified, and then received
phonemic prompts for figures not identified with semantic prompts.
The semantic prompts provided a number of facts about the
unidentified famous person (e.g., for Alfred Landon "He was the
Republican presidential nominee in 1936; he ran against Roosevelt
and lost; he was also governor of Kansas.") The phonemic prompts
provided an increasing number of letters in the first and last
names of the public figures, moving from initials and ending with
almost the whole name provided until the subject could produce the
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Figure IV-8. Percentage correct identification of faces (unprompted)
in each decade for normal control subjects (NCS) and H.M.
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correct name. For Alfred Landon the phonemic cues were "A.L., Alf.
L, Alfred L., Alfred Lan., Alfred Land." H.M. used the semantic
prompts as well as the normal subjects for his premorbid period
(1920s-1940s): He correctly identified 28% of the public figures
versus a mean of 35% (SD = 12) for the normal subjects (Figure
IV-9). His successful use of semantic prompts for figures in the
1950s-1970s fell to 2%, whereas the normal subjects scored a higher
21% (SD = 8). Thus, H.M.'s semantic knowledge of the faces and
names of public figures from the time after his operation was as
impaired as the results of Experiment 3 suggested. H.M.'s
performance with the phonemic prompts, 77% for premorbid figures
and 69% for postmorbid figures, showed a smaller decrease following
his operation and resembled those of the normal subjects (74% for
1920s-1940s, 89% for 1950s-1970s) (Figure IV-9). Even these
scores, though, underestimated H.M.'s postmorbid impairment. In
order to achieve his premorbid phonemically prompted
identification, H.M. required a mean of 2.7 prompts to the mean of
2.1 for the normal subjects. For successful phonemic prompting for
postmorbid figures, H.M. required a mean of 3.2 prompts to the mean
of 2.1 for the normal subjects. Thus, H.M. required more phonemic
prompts to achieve the correct postmorbid identifications relative
to his own premorbid identifications and to those of normal
subjects. Taken together, these retrospective analyses suggest
that H.M. was severely impaired in all aspects of acquiring the
semantic knowledge tested for by the Marslen-Wilson and Teuber
method. On the two later test occasions, he identified only 2 of
95 public figures from the 1950s-1970s period with the aid of
93
-- -- Ns (n=3)
"'Do-* W
-- 0-- tNS (n=3)
.---- w
I.
190
Decade
Figure IV-9. Mean percentage correct identification of faces in each
decade for normal control subjects (NCS) and H.M., following semantic
prompts (top panel) and phonemic prompts (bottom panel).
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semantic prompts. These two were Mao Tse Tung, a 1960s figure in
the test who became the leader of China in 1947 (the first semantic
prompt) and Lyndon Baines Johnson, who had been active in national
politics since the late 1940s. H.M.'s performance with phonemic
cues also was impaired for the period of this anterograde amnesia,
but perhaps somewhat better than would be guessed from his poor use
of semantic cues. Perhaps he provided some of the names via a
priming-like activation by the phonemic cues of his poor but not
entirely absent familiarity with famous names, illustrated in
Experiment 3. If so, he was not so much identifying a figure as
completing the phonemic cues to the first name that came to mind.
In any case, it is difficult, upon close retrospective examination
of these data, to conclude that successful encoding and storage of
semantic information occurred in H.M., as Weiskrantz (1985) has
proposed.
In summary, the results of Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3 do not
reveal a semantic memory that has missed the last 32 years
entirely. H.M.'s performances on the analogous lexical decision
test for new words and the famous names test show some meager
consequence of these 32 years of experience. Nevertheless, H.M.'s
recall and recognition for the meanings of words, decisions about
the lexical status of words, ability to perceive and pronounce
words, and knowledge of famous names from the period of his
anterograde amnesia were all severely impaired. Semantic memory
for experiences prior to the onset of his amnesia appeared to be
normal for H.M. as far as it was assessed in these experiments.
Semantic memory for experiences subsequent to the onset of the
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amnesia were impaired by implicit and explicit performance
measures. The evidence, therefore, indicated that the acquisition
of semantic knowledge depends upon the same limbic structures of
the medial temporal-lobe as does the acquisition of episodic
knowledge. The two forms of memory share a common brain basis.
H.M. has not "learn(ed)" the language (as a child would, slowly)"
(Wood and Kinsbourne, 1982). Rather, H.M.'s anterograde amnesia
has rendered him an alien in his own land, and modern-day English
has become, for him, a partially foreign language.
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V. ANTEROGRADE ACQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE FOR CONTENT AND CONTEXT
Experiment 1: Verbal Temporal Ordering
These experiments examined whether the global amnesia pursuant
to bilateral medial temporal-lobe resection is secondary to a more
fundamental disturbance of remembering the context of an event
(where, how recently, or how often the event occurred). After
reviewing many studies, Stern (1981) and Hirst (1982) concluded
that damage to psychological mechanisms that record contextual
information lies at the root of the amnesic syndrome, irrespective
of the etiology of the amnesia.
Memory for an event may be subjectively experienced as a
whole, but is probably constructed from multiple representations
and processes that congregate about separable features of that
event. Studies of normal human memory suggest that two kinds of
mnemonic features are those related to the content and to the
temporospatial context of an event. Support for this dichotomy was
marshalled in Hasher and Zacks' (1979) review of a large number of
studies, all showing that the experimental variables that strongly
influenced the level of memory for content of an event exerted
little if any influence upon three sorts of contextual memory for
the same event: its recency, frequency, and spatial location.
Memory for content, but not context, was powerfully affected by
intentionality of encoding (versus incidental encoding), by
instructions and practice, and by concurrent tests that divided
attention during encoding. Hasher and Zacks proposed that memory
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for content depends upon effortful processes that are influenced by
the above factors, whereas memory for context relies upon automatic
processes that are immune to these factors. This view has been
challenged and exceptions found (e.g., Fisk and Schneider, 1984;
Greene, 1984; Noveh-Benjamin, and Tonides, 1986), but the
distinction between effortful encoding of content and automatic
encoding of context does provide a unifying framework for many
experimental results. Memory for content and context normally
interact with each other, and their interrelationship is attested
to by experiments showing that contextual cues aid in the recall of
content. For example, subjects had a 30% decrement in recall of
word lists learned either on a beach or under 15 feet of water if
they had to recall in the other place (context) rather than the
same one (Godden and Baddeley, 1975). One more complication,
however, is that there is little or no effect of such context on
recognition memory for words (Godden and Baddeley, 1980; Smith et
al., 1978).
Since these two kinds of memory interact in the course of
normal human remembering, some information about their separateness
could come from patients with brain injuries that impair memory for
one but not the other class of mnemonic features. Moreover, to the
extent that the brain injury is localized, it may be possible to
identify the neural bases for the different kinds of memory.
Evidence of separate brain bases for memory for content and context
began with patients who had received a unilateral cortical excision
in either frontal or temporal neocortex for relief of epilepsy
(Milner, 1970; Corsi, 1972). Patients who had undergone left or
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right temporal lobectomy were impaired in recognizing which words
or pictures, respectively, they had seen in a study list, but were
unimpaired in recognizing which of two they had seen more recently.
Patients with left or right frontal-lobe removals were unimpaired
in recognizing which words or pictures they had seen in the study
lists, but impaired at recognizing which of two words or pictures,
respectively, they had seen more recently in the list. Thus, there
were two double dissociations: an interhemispheric one between left
specialization for verbal and right specialization for nonverbal
material, and an intrahemispheric one between recognition for
content, dependent upon the temporal lobe, and recognition for
recency, dependent upon the frontal lobe.
Memory for verbal and nonverbal content is impaired in global
amnesia, but memory for context may vary, depending upon the
etiology of the amnesia and the locus of lesion. Amnesic patients
with Korsakoff's syndrome (KS) have been reported to exhibit
disturbances in recognition of recency (Squire, 1982) and frequency
(Huppert and Piercy, 1976; Meudell et al., 1985) worse than would
be expected for their impaired content recognition. Patients with
amnesia following electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) for depression,
or following a unilateral diencephalic lesion (N.A.) appeared to
have a deficit in recency recognition relative to control subjects,
but not disproportionate to their deficit in content recognition
(Squire, 1982). Hirst (1982) proposed that a specific deficit in
contextual memory forms the basis of impaired content recognition
in all etiologies of amnesia. He suggested that contextual memory
becomes impaired, and that the loss of a temporospatial reference
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renders otherwise intact memories for content useless. Certainly
not knowing when or where one had seen something precludes optimal
use of even intact knowledge of what had been seen. Hirst and
Volpe (1982) suggested that the normally automatic processes that
record contextual memories require effort in amnesic patients, and
do not effectively create contextual memories. Hirst and Volpe
(1982) tested this hypothesis by studying the time-course of
content and context (recency) memory for single words at seven
delays following word presentations. They found that 7 patients
with amnesia due to a variety of etiologies exhibited a deficit in
recognition for recency even when the delay was short enough so
that their recognition for content was equivalent to that of
control subjects.
Thus, there were three sharply different predictions on how
H.M. would perform in an experiment modeled after that of Hirst and
Volpe (1982). If the temporal lobes are not involved in recency
recognition (Milner, 1971), H.M. ought to show normal recency
recognition but impaired content recognition. If the two kinds of
recognition decline together (Squire, 1982), H.M. ought to be
similarly impaired on both recognition measures. If failure in
contextual memory precedes and produces impaired content
recognition (Hirst and Volpe, 1982), H.M. ought to be impaired at a
shorter delay for recency recognition than for content recognition.
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Method
Subjects
The subjects were H.M. and 10 male control subjects. His age
at testing was 58. The 10 control subjects had a mean age of 62
(range 59-67), and none had a Blessed Dementia Scale score (Blessed
et al., 1968) of two or more, ruling out marked cognitive
impairments that could be associated with any undetected
age-related disease.
Materials and Procedure
The experiment was conducted with an Apple IIe microcomputer
that controlled a Comrex amber monitor. The stimuli were 538
nouns, four to six letters long, and with a frequency rating of 25
or more per million (Kucera and Francis, 1967). There were 493
single-word stimulus presentations at a rate of one every 2
seconds. Interspersed among the stimulus presentations were
recognition tests for content and recency. Content recognition
tests began with the display "Which word have you seen before in
this test?" This question was followed by the appearance of two
words, side-by-side, one of which had appeared earlier as a
stimulus and one of which had not appeared on the test and was a
foil. Recency recognition tests began with the display "Which word
have you seen more recently?" This question was followed by the
appearance of two words, side-by-side, both of which had appeared
in the test. The position of the correct answer occurred equally
often on the left or right for both types of test questions. Each
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correct answer and its alternative were matched for letter-length
and frequency.
For purposes of this experiment, an interval was defined as
the interevent duration, and an event was either a single-word
stimulus presentation or a test question. Thus, if a word that had
just been presented was then tested without intervening stimuli or
questions, the interval was 1. Content recognition test questions
appeared at intervals of 1, 3, 6, 10, 15, 25, 50, 100, and 150;
there were five questions at each interval. Recency recognition
questions presented two words from all of the possible combinations
of the same intervals used for content questions, e.g., 1-3, 1-6,
1-10, 1-15, 1-25, 1-50, 1-150, 3-6, 3-10, 3-15, 3-25, 3-50, 3-100,
3-150, 6-10, 6-15, 6-25, 6-50, 6-100, 6-150, 10-15, 10-25, 10-50,
10-100, 10-150, 15-25, 15-50, 15-100, 15-150, 25-50, 25-100,
25-150, 50-100, 50-150, 100-150. There were five questions for
each interval combination of intervals. The 493 stimulus-word
presentations, 45 content recognition questions, and 175 recency
recognition questions were randomly interspersed. The mean
frequency of the test words at the different intervals was balanced
for the two types of questions.
Subjects were seated approximately 1 meter in front of the
monitor. They were told to read every word aloud, and to try to
remember the words and the order in which they appeared. Subjects
replied orally to the test questions, and the examiner pressed a
key that recorded the subject's response and latency to respond.
Then, the next word or question appeared. Testing required
approximately 1 hour.
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Results
The data at all intervals for H.M. and for the normal control
subjects are shown in Table V-1 and Figure V-1. On content
questions, the normal control subjects averaged 81.3% correct (SD =
7.4) across all intervals. H.M. scored 57.8% (chance = 50%), more
than three standard deviations below the mean of the control
subjects, and outside the normal range. On recency questions,
normal control subjects averaged 68.3% correct (SD = 5.5); H.M.
scored 58.9%, less than two standard deviations below the mean of
control subjects and within the normal range.
The relation between the two types of recognition was explored
in two ways. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) examined the
interaction between Task and Interval in the control group. Arc
sine square root transformations were used to produce normal
distributions of data with homogenous variances. Content
recognition was performed significantly more accurately than
recency recognition [E(1, 10) = 176.38, p<.01]. In contrast,
H.M.'s scores were nearly equivalent for the two types of
recognition (58% and 59%), reflecting his poor content recognition
scores and normal or near-normal recency scores.
The time course of content and recency recognition accuracy
are shown in Figure V-2. For the analysis of content scores and
recency scores, the stimulus-test intervals were grouped as
follows: 1, 3-6, 10-25, 50-150; the recency intervals represented
the more recent of the two selections. For content recognition,
103
(Figure V-1), H.M. was barely in the range of normal performance at
an interval of 3 items, and impaired, and at chance by an interval
of 6 items. In contrast, H.M.'s recency score remained in the
normal range up to an interval of 25 items.
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Figure V-1. Mean percentage correct responses to content questions
(upper panel) and to recency questions (lower panel) for 10 normal
control subjects (NCS) and for H.M. in Experiment 1.
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Table V-1. EXPERIMENT 1: MEAN PERCENTAGE CORRECT RESPONSES
Stimulus-Test Material Content Questions Recency Questionsa
NCS H.M. NCS H.M.
1 M
SD
3M
SD
6M
SD
10 M
SD
15 M
SD
100
0
98
6.3
88
16.8
76
72.7
84
20.7
7425 M
SD
50 M
SD
100
80
97
26
83
100
83
9.5
20
40
60
40
25.0
78
17.5
68
25.3
100 M
SD
150 M
SD
athe
pair
66
70
6.9
66
8.9
57
9.4
59
63
60
55
40
12.9
60
60
58
14.0
58
16.2
30
40
60
23.2
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stimulus-test entered is defined by the more recent of the
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Discussion
The results contradicted directly the predictions generated by
a contextual deficit theory (e.g., Hirst and Volpe, 1982; Stern,
1981) for the amnesia following bilateral medial temporal-lobe
resection. In all analyses, H.M.'s recognition of recency, a form
of contextual memory, was spared relative to his recognition of
context. These results are consistent with Milner's (1970) finding
that temporal-lobe lesions affected content recognition but spared
recency recognition. H.M.'s poor recognition of recency at longer
intervals was consistent with the results of Squire (1982), who
found impairments in amnesic patients for recognition of content
and context at long intervals.
The possibility that recognition of recency is more resistant
to brain injury than recognition of content, at least in this
paradigm, was addressed by studying patients with Parkinson's
disease (PD) using the same paradigm as described above. These
patients were impaired in recognition of recency but not in
recognition of content (Sagar et al., 1985). This result revealed
a similarity between the cognitive deficits seen in PD and in
patients with frontal-lobe lesions (Milner, 1970). The similarity
in patterns of cognitive impairment in patients with PD and
patients with frontal-lobe lesions has been noted before: Both
groups of patients have impaired verbal fluency (Milner, 1964;
Matison, 1982; Lees and Smith, 1983) and a deficit on
problem-solving tasks (Milner, 1963, 1964; Lees and Smith, 1983).
Because the frontal lobes have extensive efferent and afferent
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connections with the basal ganglia (Alexander et al., 1985), the
site of consistent neuropathology in PD, it may be that the
cognitive deficits in PD result from disruptions of those
interconnections. On the test described here, the pattern of
impairment that characterized PD was the opposite of that seen in
H.M. These results suggested not only that the experimental
paradigm was differentially sensitive to impairments in content and
recency recognition, but also supported the idea that the two kinds
of recognition are dependent upon different neural substrates.
Furthermore, the fact that the PD group was not impaired in content
recognition argues against the notion that a deficit in contextual
memory inevitably leads to a commensurate deficit in memory for
content. H.M.'s performance, especially in contrast to that of the
PD patients, was not at all consistent with the hypothesis that his
memory for content was impaired as a consequence of a deficit in
contextual memory. The opposite was true, however: At some points
where his memory for content was impaired and at chance, H.M.'s
contextual memory was unimpaired.
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Experiment 2: Recall of Spatial Location
In 1981, Smith and Milner examined the role of the hippocampus
in the recall of spatial location. There were two possible and
opposite expectations. Memory for spatial location is one of the
types of memory that is encoded effectively without conscious
effort (Mandler et al., 1977; Pezdek and Evans, 1979; Schulman,
1973). Because patients with temporal-lobe excisions were
unimpaired in another such type of memory (recency), it was
possible that the temporal lobes would not play a role in the class
of contextual memories that occurred automatically. Then, patients
with unilateral temporal lobectomies would perform normally on a
task of incidental spatial recall as they had on recognition for
recency. The alternative expectations followed from experiments
concerning the intentional learning and recall of location (Corsi,
1972; Milner, 1978; Milner, 1980) and spatial paths in stylus mazes
(Corkin, 1965; Milner, 1965), which were impaired following right,
but not left temporal lobectomy. If incidental memory for spatial
location relies upon the same neural machinery as does intentional
memory for location, then patients with right resections would be
impaired on the recall of location. By this second alternative,
H.M. with his radical bilateral resection ought to be at least as
impaired as the worst performing patient with a unilateral
resection. Smith and Milner adapted a design by Mandler et al.,
1977, which had shown how well subjects remembered spatial location
under incidental study conditions. Subjects had to estimate the
prices of objects presented in a particular array, and then,
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without warning, had to recall the positions of the objects in the
array. The results with normal subjects had been that recall for
location was not significantly better when subjects were trying to
remember location intentionally than when they had learned the
locations incidentally while estimating prices (Mandler et al.,
1977). The Smith and Milner results were straightforward:
Patients with right-hippocampal removals were impaired on immediate
and delayed location-recall, the degree of deficit depended upon
the amount of right-hippocampal excision, and H.M. was the most
impaired on location-recall.
The present experiment sought to examine two main issues in
H.M.'s performance on the same task. First, it has been suggested
that amnesic patients' memories for spatial location benefitted
considerably when patients were given intentional versus incidental
encoding instructions, because they can encode location effortfully
even tough they fail to encode location automatically (Hirst and
Volpe, 1984). To test this notion in H.M., intentional and
incidental learning conditions were used. Second, it was of
interest to characterize the deformation of his memory for
location. We developed a series of scoring algorithms for
subjects' placement of the objects in the location-recall. One
score was a simple average linear error in placement. Then, the
same placements were analyzed in terms of error in translation (up
or down, left or right in the place of the display), in rotation,
and in scale. It also seemed useful to measure the accuracy of the
pattern of placements irrespective of the errors for any single
object. The errors of linear length, translation, scaling, and
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rotation were all calculated by maintaining a tie between where a
particular object had been seen originally and where that same
object was later placed. It seemed that a subject could be poor at
knowing which object went where, but good at knowing what the
general pattern had been (e.g., a bunch of objects in the upper
left area, few in the central left). A fourth measure was
therefore computed, a pattern error score which analyzed error
between the whole set of original locations and the whole set of
subject placements. For the translation scale, rotation, and
pattern errors an optimal score was computed and compared to a
statistical estimate of a normal curve generated by 10,000 random
computer placements of the objects (the placements took into
account the size of the display and the physical space taken up by
each object). The error scores were compared to the random
distribution.
Method
Subjects
H.M. and 10 normal control subjects (6 women, 4 men) were
tested. The normal control subjects had a mean age of 62.4 years
(range 55-69) and a mean educational level of 14.5 years (range
12-20). H.M., with 12 years of education, was tested twice, at
ages 58 and 60. In addition, he was tested with intentional
instructions at age 58.
Materials and Procedure
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The stimuli were 20 small toy versions of such familiar
objects such as a car, boat, scissors, and measuring cup. Prior to
the experiment, the examiner placed the toys on 20 randomly
selected points on a 30-inch square piece of white paper affixed to
a white board. The 20 locations were the same for all subjects;
there were 20 arrangements of the toys on those locations that
rotated in a Latin-square design from subject to subject.
Subjects were seated before the horizontal display of the 20
toys atop the 30-inch square paper. They were told that the test
sought to measure their ability to estimate prices accurately, and
that their task was to guess the average price of the real object
represented by each toy. The examiner pointed to the toy in each
location, in a prearranged and constant order of locations, and
asked the subject to name the toy and, after 10 seconds of
consideration, to estimate the price. The toys and paper were then
removed from view, and the subjects were asked to recall the
objects they had just seen. Following the recall, the toys were
placed back on the table in a heap, a new piece of blank 30-inch
square paper placed where the original display had been, and
subjects was asked to place the toys on the new piece of paper in
the original locations. After location recall, the placements of
the toys were marked on the paper, and the paper was removed.
Then, the examiner picked up two toys, in a prearranged order, and
asked which of the two toys had been priced first in the initial
price estimation phase (a recency discrimination). This test was
done with 10 pairs of toys, with half the correct answers in the
left and half in the right hand. Without warning, and at the same
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table, subjects were retested approximately 8 hours later. They
were asked, without any toys in view, to recall what toys they had
seen previously. Then, a new 30-inch square paper was placed in
the same location as in the earlier session, the toys were placed
in a heap to the side of the paper, and the subjects were asked to
replace the toys in the original positions.
H.M. was tested on a separate occasion (between his two
standard testings) with different instructions intended to induce
effortful encoding of the objects' locations. He was presented
with the same array, but told that this was a test of his memory
for their locations. The examiner pointed to each item and asked
H.M. to name the object, to say whether the object was on the top
or bottom half of the paper, and whether the object was on the left
or the right half of the paper. No price estimation was done. He
was immediately given a two-choice verbal recognition test with the
names of the 20 objects (e.g., did you see an axe or a saw, car or
bus, gun or knife, dog or cat). Then, each toy was shown, one at a
time, and he was asked to select which of two places the toy had
been located. One place was the correct answer and one place was a
foil. The foils were always in the opposite quadrant of the
correct answer. For example, if the correct answer was in the left
upper quadrant, the foil location was in the right lower quadrant.
Results
There were five types of measures of memory taken in this
experiment, including ones of confrontation naming, price
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estimation, recall of objects seen, recall of the spatial location
of those objects, and recency recognition. The scoring was
straightforward for confrontation naming (number of toys named
correctly out of 20), and recency recognition (number of correct
answers out of 10). Analysis of price estimation was less
straightforward because, as might be expected, there were
considerable differences in absolute price answers dependent upon
the interests, assumptions, and background of each subject. At the
same time, there was no definitely correct answer. In order to
evaluate the reasonableness of pricing, therefore, the analysis was
aimed at the relationship among prices for a given subject. In a
separate control study, 10 young subjects were asked to divide the
toys into at least two groups, a group being defined by items that
had similar prices; there had to be at least two toys per group.
Then, once the groups had been established, the same subjects had
to estimate the average price per toy in each group they had
clustered. The results from the group were averaged, and the
result was that the 20 toys were clustered into five groups with
average estimated prices of $1-$50, $50-$200, $200-$1000, and over
$1000. For every subject who took the spatial location test, the
subject's estimated prices were analyzed to discover which, if any,
prices appeared in the wrong group.
H.M.'s performances on the two separate occasions, 2 years
apart, were similar. Scores of the, two were therefore averaged to
yield reliable estimates of his abilities. For the price
estimation score, where a good performance was represented by a low
score, the control group had a mean score of 16.4 (SD = 9.4) and
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H.M. a mean score of 23.5 (within one standard deviation of the
control mean). In recalling the objects, the control group
achieved a mean score of 55.5% correct (SD = 12.1) for the
immediate recall and 62.5% correct (SD = 12.5) at the 8-hour delay.
H.M.'s scores were 15% and 0% at the two delays, respectively;
these scores were over three standard deviations below the means of
the control group.
For the recency judgments, where chance yielded a 50% score,
the mean score of the control group was 72% (SD = 12.2) at the
immediate and 69% (SD = 13.7) at the 8-hour delayed testings. H.M.
scored means of 50% and 55% at the two testings, indicating a
deficit in the recognition of recency commensurate with impaired
recall for the objects.
The spatial location scores are shown in Table V-2. In
contrast to the scores of the control subjects, which were far from
chance (=30), H.M.'s scores in all analyses hovered around chance,
even at the immediate delay. H.M.'s pattern score was also at
least two standard deviations worse than the mean scores of the
control group. In further analyses of the normal control data, the
location scores for objects that had been recalled were compared
with the location scores for objects that had not been recalled.
There was no significant difference at either session between
location accuracies for recalled and unrecalled objects.
Table V-2. RECALL OF THE SPATIAL
ERROR SCORE FOR 10 NORMAL
LOCATIONS OF OBJECTS: MEAN
CONTROL SUBJECTS AND H.M.
Error Score Normal Control Group H.M.
Standard
Mean Deviation Mean
Translated
Initial
Delayed
Scaled
Initial
Delayed
Rotated
Initial
Delayed
Pattern
Initial
Delayed
7.19
8.25
7.17
7.98
7.12
7.95
(1.28)
(1.44)
(1.27)
(1.40)
(1.32)
(1.56)
5.53
6.02
(0.60)
(0.67)
31.41
28.72
31.81
28.50
30.35
26.20
(chance = 30)
(chance = 30)
(chance = 30)
6.91
8.29
Translated
Initial
Delayed
Translated
Initial
Delayed
(Recalled Objects)
7.13
8.71
(Unrecalled Objects)
6.99
7.07
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(1.89)
(2.56)
(2.53)
(2.99)
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H.M., on the intentional, multiple-choice version of this
task, selected 85% of the correct object names and 45% of the
correct object locations on immediate testing (chance = 50% for
both recognition tests).
Discussion
H.M. was impaired in recalling object names and object
locations after a short delay. Indeed, his memory for object
location was at chance within two minutes. Unlike the recency
recognition results, there was no hint of relatively spared
contextual memory for spatial location in H.M. Furthermore, making
the task one of intentional learning and one of two-choice
recognition, both changes that ought to aid H.M.'s performance, did
not help him at all. H.M.'s poor memory for spatial location and
object names does not mean, however, that these functions are
fundamentally associated, for two reasons. First, Smith and Milner
(1983) found a double dissociation: Patients with unilateral right
and unilateral left temporal lobectomies were impaired on memory
for locations and object-name, respectively. Because H.M. has a
bilateral removal, the two memory failures are likely to be
separately ascribable to lesions in the two hemispheres. Second,
the normal subjects recalled object location equally well whether
they could recall the object names or not, at both the initial and
8-hour delay intervals. The main conclusion to be drawn from the
results of Experiments 1 and 2, however, is that H.M's anterograde
amnesia for content cannot be explained as a consequence of
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impaired, automatic processes that record contextual memories.
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VI. ANTEROGRADE ACQUISITION OF MOTOR SKILLS
It is sometimes said that you never forget how to ride a
bicycle once you have learned how to do so. This everyday
observation captures the sense that the learning of motor skills is
fundamentally different from the learning involved in remembering
events or retaining facts. Motor skills are often learned
incrementally through training, and the basis of increasing
proficiency is not open to conscious, verbal report. Corkin (1968)
has also pointed out that such complex motor skills as riding a
bicycle, skating, or piano playing are often best acquired in
childhood, and largely retained despite disuse.
The study of motor learning in patients with global amnesia
has supported these intuitions, and has provided evidence that
dissociable neural circuits underlie the learning of motor skills,
as distinct from the remembering of events and facts. Amnesic
patients are impaired in learning facts, but these same patients
can acquire and retain motor skills in a normal or near-normal way
(Milner, 1962; Corkin, 1968; Starr and Philips, 1970; Cermak et
al., 1973; Brooks and Baddeley, 1976; Cohen, 1981). The patients
may remember nothing from their experience with a motor task and
may deny ever having done it, even as they show the proficiency
acquired from that previous experience with the task. Because
these patients have injuries to certain limbic structures, it is
inferred that these structures play a role in the remembering of
facts and events, but not in the learning of motor skills.
The first report of preserved motor-skill learning in global
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amnesia came from Milner (1962) and concerned the patient H.M.,
whose severe anterograde amnesia followed bilateral medial
temporal-lobe resection, including the amygdala and most of the
hippocampal complex. H.M. had to trace a star reflected in a
mirror; he not only improved in consecutive trials on each day, but
retained that improvement across the 3 days. In contrast, H.M.
could not recall having performed the task.
Since this discovery of spared motor learning in global
amnesia, other kinds of spared learning have been found. These
discoveries have provoked reconsideration of what constitutes
convincing evidence for the true preservation of a learning
capacity in amnesia (reviewed in Chapter III). When the present
criteria are applied to the original mirror-tracing experiments
with H.M., it is uncertain whether those results provide clear
evidence for the intact functioning of a spared memory system. The
present experiments sought to re-examine whether mirror-tracing
skills may be acquired and retained by a memory system not
including medial temporal-lobe structures, i.e., whether fact
learning and motor-skill learning are robustly dissociable in H.M.
In addition, two other patients with global amnesia were tested, as
were 6 patients with memory disorders due to AD.
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Experiment 1: Mirror Tracing
Impressive as was H.M.'s learning of the mirror-tracing skill
(Milner, 1962), control subjects were not tested, and this omission
precluded a documentation of the degree of his skill preservation.
If H.M.'s learning were equivalent to that of control subjects, his
performance would provide strong evidence for the notion that
mirror tracing is learned by a memory system that is intact in
global amnesia. If H.M.'s learning were less than that of control
subjects, it would reflect minimal learning in an impaired system.
The present experiment included H.M. and control subjects.
The second issue concerned how H.M.'s impaired fact learning
was dissociated from his apparently intact motor learning. The
former was tested by asking HM. whether he remembered doing the
task, the method of free recall. The latter was tested by
quantitative measurements of the numbers of errors and trials to
complete the tracing. Certainly it is striking that H.M. could not
recall having done the task, but could benefit from practice on it.
A second interpretation, though, is also consistent with these
results. Perhaps the highly constrained nature of the motor task
offered many cues with limited response choices, whereas the free
recall question provided no constraints. If so, his preserved
motor learning might have been a function of the constraining
experimental conditions, and might not have had a special relation
to motor learning. Furthermore, an amnesic patient may be likely
to deny memory for any events, not because of dishonesty but rather
because claiming memory for an event may provoke further
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questioning that the patient is unlikely to be able to answer.
H.M. realized that he has a severe memory disturbance. For these
reasons, it was important to ask H.M. questions about his memory of
having done mirror tracing that resembled the constraints imposed
by redoing the tracing, questions with a limited set of choices for
response.
Method
Subjects
There were three groups of subjects: 3 patients with global
amnesia, 6 with AD, and 7 normal control subjects.
Amnesic patients. H.M., patient #6125 (bilateral stroke), and
patient #4624 (herpes simplex encephalitis) took part in the
experiment (Appendix A). The mean age of the amnesic patients was
57.0 years (range 50-61) and the mean years of education was 13.3
(range 12-16).
AD patients. All the patients with probable AD met NINCDS and
NIA research criteria for the diagnosis of AD (McKhann et al.,
1984; Khachaturian, 1985). They were referred from the Memory
Disorders Unit of the Massachusetts General Hospital, and were
consecutive patients whose dementia was mild enough to permit
behavioral testing and who were willing to participate in research
studies. The group consisted of 6 patients (3 men, 3 women) with a
mean age of 68.2 years (range 62 - 85) and a mean educational level
of 13.2 years (range 12 - 16).
Normal control subjects. The control group consisted of 3
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women and 4 men with a mean age of 69 years (range 56 - 71) and a
mean education level of 13.0 years (range 12 - 16). Their
neurological examinations revealed no abnormalities.
Materials and Procedure
The mirror tracing apparatus consisted of an aluminum plate on
which nonconducting tape was arranged in one of two patterns: a
six-pointed star (similar to Milner, 1962) or an alternate pattern
with an equal number of sides and angles. One plate at a time was
mounted on a wooden board that was hidden from the subjects' view
by a near vertical metal barrier. Subjects sat facing a mirror,
mounted on the far side of the obscuring metal board, in which they
could see the pattern reflected. Subjects held the stylus in their
preferred hand, and were told to trace around the pattern, from a
starting mark, and to work as quickly and as accurately as
possible. Subjects had to reach around the metal barrier and could
see the pattern and their hand only in the mirror. A ground wire
between the aluminum plate and a scoring box completed a low
voltage circuit whenever the stylus strayed off the nonconducting
tape. The scoring box recorded the number of times subjects went
off the pattern and the total duration of time off the pattern. In
addition, total time to trace around the entire pattern was
measured by stopwatch.
There was one session per day for three consecutive days, with
seven trials per session. The first trial on Day 1 and the last
trial on Day 3 occurred with the alternate pattern; all other
trials employed the star pattern. Two questionnaires were used to
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measure subjects' recall and recognition of their experience in
doing this task. In the recall questionnaire, subjects were asked
10 questions, such as whether they had seen the apparatus before,
when and for how long they had last seen it, what their goal had
been, and so on. Free and cued recall questions were included.
The recognition questionnaire consisted of 10 multiple-choice
versions of the questions from the recall questionnaire, as well as
pictorial multiple-choice displays in which the subjects had to
identify photographs of the mirror-tracing apparatus and the
patterns they had traced. The Recall and Recognition Questionnaires
were administered just prior to the Day 2 and Day 3 sessions.
Results
Fact-Learninq Measures
The recall and recognition questionnaires were measures of
fact learning. The results were analyzed in a repeated measures
ANOVA with the factors of group (amnesic, AD, normal control), day
(Day 2 and Day 3), and test type (recall and recognition) (Table
VI-1 and Figure VI-1). A significant interaction was found between
group and scores on the tests of fact learning F(2, 13) = 16.67,
MSe = 735.1, p<.001]; the normal group scored well above both
patient Se groups. The test type had a significant effect F(1,
13) = 10.58, Se = 69.46, <.01] that interacted with group [F(2,
13) = 5.98, p<.01]. This effect MSe was accounted for primarily by
the amnesic group's disproportionately better MSe recognition than
recall scores. The test day also produced a significant effect
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[E(1, 13) = 5.23, MSe = 87.48, p<.05 that interacted with group
IF(2, 13) = 5.91), p<.02]. This effect of day was accounted for by
the improvement of the AD group across days; the scores of the
normal control and amnesic groups did not change across days, but
for different reasons. The normal group's scores were limited by a
ceiling effect, whereas the amnesic patients simply failed to
improve.
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Figure VI-L. Mean percentage correct responses to recall questions (upper panel)
and for recognition questions (lower panel) for normal control (NCS),
Alzheimer's disease (AD), and amnesic (AMN) groups.
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Table VI-1. MEAN FACT-LEARNING SCORES FOR MIRROR-TRACING EPISODES
Group Recall Recognitiona
Day 2 Day 3 Day 2 Day 3
Normal Control 92.0(4.8 )b 92.6(1.1) 90.0(14.4) 95.7(5.3)
(N=7)
AD 52.8(31.2) 72.1(21.2) 56.7(23.4) 71.7(160)
(N=6)
Amnesic 33.7(4.0) 30.7(4.7) 53.3(15.2) 50.0(10.0)
(N=3)
a chance is 20
b standard deviation
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Performance Measures
The three performance measures were analyzed separately: the
number of times the stylus went off the patterns (error score), the
number of seconds taken to trace around the pattern (time-to-trace
score), and the number of seconds the stylus was off the pattern
(time-off score) (Tables VI-2 - 4 and Figure VI-2). The three sets
of scores were analyzed in repeated measures ANOVAs, with factors
of group (amnesic, AD, normal control), day (Days 1, 2, and 3), and
trial (7 trials per day). For all three analyses, significant main
effects emerged for day [error score: F(2, 26) = 18.19, MSe =
3555.2, p<.001; time-to-trace score: F(2, 26) = 34.51, MSe
2116.3, <.001; time-off score: F(2, 26) = 12.95, MSe = 555.1,
p<.001] and for trial error score: F(6, 78) = 5.23, MSe = 1027.5,
p<.001; time-to-trace score: F(6, 78) = 18.71, MSe = 6990.9,
(<.001; time-off score: F(6, 78) = 5.02, MSe = 129.2, p<.0011. In
addition, a significant interaction was found between day and trial
[error score: F(12, 156) = 4.93, MSe = 865.5, <.001;
time-to-trace score: F(12, 156) = 12.08, MSe = 6765.1, <.001;
time-off score: F(12, 156) = 4.08, MSe = 125.6, p<.001]. This
interaction reflects the disproportionately large learning that
occurred on the first day of testing. Most importantly, there were
no group by score interactions for any measure of skill learning.
Table VI-2. MEAN SECONDS TO TRACE PATTERN
Group Day 1 Day 2 Day 3
Normal control 173.0 (50.1)b 76.1 (33.4) 46.0 (18.3)
(N = 7)
Amnesic 307.6 (58.3) 139.7 (84.1) 93.8 (65.8)
(N = 3)
AD 220.1 (143.6) 105.7 (111.7) 139.7 (59.3)
(N = 6)
b standard deviation
Table VI-3. MEAN ERRORS WHILE TRACING
Group Day 1 Day 2 Day 3
Normal control 57.7 (23.7)a 25.0 (17.1) 9.9 (8.5)
(N = 7)
Amnesic 42.5 (16.9) 10.0 (7.4) 1.5 (1.2)
(N = 3)
AD 64.8 (60.7) 15.2 (11.2) 7.1 (4.8)
(N = 6)
a standard deviation
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Table VI-4. MEAN SECONDS OFF PATTERN
Group Day 1 Day 2 Day 3
Normal control 15.2 (9.4)a 6.2 (4.3) 2.4 (1.8)
(N = 7)
Amnesic 15.1 (6.5) 3.7 0.5
(N = 3)
AD 23.9 (23.5) 6.0 (5.8) 2.5 (1.9)
(N = 6)
a standard deviation
Table VI-5. MEAN MIRROR-TRACING SCORES FOR H.M. OVER 3 WEEKS
Day
Type of score 1 2 3 10 24
Errors per trial 50.1 11.0 2.0 1.1 1.0
Time-to-trace 340.1 228.6 152.2 120.7 100.4
per trial (sec)
Time-off pattern 16.6 6.9 0.6 0.5 0.5
per trial (sec)
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Figure VI-2. Mean seconds per trial (upper panel) and mean errors
per trial (lower panel) for normal control (NCS), Alzheimer's disease
(AD), and amnesic (AMN) groups.
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451 
M 40-
35 -
n
E 30ZO
r
o
1 20
I
A133
NCS (n-7)
AD (no6) O0
Ib
A" (n=) a- 0- ...
I a
-
E t -
-n 55 
o-- I
0.s
E
r 0.40 -
r
0
r V' A
0.30 
11
r -3 
e 0.20 '
n 0.15
0.10
0. Os
0.00 I a 3--------
Day
0. s 
0-50 -
r 0.40 -
0 .1 
r 0.3s 1
0. 30 
0.0
nO.IS 
&xCS in- q
0
b------- I---·-- D-L-_~L~
I·~1---1---4-------
0 1 a 3 1
Day
Figure VI-4. Mean errors-per-second for normal control (NCS),
Alzbeimers' disease (AD), and amnesic AMN) groups (upper panel),
and for normal control subjects and H.M. (lower panel).
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Discussion
The main results were that the amnesic and AD groups, despite
substantial deficits in recalling or recognizing their experiences
of mirror-tracing, nevertheless learned the motor skill in a normal
fashion. Overall, the control group, AD group, and amnesic group
improved their time-to-trace scores by 73%, 70%, and 69%,
respectively, and their error scores by 83%, 89%, and 95%. H.M.
reduced his time-to-trace score by 56% and his error score by 96%.
The inclusion of normal control subjects and the formal,
constrained measurements of recall and recognition supported the
conclusion drawn by Milner (1962) and extended by other
investigators with H.M. (Corkin, 1968) and with other amnesic
subjects (Cermak et al., 1973; Brooks and Baddeley, 1976; Cohen,
1982).
The two patient groups demonstrated contrasting patterns of
fact-learning deficits. The patients with AD were equally impaired
on the recall and recognition tests, but benefited from a second
day's experience of mirror-tracing with a resultant 20% improvement
on both fact-learning tests on Day 3. The amnesic group showed the
opposite profile: They benefited from the recognition format
versus the recall format, but did not remember any more about their
mirror-tracing experience after two sessions than after one
session. Despite these differences in patterns of fact-learning
impairments, both groups learned to mirror trace. The durability
of this preserved learning was studied further in H.M., who was
retested a week (Day 10) after the last session (Day 3), and two
135
weeks after that (Day 24). H.M.'s time-to-trace and his error
scores (Table VI-5, Figure VI-3) showed that he retained his
proficiency over those long periods and continued to improve within
the later sessions.
Though they did not differ significantly from the control
group by any measure of skill learning, the two patient groups
tended to require longer times to trace the patterns but to make
fewer errors than the healthy subjects. All subjects were
instructed to trace as quickly and accurately as possible, but any
trade-off between speed and accuracy was determined by each
subject. Indeed, some subjects asked whether speed or accuracy was
more important; they were told that the two factors were both
important. An indicator of the speed-accuracy trade-off was
calculated by dividing for each group on each day, the mean errors
by the mean time-to-trace. The resultant errors-per-second tracing
scores (Figure VI-4) suggested that the two patient groups were
more cautious than control subjects from the outset, and this
tendency was especially true of the amnesic group. The normal
control subjects actually increased their errors-per-second tracing
on Day 2, suggesting an emphasis on speed over accuracy. By Day 3,
all groups had reduced their errors-per-second while tracing, but
the reduction was greatest in the amnesic group, and least in the
normal control group. There were several possible reasons
contributing to these differing patterns of speed-accuracy
tradeoff. Patients who were aware of cognitive or physical
limitations may have tended toward, or have been limited to,
cautious strategies that promoted control over their behavior by
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minimizing the occurrence of unexpected conditions. Excursions off
of the pattern could occur in many unique ways, whereas careful
revisiting of the pattern's routes assured a controlled
continuation of the current trial. Another possibility was that
the memory-impaired subjects were more patient because they were
less frustrated by their recollection of prior trials or prior
portions of the current trial. Normal subjects may have become
increasingly irked by the frustrative aspects of the task, and
preferred to complete each trial at the cost of more errors. The
patients, with poorer memories of their frustrations, may have
failed to accumulate sufficient irritation to pursue such a
reckless but speedy strategy. This possibility pertains especially
to H.M., whose error-rate at the outset and reduction in errors
across the days were superior to nearly all the control subjects.
Finally, it may be that the control subjects' awareness of their
increasing proficiency influenced their speed-accuracy tradeoff.
The patients may have remained cautious because they were less
aware of their own growing skills.
The preserved learning by the patients with AD was interesting
as well. Normal motor-skill learning in a group of AD patients has
been reported before (Eslinger et al., 1985, for rotary pursuit),
but not with a delay approaching 24 hours. This finding does not
mean that all patients with AD could learn to mirror-trace, because
the progressive dementia renders all patients with AD incapable of
even performing the task at some point during the course of their
disease. That incapacity, however, does not explain why three
other patients with AD failed to be able to perform the task at
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all. The subgroups that could and could not perform the task had
similar mean ages (68.2 for the performers, 61.3 for the
nonperformers) and were similar in severity of dementia as assessed
by the Blessed Dementia Scale (Blessed et al., 1968) (a mean of
13.0 for the performers, and a mean of 11.2 for the nonperformers;
a higher score indicates more severe dementia). Indeed, the three
most demented patients were able to perform the task. A larger
group of patients with AD must now be examined with this task in
order to discover what behavioral, epidemiological, or biological
features distinguish the two groups. Two preliminary hints worth
noting are the tendency of the nonperformers to be younger, and the
different proportion of men who failed mirror-tracing (50%) as
compared with women (0%).
In summary, the results of this mirror-tracing experiment
reinforced the dissociation between fact-learning and the learning
and long-term retention of the motor skill involved in
mirror-tracing. While this study reaffirmed the dependence of
fact-learning upon structures of the medial temporal-lobe (injured
in all three amnesic patients and presumably in the patients with
AD), the neural circuitry underlying mirror-tracing skill remains
undefined. If the locus of pathological changes in the brain
differed in the two AD subgroups, that difference could indicate
part of the neural circuit mediating mirror-tracing skill.
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VII: ANTEROGRADE ACQUISITION OF PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE
A remarkable feat of human visual cognition is the extraction
of finite meaning from an infinite variety of sensory experiences.
For example, people readily identify a cat as a cat even though the
appearance of a cat varies from feline to feline and varies under
condition of lighting, shadow, position, orientation, and partial
occlusion by other objects. The apparent ease and accuracy of
visual identification is a consequence of the powerful neural
apparatus underlying the identification (Schiller, in press), and
the power of that apparatus is made evident by the current failure
of machine vision to approach human performance in this domain.
Some evidence exists that two dissociable memory systems
separately record knowledge for what visual pattern has been seen
and knowledge for how that pattern was associated to a name, word,
or concept. The former knowledge appears to be mediated by
fact-learning mechanisms dependent upon the integrity of certain
limbic structures, whereas the neural basis of the latter knowledge
is less well understood. Studies with normal subjects have
produced results suggesting that visuoperceptual skill with a word
depends upon psychological processes different from those
underlying recall or recognition for a word (e.g., Jacoby and
Dallas, 1981; Jacoby and Witherspoon, 1982; Jacoby, 1983).
Patients with global amnesia, who could neither remember having
seen the atypical patterns nor recall normally what patterns they
had seen, nevertheless demonstrated substantial improvement when
reidentifying the patterns (Milner, 1962; Milner et al., 1968;
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Warrington and Weiskrantz, 1968; Warrington and Weiskrantz, 1970;
Cohen and Squire, 1981). The present experiments examined whether
the medial temporal-lobe structures crucial for recalling what
patterns had been seen play a role in the reidentification of these
patterns. The experiments also sought to characterize how these
two forms of memory interact with one another in the anterograde
acquisition of perceptual knowledge.
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Experiment 1: Identification of Mirror-Reversed Text
Kohlers (1975, 1976, 1979) found that normal subjects retained
the skill required for reading mirror-reversed text over periods
well past their memory for the content of the text. Cohen and
Squire (1981) used that paradigm of skill acquisition to examine
preserved and impaired learning capacities in patients with global
amnesia due to KS or to temporary amnesia following
electroconvulsive therapy (ECT). These patients and control
subjects read low-frequency word triplets in mirror-reversed
presentations; the measure of performance was the time to read a
triplet correctly. Testing was conducted in five blocks a day for
three successive days and in a fourth session 91 days later. Half
of each block comprised triplets that repeated, in the same order,
from block to block and day to day, and the other half
once-appearing or unique triplets. The amnesic patients and
control subjects showed substantial learning (i.e., faster reading
times) within each session, and this learning was retained and
improved upon across days. Indeed, the patients' learning curves
for the unique triplets were indistinguishable from those of
control subjects, providing strong evidence of normal learning of
the skill involved in reading mirror-reversed words. The patients,
however, were impaired relative to the control subjects in the
speed of reading repeated stimuli; the control subjects had even
faster reading times for the repeated than for the unique words.
The patients also improved more with the repeated than the unique
triplets, but the repetition advantage was greater for the control
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subjects. The failure of the patients to show the normal advantage
with repeated words was interpreted as impaired memory for knowing
that a particular triplet had been seen earlier in the test. The
patients were also impaired in recognizing what words they had seen
in the reading tests on a yes/no recognition test of the words
presented in typed, nonreversed text. Martone et al. replicated
these results in another group of patients with KS (1984).
The mirror-reading results were of particular interest because
they provided an unambiguous and replicable case of entirely
preserved learning in global amnesia. The present experiment had
three main goals. First, we sought to determine whether a patient
with global amnesia due to bilateral medial temporal-lobe lesions
would show the same pattern of knowing how but not knowing that
when reading mirror-reversed text. The patients with KS had damage
to diencephalic structures; the site of damage in patients with
amnesia following ECT is uncertain. The idea that patients after
ECT have an anterograde amnesia closely resembling that of H.M. is
now in question because these patients have a rapid rate of
forgetting (Squire, 1982) but H.M. does not (Freed, 1986). H.M.'s
amnesia is not only of a different etiology, but is also likely to
be more severe in its anterograde aspect than that typically seen
in the patients who have shown normal acquisition of the
mirror-reading skill. Second, we aimed to make a more rigorous
dissociation between fact learning and skill learning. Cohen and
Squire (1981) and Martone et al. (1985) measured patients'
recognition accuracy for words they had read in mirror-reversed
fashion, but the test of recognition was done with normal,
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nonreversed versions of the words. Thus, recognition was not
assessed using the most relevant version of the words, the
mirror-reversed version. Accordingly, we included two-choice
recognition tests in which the choices were shown in
mirror-reversed text. Third, we wanted to reexamine the basis of
the failure of the amnesic patients to show a normal benefit with
the repeated triplets. This point touches upon the mechanism of
the normally learned skill involved in reading unique triplets.
One potential reason for this pattern of impaired and preserved
learning relates to the design of the Cohen and Squire experiment.
Reading times were recorded at the end of correctly read triplets;
the repeated triplets repeated often, with the words in a fixed
order within a triplet. It is possible therefore that control
subjects quickly learned the three words as a triplet, and that
after they read the first word, they said the second and third
words from memory without having to read the mirror-reversed words.
If this speculation is accurate, it does not alter the original
results but rather identifies the locus of the extra repetition
advantage seen in the control subjects. We attempted to assess
this possibility in three ways: The test included displays of both
single words and triplets, reading times were recorded for each
member of every triplet, and in one block the repeated triplets
were scrambled so as to preclude effective guessing on the identity
of the second and third members of triplets.
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Method
Subjects
H.M. and 7 normal control subjects participated in this
experiment. The control group, 5 men and 2 women, had a mean age
of 56.1 years (range 50-60) versus H.M.'s age of 60; a mean WAIS
vocabulary raw score of 42.4 (range 31-51) versus H.M.'s score of
37; and a mean educational level of 13.0 years (range 11-16) versus
H.M.'s 12 years.
Materials and Procedure
The stimuli were 360 low-frequency, 6-letter words (frequency
of 13 or less, Kucera and Francis, 1967). The words were divided
into 15 sets, balanced with respect to means and ranges of word
frequency. One set was randomly designated the repeating set, nine
sets as unique sets, and five sets as foil sets (wrong answers for
two-choice recognition tests). The words were presented in lower
case letters and in standard screen print. Subjects read the words
in an enlarging, concave mirror about 1 meter in front of them.
Three reading tests and five recognition tests were given
(Table VII-1). The Day-1 and Day-2 reading tests were made in the
same manner. Within the 1 repeating and 10 unique sets, 6 words
were designated to appear as single stimuli and 18 words as triplet
stimuli; the mean frequency of the 6 single stimuli and 6 triplets
(each triplet made of 3 stimuli) was balanced within, and across,
the sets. The Day-1 and Day-2 reading tests were each made up of
four blocks. Each block included 48 words, 12 appearing in 12
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single-stimulus trials and 36 appearing in 12 triplet trials. Half
the single and triplet trials in each block presented words from
the repeating set, and the other 12 trials (24 words) presented
words from a unique set. The repeating and unique words and the
single and triplet displays were interspersed randomly. The Day-3
reading test included one never before seen unique set, and the
unique sets that had been seen once in the first blocks of the
Day-1 and Day-2 reading tests. These 72 trials were mixed
randomly. For the repeating set triplets, and the Day-1 and Day-2
triplets that reappeared in the Day-3 reading test, the order and
identity of a triplet was always the same. The only exception was
in Block 4 of the Day-3 reading test, in which the repeating set
triplet items were scattered so that no repeating set triplet item
ever appeared either together with two other words it had in all
the previous blocks or in the left-to-right position that it had
been appearing.
Five recognition tests were also given. Recognition Test 1
followed the Day-1 reading test. There were 24 two-choice
displays, and the correct answers came from the unique set in Block
4. The first 6 and last 6 displays were read and then answered in
mirror-reversed text; the middle 12 displays were read and answered
in normal non-reversed test. Recognition Test 2 was designed like
Recognition Test 1, except that it followed the Day-2 reading test
and included words from the unique set in Block 8. Recognition
Tests 4, 5, and 6 were given on Day 3; all of the displays for
those tests were read and answered in mirror-reversed text. The
correct answers came from the repeating set (Recognition Test 3),
145
and from the unique sets from Blocks 1 and 2 of the Day-1
(Recognition Test 4) and the Day-2 (Recognition Test 5) reading
tests.
For the Day-1, Day-2, and Day-3 reading tests, subjects were
instructed to read the word presented in mirror-reversed fashion.
No practice trials were given. Subjects were encouraged to spell
out the word letter by letter if they could not read the whole
word. If letters or words were misidentified, subjects were told
that they were wrong, but the correct answer was not provided. If
a subject could not identify a letter correctly after several
attempts, the correct answer was suggested by the examiner, but the
whole word was never given. After the subject read a whole word
correctly, the examiner pressed a button to record the latency of
response.
Subjects were asked to recall as many words as they could from
the experiment immediately following. This same procedure was
followed for two-choice recognition displays in which the stimuli
were shown as mirror-reversed. Following correct readings of both
words, subjects were asked to say which of the two they had read
earlier.
In addition, prior to testing on Days 2 and 3, subjects were
asked to recall the testing experience. If they could not, they
were given a five-choice recognition question asking what task they
had performed the day before; one of the choices was reading words
in a mirror.
Table VII-1. PROCEDURE FOR EXPERIMENT 1: IDENTIFICATION
OF MIRROR-REVERSED TEXT
Day Task Design
1 Mirror-reading words Block 1 - 48 unique words, 24
singles, 24 triplets
Block 2 - 24 repeated and 24
unique words
Block 3 - 24 repeated and 24
unique words
Block 4 - 24 repeated and 24
unique words
Recall of Blocks 1-4
Recognition for unique
words from Block 4
12 two-choice displays, normal
text
12 two-choice displays,
mirror-reversed text
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2 Mirror-reading words Block 5 - 24 repeated and 24
unique words
Block 6 - 24 repeated and 24
unique words
Block 7 - 24 repeated and 24
unique words
Block 8 - 48 words, 24
repeated, 24 unique (but
repeated triples are
reordered and separated)
Recall of Blocks 5-8
Recognition of unique
words from Block 8
12 two-choice displays, normal
text
12 two-choice displays,
mirror-reversed text
3 Recall of words from
Days 1 and 2
Recognition of repeated
words
Mirror-reading words
Recognition of unique
words
24 two-choice displays,
mirror-reversed text
48 once-seen words from Days 1
and 2
48 unique words
48 two-choice displays for
once-seen words from Days
1 and 2, mirror-reversed
text
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Results
Fact-Learning Measures
The 7 control subjects could recall having done mirror-reading
the previous day prior to the start of the Day-2 and Day-3
sessions. H.M. could not recall doing mirror-reading on either
day. When given a five-choice recognition test for what task he
had done the day before, he selected a wrong response on Day 2 but
the correct response on Day 3.
There were two tests of immediate recall following the final
blocks of stimuli on Days 1 and 2. The control group recalled a
mean of 5.6 words (SD = 4.6) on Day 1, and 13.6 words on Day 2 (SD
= 7.1). H.M. did not recall any word on either day. The third
test of recall occurred on Day 3, 24 hours after the last exposure
to mirror-reversed words. The control subjects recalled a mean of
9.4 words (SD = 4.8), whereas H.M. could not recall any word.
The two immediate recognition tests of unique words from the
last blocks of Days 1 and 2 were combined for analysis (Figure
VII-l). Answers for the two-choice displays presented in normal,
nonreversed text and in mirror-reversed text were scored
separately. The normal group scored a mean of 86.3% correct (SD =
7.6) for the nonreversed displays, and a mean of 93.4% correct (SD
= 3.7) for the mirror-reversed displays. Recognition accuracy was
significantly better with the mirror-reversed displays t (6) =
2.19, p<.05, one-tailed]. H.M. scored 42% and 63% correct on the
nonreversed and mirror-reversed stimuli, respectively (both scores
were near the chance score of 50). The normal group scored a mean
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Figure VII-1. Mean percentage correct on recognition tests
1,2,3 and 4 for normal control subjects (NCS) and H.M. in Experiment 1.
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95.3% correct (SD = 9.4) on the 24-hour delayed recognition test
for the repeated words; H.M. scored 46% correct (about chance)
(Figure VII-1). Scores from the two recognition tests for unique
words seen 24 and 48 hours previously were combined for analysis.
Control subjects had a mean of 71.0% correct responses (SD = 4.3);
H.M. scored 48% (about chance).
Performance Measures
H.M. took much longer than any control subject to read the
mirror reversed words. H.M.'s mean time to read a mirror-reversed
word in the first block of Day 1 was 80.3 seconds, versus a mean of
25.4 seconds for the normal control subjects (range 7.8 - 54.7).
For purposes of comparison, therefore, all data were converted to
their log 10 equivalent, and statistical analyses were performed on
the log-transformed data (the raw data are summarized in Table
VII-2). The scores of the control group were analyzed in a
repeated measures ANOVA, with factors of day (Day 2 and Day 3)
block (1-8), repetition (repeated versus unique), and display
(single versus triple). There were significant main effects of day
[F(1, 6) = 109.6, MSe = 1281.1, <.01], of block F(3, 18) = 56.46,
MSe = 69.4, p<.01], of repetition [F(1, 6) = 121.59, MSe = 11.39,
p<.01] and of display [F(1, 6) = 16.62, MSe = 15.5, <.01] (Figure
VII-2). Thus, the control subjects showed substantial reductions
in latency to read unique and repeated words across blocks and
across days, and a greater reduction with the repeated words, which
was also reflected by significant interactions between repetition
and day [F(1, 6) = 19.81, MSe = 19.8, p<.011 and repetition and
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block F(1, 6) = 16.97, MSe = 8.56, p<(.01. In addition, all other
possible two-way and three-way interactions were significant at the
p<.01 level.
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Figure VII-2. Mean time to read words, in log1 0 seconds per word,
for seven normal control subjects (upper panel) and for H.M. (lower panel).
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Table VII-2. MEAN SECONDS FOR CONTROL SUBJECTS AND H.M. TO READ
MIRROR-REVERSED WORDS
Day and Block Unique Words Repeated Words
Control H.M. Control H.M.
Day 1, Block 1 M
SD
Block 2 M
SD
Block 3 M
SD
Block 4 M
SD
Day 2, Block 5
26.3
17.0
14.8
6.9
12.1
7.1
12.0
5.8
M
SD
Block 6 M
SD
Block 7 M
SD
Block 8 M
SD
Day 3, Block 9 M
SD
12.4
4.8
10.3
4.7
10.3
4.7
7.4
1.9
7.8
3.5
81.1
58.1
51.7
50.2
53.7
57.1
46.5
24.6
12.8
8.6
6.2
6.7
3.1
5.4
2.8
6.7
3.3
79.5
56.5
70.4
61.3
47.7
42.24.5
2.8
3.1
2.3
42.3
38.8
39.33.2a
1.7
32.0
atriplets were scrambled
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H.M. also showed substantial learning across blocks and days
(Figure VII-2, Table VII-2). He reduced his mean reading time per
word from 80.3 seconds in the first block on the Day 1 to 40.8
seconds on the last block of Day 2 to 32.0 seconds for the unique
words on Day 3. The improvement in speed for reading unique words
is comparable in some respects to that seen in the control group.
H.M. reduced his mean time to read unique words by 60.0% across the
three days, whereas the control group reduced a mean of 65.3% (SD =
12.3, range 53-84). In contrast, H.M. failed to show the normal
advantage in latency for repeated over unique words. Across the
first two days, the normal subjects had mean reading latencies of
13.2 seconds for the unique words and 7.9 seconds for the repeated
words. In contrast to the normal 40% advantage for repeated words,
H.M. had means of 55.1 seconds for both the repeated and unique
words.
Interactions Between Fact and Performance Measures
Measure of the relationship between the two kinds of learning
were examined in several planned ways. First, performances by the
normal control group were analyzed for the single versus triplet
repeated displays. There were no significant interactions between
day, block, or repetition and display type. The noninteractions
indicate that there was not a significantly greater advantage of
repetition for the triplets than for the single displays. The
performance of the normal subjects was compared on Day 2 between
the Block 7 and Block 8. The repeated triplets were broken up into
different combinations in Block 8. The mean latency to read the
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repeated triplet words rose from 0.76 log 10 seconds to 0.85 log 10
seconds across these two blocks; this rise was significant t (6) =
6.2, p<.05, one-tailed]. Third, the effect of having read a
mirror-reversed word once 24-48 hours earlier was examined by
comparing the once-seen words on Day 3 to the never-before-seen new
words in the same block (Figure VII-3). The means for the words
seen once 48 hours earlier, 24 hours earlier, and the new unique
words were (in log 10 seconds), 1.71 (SD = 2.7), 1.70 (SD = .37),
and 1.67 (SD = .39); the difference among the three groups did not
approach significance. Finally, latencies for reading the repeated
words and foils were compared for the 24-hour delay recognition
test (Day 3) that was presented in the mirror-reversed fashion.
The percentage reduced latency for reading the repeated words
versus the foils was calculated for each subject. The normal
control group had a mean of a 82.8% (SD = 9.0) latency advantage of
repeated (correct answer) over foil words and H.M. had an 84%
advantage.
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Figure VII-3. Time taken by normal control subjects (NCS)
to read words, in log 10 seconds per word, for words not
read before and for words read once 24 and 48 hours
previously.
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Discussion
H.M. was impaired by all measures of fact learning. He could
not recall having performed the task one day after each session.
Moreover, presenting the recognition tests in the same format upon
which his skill was built did not reduce the magnitude of his
deficit. A comparison between H.M. and the control subjects with
respect to their acquisition of the mirror-reading skill must be
viewed with some caution, because H.M.'s overall latencies were so
much greater than those of any control subject. He did show,
however, a substantial reduction in latency to read mirror-reversed
words: Across the three days he reduced his time to read by nearly
a minute per word. The further reduction in latency for repeated,
versus unique, words shown by the control subjects did not occur
with H.M. In the studies of mirror-reading in other amnesic
patients, Cohen and Squire (1981) and Martone et al. (1985) found
that amnesic patients did have a reduced latency with repeated
versus unique words, but that the relative difference was
significantly smaller than that seen with control subjects. H.M.
had virtually no advantage with repeated words. Thus, H.M.'s
results lend further support to the notion that the extra reduction
in latency with repeated words in normal subjects depends upon the
same fact-learning mechanisms underlying recall and recognition of
the words.
A comparison of latencies for the single and triple repeated
stimuli, for the control subjects, did not show a significantly
more powerful repetition effect with the triple stimuli.
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Scrambling the triple stimuli in Block 8 on Day 2 did increase the
latencies for the repeated triple, but not the repeated single,
stimuli. These results indicate that subjects were remembering the
triple stimuli as triple associates, and using the presence of the
other members of the triple to cue their recognition for each word
in the display. In experiments that used more memorable words and
repeated them more often, such as that by Cohen and Squire (1981),
the cueing effect may have contributed much to the superior
repetition effect of the control subjects and to the presence of
any repetition effect in the amnesic patients. Nevertheless, in
the present experiment the repetition effect achieved by the
control subjects for single stimuli was nearly as large as that for
the triple stimuli. Thus, the locus of the repetition effect was
not entirely in the cueing provided by the frequent repetition of
these words in the same order. Rather, the repetition effect was
already manifest at the single word level. The control subjects
showed no repetition effect for words seen once 24 or 48 hours
before (Figure VII-3), at a point when their recognition accuracy
for such words was at 71%. These results indicate that the
repetition effect was entirely dependent upon the very same
processes underlying recall and recognition. The disappearance of
a repetition effect with words poorly remembered by control
subjects parallels the absence of a repetition effect in H.M., who
was at chance in recognizing words presented in the previous block
(recognition tests 1 and 2).
H.M.'s mirror-reading skill was compared to that of the
control subjects by equating his initial performance with the
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control groups' with respect to repeated words and unique words
(Figure VII-4). The difference between H.M.'s and the control
group's latencies for the first block was then subtracted from the
mean latencies for all the remaining blocks; this calculation was
done separately for the repeated and unique stimuli. Following the
transformation, H.M.'s latencies fall consistently outside of a
single standard deviation of the control group's means for the
repeated stimuli, but consistently inside a single standard
deviation for the unique stimuli. These transformed comparisons
suggest that H.M. learned to read unique words more normally than
he did the repeated words.
The final issue of note is whether H.M.'s long latencies ought
to be viewed as a consequence of a nonmnemonic deficit or of his
amnesia. In recent years, a small but growing language impairment
has been evident in H.M. and it may have harmed his performance.
The origins of his mild language impairment are uncertain, but they
could involve over 40 years of seizures and the side effects of
taking anticonvulsant medications for so long a time. Also, it is
difficult to imagine the full consequence of nearly 40 years of
dense anterograde amnesia upon language abilities. That many years
of impoverished experience, or certainly impoverished memory of
experience, may take subtle tolls upon language. Finally, H.M. was
60 years old when tested, an age at which some decline in task
performance is evident in normal subjects (Salthouse, 1982). The
deleterious effects of aging upon language may well be accentuated
in H.M's case of chronic disease.
It also seems possible, however, that a memory impairment
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could have hindered performance in the early stages of learning to
mirror-read when some subjects laboriously spelled out the words
letter by letter. By the time they correctly identified the final
letters, they sometimes forgot the identity of the initial letters.
Such a problem could be magnified tremendously in H.M.: By the
time he got to the end of the word he may have forgotten entirely
the beginning of the word. In that case, overall latencies would
be associated with the severity of amnesia. Martone et al. did
find longer latencies for KS patients than for their control
subjects with unique words, and they used even shorter words (three
to five letters versus six letters in this experiment). Those
results are consistent with the idea that the length of the word
and the severity of the patient's amnesia interact to produce
longer overall latencies because the amnesia itself intrudes on the
letter-by-letter initial reading process. The results from Cohen
and Squire (1981) do not support this notion, because they found no
impairment whatsoever by their amnesic patients in reading unique
triads, and they used 8- to 10-letter words. Perhaps, in the
context of identifying mirror-reversed text, the Cohen and Squire
patients were less amnesic; they also appeared to show the largest
repetition effect of any amnesic group to date.
In summary, these results suggest that H.M. acquired
considerable skill in mirror-reading, although it is impossible to
say that his acquisition of the perceptual skill was truly normal
because of the increased latency he demonstrated throughout the
experiment. He clearly demonstrated a virtually complete
repetition deficit, which extends the findings of partial
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repetition deficits in KS patients (Cohen and Squire, 1981; Martone
et al., 1985). Furthermore, the repetition effect appeared to
depend upon fact-learning capacities in normal subjects as well.
Finally, fact-learning capacities may play a role in the speed of
reading even unique single words. Further elucidation of this
point requires some understanding of what was learned by subjects,
amnesic or healthy, when they acquired the skill to read
mirror-reversed words.
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Experiment 2: Identification of Incomplete Words and Nonwords
The normal (Cohen and Squire, 1981) or relatively spared
(Martone et al. 1985; Experiment 1) capacity of learning to read
mirror-reversed words despite amnesia applied only to unique
stimuli. The spared learning, therefore, was not item-specific at
the word level: When items were repeated, the amnesic patients
displayed an impairment. Thus, it remained an open question as to
whether amnesic patients can learn a long-lasting (24 hours)
word-specific perceptual skill.
A second issue was what a priori knowledge a subject must have
in order to acquire perceptual skill with a class of stimuli.
Cermak et al. (1985) found that patients with KS learned to read
very rapidly presented words normally, but not nonwords, under
otherwise identical experimental conditions. This finding was
interpreted as evidence that amnesic patients must have premorbid
knowledge of the stimulus as a unit in order to acquire normal
skill with that stimulus. The question of the unit arises from the
fact that patients knew the letters composing the nonwords; the
issue, therefore, centers on what sort of premorbid knowledge is
required to support skill acquisition.
The present experiment examined the acquisition of a
perceptual skill in H.M. with a method similar to that used by
Warrington and Weiskrantz (1970) with amnesic patients, and by
Feustal, Shiffrin, and Salasoo with normal subjects (Feustal et
al., 1983; Salasoo et al., 1985). Subjects had to read words and
pseudowords that emerged slowly from behind a cover of visual
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noise. Repeated and unique stimuli were used so that item-specific
and general perceptual skills could be achieved, respectively.
The relation of fact learning to skill learning in this
paradigm was assessed in several ways. First, high-frequency and
low-frequency words were used as stimuli because low-frequency
words are easier to recognize and high-frequency words are easier
to recall (e.g., Anderson and Bower, 1972; McCormack, 1972). To
the extent that the perceptual skill involved in reading a word
relates to the recall or recognition of having seen the word, one
expects a contrast between skill for rereading high-frequency and
low-frequency words. Second, recall and recognition memory for
unique stimuli were assessed at an interval similar to that between
repetitions of repeating stimuli. These measures were used in
order to infer how well a subject could have recalled or recognized
a stimulus when reading its first repetition. Third, recall and
recognition of the repeated stimuli were assessed one hour after
the Day-1 session and 24 hours after the Day-2 session. These
tests served as estimates of how well subjects could recall or
recognize the repeated stimuli after a 24-hour delay. Fourth, the
two-choice recognition tests employed one of two formats. The
pairs of choices were either presented in regular computer
lettering, or they appeared out of noise in the same graphic mode
as when the subjects were initially exposed to them.
A third issue was the comparison of fact and skill learning
following a single prior exposure to a stimulus. Long-term skill
acquisition paradigms used with amnesic subjects have employed
multiple repetitions in the initial training session. This
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experiment sought to measure fact and skill learning with stimuli
read once 24 or 48 hours earlier. It has been pointed out (Mishkin
and Petri, 1984) that skill learning requires multiple repetitions
to reach their limit, whereas facts can be remembered forever with
a single experience. It is uncertain, however, whether this
contrast between kinds of learning is an essential difference
between them or whether it is related to differences in
experimental design. This experiment compared the enduring
consequence of a single trial upon the two kinds of learning.
Method
Subjects
There were three groups of subjects: 2 severely amnesic
patients, 2 moderately amnesic patients, and 8 normal control
subjects. The two severely amnesic patients were H.M. and #7439
(KS), and the two moderately amnesic patients were #6125 (bilateral
stroke) and #4624 (herpes simplex encephalitis) (described in
Appendix A). The severely amnesic, moderately amnesic, and control
groups had mean ages of 54.0, 55.5, and 54.89 years (range 50-62);
means of 12.0, 16.0, and 13.3 years of education (range 12-16); and
mean WAIS Vocabulary subtest raw scores of 39.0, 54.5, and 41.6
(range 33-51), respectively.
Materials and Procedure
The stimuli were 360 words and 120 pseudowords, all 9 to 11
letters long. The words included 96 high-frequency words (30 to
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350 per million), and 132 low-frequency words (1 per million)
(Kucera and Francis, 1967). The pseudowords were made by
substituting 2 or 3 letters in medium-frequency words (10-15 per
million) such that the resultant pseudowords remained
pronounceable. The stimuli were divided into 12 30-item sets so
that each set included 8 high-frequency and 12 low-frequency words
and 10 pseudowords. The sets were balanced for mean word
frequency's and range of word frequencies, and for letter length.
One set was selected randomly as the repeating set, 7 as unique
sets, and 4 as foils (wrong answers) for multiple-choice
recognition tests. There were three reading tests and four
recognition tests. All stimuli in the reading tests were presented
with graphically produced letters that were four times larger, in
all dimensions, than normal screen print. A stimulus appeared
initially such that 70% of the display was obscured by a field of
randomly placed dots that served as visual noise. Pilot studies
had shown that no subject could read the stimulus correctly with
70% noise. The noise was removed slowly in 60 equal steps of 1.2%
per step so that the word became clear without any noise in 15
seconds. Subjects were seated about 1 meter from the screen, so
that stimuli subtended about 1.1 degrees of vertical and 7.3
degrees of horizontal visual angle.
The Day-1 Reading Test was comprised of three blocks of 60
items each. Each block included 30 items from the repeating set,
and 30 items from a unique set; the repeating set thus appeared in
every block and a unique set appeared just once. The items from
the two sets were randomly interspersed. The Day-2 Reading Test
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was constructed identically, with the same repeating set and three
more unique sets. The Day-3 Reading Test included the unique set
from the second blocks of the Day-1 and Day-2 reading tests and one
new unique set. There were two recognition tests on Day 1.
Recognition Test la included the 30 items from the unique set
(once-seen) from the third block of the Day 1 Reading Test and 30
foils. Each of 30 two-choice displays included the target and foil
one above the other; half of the correct answers were above and
half were below the foil. Target-foil displays were one of two
kinds. In one kind, the two choices appeared in regular screen
print. In the second kind, the two choices appeared in the same
graphic mode as had the stimuli in the Day-1 Reading Test, also
starting at 70% obscurity but clearing in 23 steps of 3.2% in 15
seconds. Both kinds of displays contained the items of each
stimulus type tested. The two kinds of display were randomly
mixed, but each of the two choices in a display was of the same
kind. Recognition Test lb had the same structure, but the correct
answers were the thrice seen items of the repeating set. A third
kind of display was used for Recognition Test 3a and 3b. The items
were presented in the large graphic letters and emerged from
obscuring noise. However, the two choices within a display emerged
at different rates. The more quickly cleared choice appeared as
the Recognition Test 1A and 1B items, 60% noise cleared in 23 steps
of 3.2% in 15 seconds. The more slowly cleared choice appeared at
75% noise and cleared at 1.2% per step in 23 steps. Both items
remained on in a clear format until the subject had responded.
Recognition Test 3a included 30 items from the once-seen unique set
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of the last block from the Day-2 reading test. Recognition Test 3b
consisted of the repeating set. Both recognition tests had half
the correct answers above and half below the matched foil, and half
of the correct answers for each of the three stimulus types were
either cleared more quickly or more slowly.
Subjects were tested on three consecutive days in four
sessions, two on Day 1 and one each on Day 2 and Day 3. The
testing sessions were 24 + 4 hours apart. For the reading tests,
subjects were asked to read each word or nonword as quickly and
accurately as possible. A reasonable reading of the nonwords was
demanded, but the individual variance on this response was large.
For the recognition tests, subjects were asked to select the item
that they had read earlier in the reading tests.
On Day 1, subjects performed Reading Test 1. Following a
1-minute delay, they were asked to recall as many of the words as
possible and then took Recognition Test la. One hour later, the
subjects were brought back into the same room, asked to recall the
words from the Day-1 Reading Test, and then given Recognition Test
lb. On Day 2, subjects took the Day-2 reading test and, after a
minute delay, asked to recall as many stimuli as possible. On Day
3, the subjects were first asked to recall as many stimuli from
Days 1 and 2 as possible, and then followed the Day-3 Reading Test,
a 1-minute delay, and Recognition Tests 3a and 3b.
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Results
Fact-Learning Measures
The recall and recognition tests were the measures of
fact-learning capacities (Figure VII-5). The recall tests,
administered 1 minute after the reading sessions on Days 1 and 2,
were summed for each subject and analyzed together. The control
subjects recalled a mean of 10.3 stimuli (SD = 3.2), the moderately
amnesic group a mean of 0.8 stimuli, and the severely amnesic group
a mean of 0.3 stimuli. One hour after the Day-1 session, the
control group recalled a mean of 3.0 stimuli (SD = 1.9), but no
amnesic patient recalled any stimulus. On Day 3, 24 hours after
the Day-2 session, the control subjects recalled a mean of 4.0
stimuli (SD = 2.7) and again no amnesic patient recalled any
stimulus (Figure VII-5).
The correct answers for Recognition Test 1 were the unique
stimuli from the last block of Day 1. Scores for all of the
recognition tests were the percentage of correct answers. Overall,
the control subjects, moderately amnesic, and severely amnesic
patients had mean scores of 71.2 (SD = 6.9), 78.5, and 55.0%
(chance performance for all the recognition tests was 50%. The
results for the control group were analyzed in a repeated measures
ANOVA with factors of stimulus type (high-frequency words,
low-frequency words, and nonwords) and presentation type (normal
screen print and emerging from visual noise). For the control
group there were significant effects of stimulus type E(2, 14) =
9.75), MSe = 527.0, p(.01] and an interaction between stimulus type
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and presentation type [F(2, 14) = 9.57, MSe = 224, (.01];
presentation type by itself did not yield a significant effect.
The normal control group recognized low-frequency words best (89.6%
correct), high frequency words less well (64.1%), and nonwords at a
near-chance level (55.0%). The moderately amnesic patients were as
accurate as the control group with low-frequency words (87.5%) and
with nonwords (60.0%), and did better with the high-frequency words
(91.7%). The severely amnesic patients remained near chance on all
classes of stimuli (50.0% for high-frequency words, 41.7% for
low-frequency words, and 65.0% for nonwords). The interaction of
stimulus-type and display-type in the control group reflected
better accuracy with high-frequency words presented as they had
been read (71.9%) rather than in regular screen print (56%).
Recognition Test 2 occurred 1 hour after the Day 1 reading
session; the correct answers were the thrice-repeated stimuli.
Overall, the control group scored a mean of 84.2% (SD = 6.8),
whereas the moderately amnesic group and severely amnesic group
recognized means of 76.5% (SD = 4.9) and 53.3% (SD = 9.4)
respectively. Analysis of the scores of the normal control group
yielded a significant effect of stimulus-type [F(2, 14) = 9.15, MSe
= 184.1, p(.01], again reflecting superior accuracy in recognizing
low-frequency words (95% correct) over high-frequency words (76%)
and nonwords (77.5%). A significant interaction between word-type
and display-type [F(2, 14) = 8.72, MSe = 237.7, p(.01] was
accounted for by the better accuracy with high-frequency words
presented as they had been read (93.8%) rather than in regular
screen print (59.4%).
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The third recognition test, on Day 3, served as a measure of
24-hour recognition for the repeated stimuli. Mean recognition
scores were 94.2% for the control group (SD = 6.62), 83.4% for the
moderately amnesic patients (SD = 18.9), and 66.5% for the severely
amnesic patients (SD = 9.2).
Performance Measures
The results for the three groups were analyzed in a repeated
measures ANOVA with factors of group, block (1-6), repetition
(repeated and unique stimuli), and stimulus type (high-frequency
word, low-frequency word, nonword). The reaction times were
converted to log 10 values; the analyses were computed with those
data and the resultant values are displayed in Figures VII-6. The
data for the repeated stimuli are shown in Tables VII-3 - 5.
There were significant main effects of block IF(5, 45) =
35.93, p<.01], word type F(2, 18 = 74.78, p<.01], and repetition
[F(1, 9) = 356.37, p<.01] (Figure VII-6). These effects indicated
that the subjects had learned to read the words more quickly, that
the repeated words had an additional advantage over the unique
words (Tables VII 3-5), and that those effects were different for
the three word types. Repetition had a greater facilitation effect
for low-frequency words and nonwords than for high-frequency words;
this result was seen in all the groups. The critical result was
that there was no repetition by group interaction, indicating that
the two amnesic groups had a normal advantage for the repeated
stimuli. There was a block by group interaction [F(10, 45) =
35.93, p<.01], but this effect was accounted for by H.M.'s
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exceedingly long initial times for low-frequency words and nonwords
(Tables VII-3 - 5; Figure VII-7). Consequently, the severely
amnesic group had a larger effect of block as H.M.'s initially long
latencies approached those of the other subjects in later blocks.
H.M.'s long initial responses also produced a stimulus type by
group interaction F(4, 18) = 2.94, p<(.051. However, there were no
significant three-way interactions among repetition, group, block,
or word type. These results indicate that the amnesic patients had
an essentially normal pattern of learning.
Interaction between Fact and Performance Learning Measures
The Day-3 reading test, and associated two-choice recognition
test, were designed to assess memory consequent to a single
exposure to a stimulus 24 to 48 hours earlier. Both amnesic groups
were near chance recognition (50%) at that delay (moderately
amnesic group 55%, severely amnesic group 43%). The control
subjects recognized about 66% of the high-frequency and
low-frequency words, but were near chance with the nonwords (56%)
(Table VII-6).
The Day 3 reading test included once-seen stimuli from the
Day-1 and Day-2 reading tests (Figure VII-8). A repeated measures
ANOVA revealed a significant repetition effect for the second
exposure of these words F(1, 9) = 9.49, MSe = 254.7, p<.011, but
no interaction of repetition by group or of repetition by
stimulus-type. These results suggest that the facilitating
influence of a single prior exposure was similar for all groups and
all stimulus types.
Table VII-3. MEAN TIME IN SECONDS TO READ REPEATED
HIGH-FREQUENCY WORDS
Day 1 Day 2
Group
Normal
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Block 6
M 7.4 6.7 7.0
Control SD (1.5) (1.3) (1.6)
(N=8)
Moderately M 7.9
Amnesic SD (1.1)
(N=2)
Severely M 8.8
6.6 6.3
(0.9) (0.6)
5.4
Amnesic SD (2.2) (0.2)
(N=2)
H.M.a 10.9 5.5
4.9
(0.2)
4.8
6.7
(1.5)
5.2
6.3
(0.9)
4.2
(0.1) (0.3)
5.1 4.0
aalso in the severely amnesic group
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6.3
(1.0)
5.8
(1.1)
6.0
(1.3)
5.6
(0.1)
5.0
(0.5)
5.4
Table VII-4. MEAN TIME IN SECONDS TO READ REPEATED
LOW-FREQUENCY WORDS
Day 1 Day 2
Group Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Block 6
Normal M 11.7 9.7 8.4 7.9 7.3 7.1
Control SD (2.1) (1.4) (1.8) (1.8) (1.2) (1.3)
(N=8)
Moderately M 11.2 8.2 7.3 8.0 7.1 6.4
Amnesic SD (1.6) (0.1) (0.5) (1.2) (1.3) (0.1)
(N=2)
Severely M 13.2 9.1 7.9 8.1 6.8 8.3
Amnesic SD (4.8) (2.3) (1.4) (2.0) (2.0) (3.6)
(N=2)
H.M.a 16.6 10.8 8.8 9.6 8.3 10.8
aalso in the severely amnesic group
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Table VII-5. MEAN TIME IN SECONDS TO READ REPEATED NONWORDS
Day 1 Day 2
Group Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Block 6
Normal M 14.2 12.0 11.1 10.2 9.1 9.2
Control SD (3.8) (2.3) (2.5) (1.7) (2.0) (1.9)
(N=7)
Moderately M 13.4 11.1 11.0 10.1 9.1 8.4
Amnesic SD (3.5) (2.4) (2.2) (2.5) (2.4) (1.0)
(N=2)
Severely M 26.6 15.5 12.6 17.0 11.4 9.3
Amnesic SD (22.0) (7.8) (5.5) (12.0) (5.8) (2.7)
(N=2)
H.M.a 42.2 21.0 16.5 25.4 15.5 11.2
aalso in severely amnesic group
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Table VII-6. RECOGNITION FOR STIMULI SEEN ONCE 24-48 HOURS
PREVIOUSLY: MEAN PERCENT CORRECT
High-Frequency Low-Frequency Nonwords
Group Overall Words Words
Normal 63.3 (11.8)a 65.6 (14.5) 67.6 (15.0) 56.3 (11.9)
Control
(N=7)
Moderately 55.0 (11.7) 50.0 (18.4) 75.5 (11.0) 35.0 (7.1)
Amnesic
(N=2)
Severely 43.4 (4.7) 50.0 (0) 37.5 (5.9) 45.0 (7.1)
Amnesic
(N=2)
H.M.c 47.0 50.0 42.0 50.0
aNote: chance performance yields a score of 50
bstandard deviation
Calso included in severely amnesic group
3.so
2.45
2.40
2.35
2.30
3.Zs
2.20
2.15
2.10
2.05
2,00
1.90
1.35
r -
ICS (n.S) Moderate An. (n-2) Severe Amn. (n-l)
.50
3.45
2.40
2.3S
2.30
2.25
2.20
2 .1S
2.10
2.05
2.00
1.9O5
1.90
MCS (n4l) Moderate Akn. (nat) Severe An. (n'2)
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Figure VII-8. Mean time, in log1 0 seconds, for normal control (NCS),
moderately amnesic, and severly amnesic groups to read stimuli read
once before, 24 hours earlier (upper panel) or 48 hours earlier (lower panel)
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Discussion
The four amnesic patients were all impaired in recalling
stimuli at all intervals. Impairments on the first test of recall,
immediately following the last block of reading on Day 1, means
that the patients were impaired in their recall of the repeating
stimuli when they first repeated in Block 2. Impairments at the
1-hour and 24-hour recall tests indicate that the patients had a
deficit in recalling the very words they learned to identify more
rapidly at the longer delays. Consequently, there is strong
evidence that the skill for identifying such stimuli perceptually
is dissociable from recall for those stimuli.
The moderately and severely amnesic groups, though similarly
impaired recall tests, showed diverging patterns of performance on
the recognition tests. The moderately amnesic patients appeared to
be unimpaired in recognizing the unique stimuli at a block's delay,
and mildly impaired in recognizing the repeated stimuli at delays
of 1 and 24 hours. In contrast, the severely amnesic patients were
near chance on all the recognition tests. As in the case of the
mirror-reversed recognition tests in Experiment 1, presenting the
recognition choices in the same format upon which skill had been
built did not reduce the magnitude of recognition impairment. The
dissociation between fully impaired recall and moderately impaired
recognition in the one amnesic group cannot be dismissed simply as
a consequence of ceiling effects in the control group, because
their 71% performance on the initial recognition test was well
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within the bounds of sensitive measurement.
The various forms of fact-learning impairment, however, did
not prevent either amnesic group from acquiring and retaining a
skill for the perceptual identification of repeating stimuli. In
contrast to the mirror-reading results, patients and normal
subjects demonstrated modest and inconsistent reductions in latency
for the unique stimuli; both groups showed substantial reductions
for the repeating stimuli. It appears that all subjects acquired
perceptual knowledge of the emergence of specific stimuli.
Inspection of H.M.'s data (Table VII-3, Figure VII-7) shows
that his performance was especially similar to normal subjects with
the high-frequency words. His performance in the first block of
Day 2 with the repeated low-frequency words and nonwords showed a
large increase in latency from the last block of Day 1.
Interpretation of those increases is clouded by the fact that
H.M.'s initial reading time with those two sets of stimuli were
exceptionally long, echoing his slow mirror-reading performance in
Experiment 1.
All three groups demonstrated reduced latencies for perceptual
identification of stimuli that were seen once 24 and 48 hours
before (Figure VII-8), despite recognition memory for stimuli seen
that long ago being at chance for the amnesic patients and low (66%
correct) for the normal group. This long-term dissociation, in
normal subjects, between perceptual knowledge and recognition
memory for an emerging stimulus parallels the dissociation between
the two forms of memory shown by amnesic patients with the repeated
stimuli.
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The good learning by at least three of the amnesic patients
with the nonword stimuli contrasts with results from Cermak et al.
(1985), who found that patients with KS showed normally enhanced
efficiency in identifying rapidly presented words but not nonwords
following earlier exposure to both. The apparent contradiction in
results is mitigated by the different perceptual and linguistic
mechanisms that must be involved in two such different tasks. For
example, the time to pronounce the stimuli constituted part of the
performance measure in the present experiment, but not in Cermak's.
The present results concur with the almost normal improvement
in reidentifying incomplete figures shown by amnesic patients,
including H.M. (Milner et al., 1968; Warrington and eiskrantz,
1968). The present experiment, however, did not provide normal
subjects the opportunity to generate a verbal memory for each
stimulus separate from memory for the stimulus itself. These
results suggest that H.M. and other amnesic patients can acquire
long-lasting stimulus-specific perceptual skill despite poor recall
or recognition memory for the stimulus itself.
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Experiment 3: Specific Learning in General Skill Acquisition
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 provided contradictory
evidence as to what sort of perceptual learning may occur despite
global amnesia. If H.M. showed normal learning in the
mirror-reading experiment, it was the skill for reading the unique
words only. H.M. showed almost no additional advantage for reading
repeated words. On the other hand, the normal learning by H.M. and
the other amnesic patients in Experiment 2 occurred with repeated
words and nonwords. Thus, two perceptual skills that could be
learned by amnesic patients appeared to involve different
mechanisms. Although it was relatively clear that all subjects
acquired a perceptual skill at the word (or nonword) level in
Experiment 2, it remained unclear as to what was being learned in a
skill for reading unique mirror-reversed words. One possibility
was that subjects learned to reverse rapidly, or mentally rotate,
the mirror-reversed text. Such a skill would allow them to gain
competence over trials with unique words as their mental reversal
speed increased. Another possibility was that subjects acquired
knowledge about the identity of specific mirror-reversed letters.
Experiment 3 was designed to examine which of these explanations
was valid and to reveal something about the mechanism underlying
the skill of reading novel, mirror-reversed words.
The words for Experiment 3 were chosen so that half (Sets 1
and 2) were composed only from the letters a, b, d, e, i, 1, m, n,
s, v, w, x, and z, and half (Sets 3 and 4) from the letters c, f,
g, h, k, o, p, q, r, t, v, and y. The letter sets were selected so
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that confusable letter pairs, such as b/d, p/q, t/f, a/e, and m/w,
appeared in the same sets. Subjects were asked to read the words
in a mirror, but Sets 1 and 2 always came before or after Sets 3
and 4. Thus, each subject read two sets of words made up from one
group of letters, and two more sets of words made up from the other
group of letters. No words were repeated.
If learning to read novel mirror-reversed words is a general
skill, or a specific mental rotation skill that applies to all
letters, the subjects were expected to show the lower pattern of
performance displayed in Figure VII-9. The subjects would display
a general skill from the first and second sets, and transfer that
skill to the third and fourth sets of words made up from letters
not yet seen by them in the mirror. Conversely, if learning to
read novel mirror-reversed words depends upon specific perceptual
knowledge of the mirror-reversed appearance of individual letters,
then subjects were expected to show the upper pattern of
performance displayed in Figure VII-9. The subjects would still
gain skill from the first to the second set, but this skill, built
upon perceptual knowledge of only the already seen letters, would
not transfer to set 3, which has words made from as yet unseen
letters.
Method
Subjects
Eight women, 19 to 25 years old and employees of MIT, took
part in this experiment. They were asked to participate as
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volunteers in the experiment.
Procedure
There were four sets of 24 words each. The design was
completely balanced, so that the four sets were shown in all eight
possible orders with the proviso that Sets 1 and 2 both come either
before or after Sets 3 and 4.
The subjects were seated 1 meter away from the mirror. They
were asked to read the individually presented words as quickly as
possible. The examiner pressed a key to record the latencies of
their responses.
Results
The median response times per word block were computed for
each block for each subject. The means of the median for each
subject for the four blocks were 2.50, 2.31, 2.98, and 2.57 seconds
(Figure VII-9). The difference from the second to the third block,
the measure of transfer of any general skill, was significant It
(7) = 3.06, p<.01, two-tailed], with the mean response time longer
for the third than for the second block. The mean time to read
Sets 1 or 2 first was 2.28 seconds, and it was 3.05 if Sets I and 2
were read after sets 3 and 4. The mean time to read sets 3 and 4
first was 2.73 seconds, and it was 2.90 following practice with
sets 1 and 2.
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Figure VII-9. Upper panel: two hypothetical results for Experiment 3 with
YES line indicating letter-specific learning, and NO line indicating more
general learning. Lower panel: results in median seconds per word for 8
normal subjects.
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Discussion
The results indicate that the skill for reading novel words in
a mirror rests upon specific perceptual knowledge of the
mirror-reversed appearance of the letters comprising the novel
words. This result is consistent with the finding in Experiment 1
that a single exposure to the mirror-reversed version of a word
did not have enduring effects. When recognition memory fell below
75%, as it did for the normal subjects on Day 3, there was no
repetition advantage for reading words seen once on Days 1 and 2.
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VIII: ANTEROGRADE ACQUISITION OF PROBLEM-SOLVING KNOWLEDGE
Although it was found that amnesic patients could acquire and
retain motor and perceptual skills, the range of behaviors that
amnesic patients learned could be considered peripheral to high
forms of human cognition. Then, Wood and Kinsbourne (1972,1982)
and Cohen and Corkin (1981) reported preserved learning in amnesic
patients when they were required to solve challenging problems of
logic. The possible range of preserved learning in amnesia gained
new breadth. These original findings, however, have not been
followed up systematically, and the present experiments were
designed to understand the significance of those original findings.
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Experiment 1: Number Series
Wood and Kinsbourne (1972,1982) reported substantial long-term
learning in a group of amnesic patients given a number-series
problem that had to be solved by a variant of the Fibonacci rule.
Subjects were presented with two numbers (e.g. 3,4) and asked to
guess the next number in a five-number series (e.g., 3 4 _ _ _).
After the subject guessed what the next number would be, the
examiner revealed the correct answer and asked the subject to
predict the next number, e.g., 3 4 7 _, 3 4 7 11 _, and then 3 4
7 11 18. This procedure was followed with seven five-number series
in succession. Subjects learned that the rule for correctly
predicting each number was to add together the two previous
numbers. One day and again 17 weeks later the amnesic patients
showed increased accuracy over the initial day in predicting the
third, fourth,and fifth number in each series. Wood et al.
interpreted their results as evidence that amnesic patients could
learn a rule despite their memory impairment. Two aspects of that
experiment, however, clouded a definitive interpretation of the
results.
First, the performance of control subjects was not reported,
making it difficult to evaluate the patients' performance in either
quantitative or qualitative terms. This issue is all the more
relevant because a lenient scoring procedure was adopted in which
subjects received partial credit for merely answering with a number
higher than the prior numbers in a series, even if that number was
not the sum of the previous two numbers. More stringent scoring
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might have revealed that amnesic patients were inferior to control
subjects, precluding the conclusion that rule learning of this sort
is spared in amnesia.
The second unresolved issue was the nature of the rules that
such a preserved rule-learning capacity could acquire. Consider a
paired-associate verbal-learning task in which subjects are asked
to learn that the word "car" goes with the word "moon." When the
examiner asks what word went with "car," the subject must answer
"moon." The paired associates may be phrased as a propositional
rule: "If the examiner says 'car', then I must say 'moon'." Yet,
it is exactly this sort of learning that amnesic patients are
especially poor at doing. It may be that amnesic patients and
normal subjects learn the Fibonacci number series as a
propositional rule: "Add the last two numbers." This possibility
was hard to evaluate in the Wood et al. study because the same
seven five-number sets were used in all testing sessions, making it
hard to know whether the patients consulted a rule of any kind or
maintained a dim but discernible memory of the actual number series
themselves.
The present experiment sought to reexamine the significance of
the experiment by Wood and Kinsbourne. The number series were also
five-number series that obeyed the Fibonacci rule, but subjects saw
a particular series only once. Subsequent good performance on
other series depended upon knowledge of an abstract rule rather
than memory for a particular number series. Scoring was strict:
An answer was either correct or incorrect, without partial credit
for incorrect answers. Finally, a parallel experiment was
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conducted with another number series that could not be predicted by
addition or by any rule. Rather, the identical arbitrary number
series repeated from trial to trial, and subjects could answer
correctly only by rote memory for the previous appearance of the
same set, i.e. paired-associate memory for a five-number series.
The more similar the performance was on the two types of number
series, for either normal or memory-disordered subjects, the more
likely that the subjects consulted similar representations or kinds
of rules for the two types of tasks.
193
Method
Subjects
Four amnesic patients and 4 control subjects participated.
The amnesic patients were H.M. (bilateral resection of
temporal-lobe structures), #4624 (herpes simplex encephalitis),
#7439 (Korsakoff's syndrome), and #6125 (bilateral stroke)
(Appendix A). The four control subjects were 2 men and 2 women
with a mean age of 58.5 years, and a mean educational level of 14.0
years (versus a mean age of 54.5 years and a mean educational level
of 14.0 years for the amnesic group).
Materials and Procedure
All testing was done on a Comrex amber monitor controlled by
an Apple IIe microcomputer. For every set, subjects were presented
initially with five dashes; above the first two dashes were two
numbers. The subject was asked to guess the next number. After
the subject responded, the examiner noted the response, pressed a
key, and the third number was revealed above the third dash. This
procedure was repeated for the fourth and fifth items in the set.
Then, a new set began. There were 15 sets in the initial session,
15 other sets in a second session an hour later, and 15 more in a
final session 24 hours later. Each set was unique, but all the
correct answers could be provided by adding the preceding two
numbers in the set.
After an intervening day, subjects were presented, under
otherwise identical conditions, with a single number set for which
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addition failed to provide the correct answer. For all 15 sets in
the first session, the identical number set of 5, 6, 10, 17, 26 was
repeated 15 times; no single rule governed the relation among the
numbers in this set. Just as is in the previous protocol, the
number series was presented with the first two numbers in view, the
subject guessed what the next number would be, the next number
appeared, and so on. There were 15 appearances of the same set in
each session, and new sessions followed 1 and 24 hours after the
first one. The number set was always the same.
Results
The number of correct responses, with a maximum of 45 per
session, were analyzed in a repeated measures ANOVA, with factors
of group (amnesic and control), rule (additive or rote), and
session (1-3). The analysis revealed significant effects of group
(F (1, 6) = 22.86, MSe = 25.7, p<.01] and of session ( (2, 12) =
14.0, MSe = 22.5, p<.01), but not of rule. These results indicate
that the amnesic patients were impaired in all sessions and with
both sorts of rules, but that both groups improved across sessions
(Figures VIII-1,2).
Discussion
The results indicated that the amnesic patients were impaired
in learning both sorts of rules (Figures VIII-1,2). In contrast,
the normal subjects learned the solutions to both sorts of number
A ...-.. A
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Figure VIII-1. Mean percentage correct responses for additive rule
(upper panel) and rote rule (lower panel) for normal control (NCS) and
amnesic (AMN) groups in Experiment 1; a bar equals one standard error of
the mean.
95 
M
* 90-
n
as -
s 
C
0
n
i
C
0
r
r
C
t
70 -
O0
1/
1-.o* -' ·
1-bour
SS-
so
Soo 
Initial
90-
aIs 
75 -
70'
60-
Ss-
SO
1 '--------f- I~~~~~~~~~~~~~--4
-- 
-t
Ire 
&W i
I'
&S'
I
III
i
I
II
196
-- *--- ADDITIVE
---O- POTE
---- ADDITIVE
--- 0O-- ROTE
Initlal 1-hour 24-hour
Delay
Figure VIII-2. Mean percentage correct responses for four amnesic patients
(upper panel) and four normal control subjects (lower panel) when applying
the additive and rote rules; a bar equals one standard error of the mean.
100 
es 
T
i.
T 7, OaI
90-
So 
75 -
70 -
6S -
&0'
55 
so
Initial 1-hour
Delay
24-hour
100oo
HM 90
n as
P
7S 
70-
n
t
C
0
r
C
t S0
55 -
50
- I · _ 4
------------------ 1
,,
I
4
I
I
I
1"
4
1-
r
t
-L_ _- - -- - - - -
-
197
series in the initial session, and remembered the solution almost
perfectly 1 and 24 hours later. The amnesic patients forgot the
solution after both delays. As a measure of remembering across the
delays, the number of correct answers from the first five series
(maximum = 15) at the two delays was subtracted from the last five
series from the previous session. The resultant numbers were
converted into a percentage remembering score, the best possible
score being 100% (perfect remembering) and lower scores indicating
worse remembering. The control group had a mean score of 100% for
both rules at both delays. The amnesic patients had mean scores of
80% (additive rule, 1-hour delay), 78% (additive rule, 24-hour
delay), 73% (rote rule, 1-hour delay), and 65% (rote rule, 24-hour
delay). Thus, the amnesic patients were impaired in remembering
the solution across a delay. They were able, however, to relearn
the rule more rapidly in each successive session, despite delays as
long as 24 hours. Retention and relearning appeared to be
dissociable in the patients, because their best relearning
performance occurred in the same 24-hour delayed sessions that
featured their worst remembering performances (28.5%). The
efficient relearning was interesting in itself, but it does not
constitute evidence of a preserved learning capacity because the
patients' impairments increased, relative to controls, across the
first two sessions. Furthermore, the scores of the control group
were limited by a ceiling effect.
Two kinds of rules were used to test the hypothesis that
amnesic and normal subjects learned the additive rule via fact
learning processes. If both subject groups learned the additive
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rule as a statement ("ADD THE LAST TWO NUMBERS"), their learning of
that rule should have been similar to their learning on the rote
rule. Indeed, comparison of the performances of the two groups
suggested that this might have been the case: The patterns of
learning were similar over time (Figure VIII-2). These data
provided evidence that the two groups learned both rules as facts,
and that the amnesic patients learned the facts less well than the
control subjects.
Although the increasingly rapid relearning of both rules by
the amnesic patients is of note, and replicates the essence of the
Wood and Kinsbourne report, the present experiment showed how
certain experimental conditions can suggest misleadingly the
presence of intact learning despite amnesia. First, the scores of
the control group were limited by a ceiling effect, and this
created an underestimate of the amnesic patients' mnemonic
impairment. Second, each additive number series contained two
examples of the rule to be learned, and the delays between number
series in a session were within the immediate memory span of the
amnesic patients. Thus, even poorly remembered information, as
shown by the amnesic patients' impaired remembering scores, may
have been amplified into high scores. Altogether, then, the
performance by amnesic patients indicated a deficit in fact
learning, not the intact functioning of a spared memory system.
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Experiment 2: Sugar Production
Instances of intact learning in amnesic patients are
characterized by a schism between acquired knowledge that guides
good performance and the inability of patients as well as normal
subjects to report or verbalize that knowledge. Experiment 1
revealed that amnesic patients were unable to learn the solution to
a problem in which the solution was easily verbalized as a
propositional rule. In contrast, Experiment 2 was patterned after
a study by Berry and Broadbent (1984), who tested normal subjects
and found them unable to verbalize acquired problem-solving
knowledge. Berry and Broadbent asked subjects to pretend that they
supervised a sugar factory, and requested them to vary the number
of workers to achieve a target sugar production. The problem was
presented on a computer; an algorithm transformed the subject's
selection of number of workers into a resultant sugar production.
Across trials, Berry and Broadbent's subjects improved their
ability to hit the target sugar production. However, the subjects
could not deduce the algorithm or give any articulate account of
how they were improving. When given a multiple choice
questionnaire in which they had to guess how much sugar would be
produced under a particular condition, the subjects who had learned
to do well on the problem did poorly, even though the same
algorithm applied to the problem and the questionnaire. A second
group of subjects were given twice as many computer trials, and
their performance at the end was significantly superior to the
first group. This second, more skilled group, however, did not do
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any better at reporting the algorithm or at giving correct answers
on the questionnaire. Thus, Berry and Broadbent found a clear
example of problem-solving learning in which acquired skill could
not be reported or transferred verbally. This present experiment
was patterned after theirs in order to find out whether a schism in
normal learning between skilled performance and conscious knowledge
of what underlies that performance was sufficient to identify a
task that an amnesic patient could learn normally.
Method
Subjects
The subjects were H.M. (aged 58) and 3 control subjects (1 man
and 2 women), who had a mean age of 57.5 years. The control
subjects had a mean educational level of 13.3 years compared to
H.M.'s 12 years.
Materials and procedure
Subjects were asked to pretend that they were in charge of a
sugar factory. Their goal was to produce 9,000 tons of sugar every
month. For each month, they could employ between 100 and 1,200
workers in units of 50 workers. These instructions were read
aloud, discussed, and summarized on a card that was kept in view
throughout testing. On each trial, designated as a month, the
subject selected a number of workers, the examiner typed the number
into the computer for calculation of the resultant production, and
that production was shown numerically and graphically. A session
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consisted of 30 trials, or months, and all 30 months were shown on
the bar graph. On Day 1, two sessions were given back-to-back. A
third session occurred 24 hours later, and a fourth and final
session 24 hours after that on Day 3.
The algorithm calculated sugar production by multiplying 20
times the number of workers selected by the subject and then
subtracting the production of the previous month. Production
values below 1,000 tons were randomly displayed as either 1,000 or
2,000 tons; production values above 12,000 tons were randomly
displayed as 11,000 or 12,000 tons; the previous month's production
was the displayed production. Limiting the sugar production
outputs between 1, 600, and 12,000 tons was done in order to
prevent subjects from straying from the target production of 9,000
tons. If the subject achieved 8,000 or 10,000 tons, a tone was
sounded, and the display "CLOSE !" was seen. If the subject
achieved a perfect 9,000 tons, a multi-tone series was sounded, and
the display "PERFECT !" was seen. Performance was scored as the
difference between the subject's production and 9,000 tons, divided
by 1,000. A perfect score was 0, and the higher the score, the
worse the performance.
Besides performance scores, the subjects' knowledge about the
problem was tracked by three types of multiple-choice
questionnaires. The problem experience questionnaire included nine
five-choice questions about the problem, including what did the
factory produce, what was your goal, how did you change the level
of sugar production, and what did you see while you were doing the
task? This questionnaire was administered prior to testing on Days
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2 and 3, 24 hours after the previous sessions on Days 1 and 2. In
addition, following each session, subjects were given qualitative
and quantitative questionnaires in which they had to select the
sugar production given the prior month's production and the current
month's number of workers (i.e., all the information needed to give
an accurate answer). The qualitative questionnaire offered three
answers; each answer covered a range of possible productions,
whereas the quantitative questionnaire demanded an answer from
1,000 to 12,000 tons in steps of 1,000 (12 choices).
Results
Fact-Learning Measures
The three normal subjects could recall having done the task,
but H.M. could not. The multiple-choice problem-experience
questionnaire provided a more sensitive measure of memory for
having attempted the problem the previous day. The control
subjects answered 100% of the questions correctly on Day 2 and on
Day 3. H.M. answered 17% (chance yielded a score of 20%) of the
questions correctly on Day 2, and 50% on Day 3. In order to find
out whether H.M. was remembering more about his sugar-production
problem experience each day, he was given the same questionnaire 24
hours after the Day 3 session; his score fell back to 17%.
Performance Measures
The score for efficiency of sugar production was the number of
tons produced above or below the target goal of 9,000 tons, divided
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Figure VIII-3. Mean error-per-trial score for normal control
subjects (NCS) and H.M. in Experiment 2.
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by 1,000. This transformation yielded on error score such that
better performance was indicated by a lower score. The three
control subjects improved from session to session and across days
(Table VIII-1, Figure VIII-3), with a mean improvement of 75.3%
(range 60-94) from the first to the last sessions. H.M., despite
starting at a better level of performance than the mean of the
control group, demonstrated an impaired degree of learning (19%)
across the three days, and had his worst performance in the third
session.
Verbalization Measures
The quantitative and qualitative questionnaires provided
measures of how well the control subjects could gain explicit
access to the knowledge that guided their skilled sugar production
management. The control subjects never rose above chance
performance on any day with the qualitative questionnaire (Table
VIII-2). Their performance improved a modest 15% across the three
days on the quantitative questionnaire. Even this improvement,
however, was inconsistent, and the group did worst on Day 2.
Discussion
The results of the sugar production experiment indicated that
H.M. was impaired in fact-learning as well as performance measures
on this task. This failure occurred despite his initially good
performance, and despite the fact that the normal subjects gained
little explicit knowledge about how the problem worked. Thus, one
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cannot predict that H.M. will show preserved learning on a task
that normal subjects learn by measures of performance, despite poor
explicit knowledge about the structure of the problem (Berry and
Broadbent, 1984).
Different aspects of the problem were examined in each
subjects' results. The algorithm that calculated each month's
sugar production created some situations in which the subject had
to lower the number of workers in order to raise the sugar
production, and vice versa. The intuitive but wrong response in
those situations was to raise the number of workers in order to
raise the sugar production, or lower the former to lower the
latter. Early on, subjects tended to make these intuitive, or
common-sense but wrong responses. As they gained expertise with
the problem, subjects learned to make the counterintuitive but
correct response, e.g., to raise the number of workers in order to
lower the sugar production. The control group learned to suppress
the intuitive but wrong responses, reducing such responses from a
mean of 60% in the first session to 0% in the last. In contrast,
H.M. increased his errors of this type from 40% to 60%. The
control group also learned to make the counterintuitive but correct
response, increasing such responses from a mean of 9% in the first
session to 87% in the last. H.M. showed a more modest improvement,
going from 13% to 40%. H.M. could not overcome his premorbid,
intuitive or common-sense knowledge that hiring more workers
usually results in more production.
The question remained whether H.M. could show normal learning
on some aspect of the problem that did not require modification of
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his premorbid beliefs. One such aspect may have been the magnitude
in the change of number of workers selected per trial. There is no
specific belief that subjects were likely to have about how many
workers should be changed per round. Early on, subjects tended to
hire or fire large numbers of workers, though optimal performance
usually resulted from small changes in the numbers of workers. The
normal subjects learned to reduce the size of the number of workers
hired or fired across sessions, averaging changes of 332 workers
per trial in the first session and 138 in the last. H.M. reduced
his changes in the average number of workers hired or fired per
trial from 290 to 110. The reductions of the control group and
H.M., 58.4% and 62.1% respectively, were similar. Thus, it appears
that H.M. could learn some aspect of this task normally, as long as
he did not have to modify premorbid beliefs.
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Table VIII-1. fEAN SUGAR PRODUCTION ERROR PER TRIAL ACROSS DAYS
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3
Group Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4
Normal M 4.15 2.28 2.07 1.03
Control SD 1.6 0.68 0.32 0.7
(N=3)
H.M. 3.20 2.9 3.80 2.60
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Table VIII-2. MEAN PERCENT CORRECT FOR NORMAL CONTROL (N=3)
SUBJECTS ON VERBALIZATION QUESTIONNAIRES
Questionnaire Day 1 Day 2 Day 3
Qualitativea 5 10 35
Quantitativeb 2.66 2.93 2.27
achance yielded a score of 33
bmean error per trial
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Experiment 3: Missionaries and Cannibals
Cohen and Corkin (1981) reported normal acquisition and
retention of the solution to the Tower-of-Hanoi puzzle by H.M. and
other amnesic patients. Butters et al. (1985) subsequently found
that patients with global amnesia due to KS were impaired in
learning the same task. Because patients with KS are known to be
poor at problem-solving tasks (e.g., Oscar-Berman, 1973), their
problem-solving deficit may have prevented efficient learning in
that domain. The Tower-of-Hanoi puzzle is an example of a
move-type problem in which elements are moved under highly
constrained conditions from a beginning state to a goal state. The
present experiment sought to determine how H.M. and a patient with
KS performed another move-type problem, Missionaries and Cannibals.
Method
Subjects
The patients were H.M. and patient #7439 (KS) (Appendix A).
There were 5 normal control subjects, 2 men and 3 women, with a
mean age of 56.2 years and a mean educational level of 13.6 years.
Materials and Procedure
All testing was done on an IBM-PC microcomputer with a color
monitor. The subject saw 3 missionaries, shown as crosses, and 3
cannibals, shown as shields, on the green left bank of a blue
river. A brown boat on the left bank could accommodate one or two
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people. When the subject had selected a move, the display
graphically showed one or two people crossing the river in the boat
and getting out on the other bank.
Subjects were told that their goal was to transport 3
missionaries and 3 cannibals across the river safely and in as few
moves as possible. All the passengers and the boat began on the
left bank. The subjects had to follow several rules: The boat
could hold only one or two people, the boat could not cross the
river without a passenger, all passengers in the boat had to
disembark before new passengers could come on board and,
critically, that the missionaries could not be outnumbered by the
cannibals on either shore for fear of being cannibalized.
Throughout the session the rules were displayed on a card placed in
the subject's view. For each crossing of the boat, the subject
selected the passenger(s), and the examiner entered the
selection(s). If the desired move was illegal, the computer made a
warning tone and displayed a message: "I cannot do that because
the missionaries would be eaten!" For legal selections, the
computer stored the response and the latency to respond. The
optimal solution required 11 steps, two of which could be made in
each of two equally good ways. When the subject had moved all the
passengers safely to the right bank, a multicolored congratulatory
display was shown. Four trials (moves to solution) were given on
each of four consecutive days. Prior to testing on Days 2,3, and
4, a problem experience questionnaire was given. It included one
recall question about having done the task, and seven five-choice
recognition questions about who had to be transported, across what,
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in what, how many had to be transported, how many could fit in the
boat, and so on.
Results
Fact-Learninq Measures
Neither amnesic patient recalled having done the problem
before at the start of the Day 2, Day 3, or Day 4 session. On the
problem-experience questionnaire, the control subjects answered
90.7%, 90.7%, and 100% of the questions correctly on Days 2-4,
respectively, compared to mean scores of 21.4%, 21.4%, and 35.7%
for the amnesic patients (chance was 20%).
Performance Measures
The critical performance measure was the number of moves
required to solve the problem on each successive day (Table VIII-3
and Figure VIII-4). The number of moves to solution per day was
analyzed in a repeated measures ANOVA with factors of group
(amnesic and normal control) and of day (Days 1-4). There was an
overall significant effect of day [EF(3, 15) = 705.9, MSe = 114.8,
p<.01], but no significant effect of group and no significant
interaction between day and group. These results suggest that the
two groups of subjects learned to solve the problem more
efficiently across days, and at a similar rate.
A number of descriptive comparisons were made in order to
characterize the performance of the two groups of subjects. The
amnesic patients reduced their number of moves by 35% across the
212
days versus 27% for the control group. The possibility that the
poorer initial performance of the amnesic patients made their
subsequent learning appear more normal than was truly the case was
assessed by calculating the percentage of possible improvement for
each subject across the days. The control subjects made 76% of
their possible improvement compared to 77% for the amnesic
patients. The amnesic and control groups reduced their number of
illegal moves by 24% and 22%, respectively, legal moves by 83% and
80%, and number of moves in difficult states of the problem by 73%
and 71%, respectively (the difficult states were the five states
that accounted for most of the illegal and the legal but wrong
moves).
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Table VIII-3. MEAN NUMBER OF MOVES TO SOLVE MISSIONARIES AND
CANNIBALS PROBLEM
Group Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4
Normal Control M 67.8 66.6 51.8 49.4
(N = 5) SD 9.8 18.3 9.3 4.3
Amnesic M 84.0 68.5 60.0 53.5
(N = 2) SD 4.2 9.2 4.2 2.1
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One difference between the two groups was the ratio of legal
to illegal moves each day. The ratios the four days for the
amnesic patients were 0.7, 1.12, 1.14, and 1.81. The ratio for the
control subjects were 1.9, 3.3, 4.7, and 5.4. The percentage
improvement of the ratios across days was similar for the two
groups, 61% for the amnesic patients and 65% for the control group.
The meaning of the smaller ratio of legal to illegal moves for
the amnesic patients was considered. If they were forgetting the
rules, they would have been expected to make as least as many
errors at easy states as at difficult states of the problem. The
ratios of illegal moves at easy versus difficult states was 0.24
for the amnesic patients and 0.13 for the normal subjects.
Finally, the mean number of consecutive repeated illegal moves was
6.5 for the amnesic patients and 0.6 for the control subjects.
Discussion
The amnesic group was severely impaired on both measures of
fact learning, but appeared to have a preserved capacity for
improving their efficiency at solving the problem from day to day.
Although their initial performance was worse than the mean of the
control group, their steady progress brought the patients to within
a standard deviation of the control group's mean each successive
day. The one difference between the' groups was the high ratio of
illegal to legal moves made by the amnesic patients. The patients
may have had a worse approach to the problem, or tended to forget
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the rules. If the latter was the case, then one would have
expected their ratio of illegal moves at easy states to have been
no lower than that of the control subjects. The logic is that if
the high error rate was a function of the amnesic patients having a
less good understanding of the problem, then their illegal-move
rate should have been disproportionately worse at difficult states.
In fact, the opposite was true, and the patients' illegal-move rate
was worse, relative to the control group, at the easy states.
Furthermore, the patients had over 10 times as many consecutive
repetitions of the same illegal move as did the control subjects.
This pattern may have occurred because the patients forgot the
illegal move they had just made by the time they made their next
move.
The main result, however, was that the two patients, whose
patterns of performance were quite similar to one another, improved
their problem-solving skills as much as the normal subjects did.
Preserved learning despite amnesia for this move-type problem
supports the conclusion drawn from the previous report of normal
learning by amnesic patients on the Tower-of-Hanoi puzzle (Cohen
and Corkin, 1981). The impaired problem-solving learning by H.M.
on the number-series and sugar-production problems (Experiments 1
and 2), however, suggests that there may be a narrow scope of
problems for which solutions may be learned despite a deficit in
fact learning.
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IX: EFFECT OF VERBAL EXPERIENCE UPON SUBSEQUENT
VERBAL PERFORMANCE (PRIMING)
Besides learning certain motor, perceptual, and
problem-solving skills, patients with global amnesia have shown
normal priming effects on various verbal tasks (Warrington and
Weiskrantz, 1970; Jacoby and Witherspoon, 1982; Graf et al., 1984,
1985; Diamond and Rozin, 1984; Cermak et al., 1985). Priming
refers to the influence of prior exposure to a stimulus upon
subsequent performance with the same or a related stimulus. The
influence manifests itself either by facilitating the speed of
response or by increasing the probability of one response relative
to other equally legitimate responses; the former may be termed
facilitation and the latter bias priming. Although intact skill
learning has been shown with H.M. before, no studies have
demonstrated intact verbal priming in him. The present experiments
examined the status of direct facilitation and bias priming in
H.M., other amnesic patients, patients with Alzheimer's disease
(AD), and control subjects.
Priming effects have an advantage over skill learning for the
analysis of preserved learning capacities in that priming may be
dissociated from recall and recognition in normal subjects (e.g.,
Jacoby and Dallas, 1981; Graf et al., 1982; Marcel, 1982; Forster
and Davis, 1984). This dissociation cannot be made for skill
learning, because normal subjects learn the skill and remember
facts about their experience associated with learning the skill
(e.g., Experiment VI-1). The main strategy used in dissociating
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priming from fact learning in normal subjects is the manipulation
of experimental conditions so that one measure of learning is
affected while the other measure is either not affected or affected
differently. For example, although normal subjects recalled and
recognized more words studied under semantic than nonsemantic
encoding conditions, the two encoding conditions had similar
priming influences upon the identification of very briefly
presented words (Jacoby and Dallas, 1981) and on the completion of
three-letter stems into words (Graf et al., 1984; Graf and Mandler,
1985). The differential effects of the same experimental variable
upon two measures of learning are taken as evidence of the
dissociation of two memory processes.
Although priming refers to a broad range of tasks and effects
and is probably not a unitary phenomenon, most priming studies
share two features. First, they are studies of such verbal
performance as reading, spelling, completing letters into words,
and deciding whether certain letters constitute a real word.
Second, they are often ascribed to the activation of mental
representations (e.g., Morton, 1969) whereby exposure to a known
word, induced by the experiment, results in the temporary
activation of the mental representation of that word. The
activation may also spread, via links, to related representations
(Collins and Loftus, 1975). When the same or a related word is
then (re)presented, the prior activation facilitates access to that
mental representation. The activation, then, accounts for the
increased speed of response or the bias to select a particular
response from among equally legitimate responses.
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Experiment 1: Stem-Completion Priming in H.M.
The experimental procedure was drawn from Graf et al. (1984),
whose own procedure followed from that of Warrington and Weiskrantz
(1970). Subjects studied words as they were presented visually,
one at a time. Immediately following the study list, subjects were
tested in one of two ways. For some lists, they were asked to
recall as many as of the words as they could. Then, they were
given a multiple-choice recognition test for the same words. For
other lists, subjects were shown three-letter stems taken from the
beginning of the study words. Subjects were asked to give the
first word that they could think of that began with the
three-letter stem. All subjects were tested in both ways. Thus,
three measures of learning, following identical study, or encoding,
conditions could be compared directly: the number of words
recalled, the number of words recognized, and the number of times
that a three-letter stem was completed as the primed (study) word
(rather than as another word).
Method
Subjects
H.M. and 4 normal control subjects participated in this
experiment. The normal subjects were matched by sex, age (mean,
55.3 years versus 58 years for H.M.), years of education (mean, 14
years versus 12 for H.M.), and knowledge of vocabulary (age-scaled
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mean of 9.5 versus 9.0 on the Vocabulary subtest of the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scales).
Materials and Procedure
A list of all three-letter stems that constituted beginnings
of at least 10 dictionary entries in Webster's Pocket Dictionary
(1974) was compiled. Stems were discarded if they made up real
words, were common abbreviations, or were otherwise problematic.
The remaining 271 stems were given on paper to 60 subjects (friends
and co-workers) who were asked to complete each three-letter stem
with additional letters so as to form a real word other than a
proper noun. Subjects were urged to write down the first word that
came to mind. From the results of this pilot study, 144 words were
selected, five to nine letters long, each with a different stem,
and never the most frequent completion of any stem. These 144
words constituted the target words for the experiment. For the
recognition test, two foils were selected for each target word that
began with the same three-letter stem and had the same letter
length. For example, for the target word "TREND" the foils were
"TREAT" and "TREAD."
The 144 test words were divided randomly into four
presentation lists. Each presentation list consisted of the
following sequence: 3 filler words used to blunt any primacy
effect, 30 target words, and 3 more filler words to blunt any
recency effect. For each of the four presentation lists,
recognition and stem-completion tests were assembled. A
recognition test included 30 three-choice response sets for each
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target word. A stem-completion test included the 60 three-letter
stems; 30 of the stems were the first 3 letters of the target
words, and 30 were the first 3 letters of words in another
presentation list. The 30 stems that came from another
presentation list permitted a control measure of how often subjects
completed a particular stem to the target word when not biased by
a presentation word in that form.
The entire test was presented on a Comrex CR-5600 amber video
monitor controlled by an Apple IIe microcomputer. Subjects studied
target words under four orienting conditions designated as Letter,
Object, Aloud, and Silent. In the Letter condition, they were
asked to say whether each word contained the letter "A". In the
Object condition, subjects were asked to judge whether each word
was the name of an object that they could touch. For both of these
incidental encoding conditions, subjects were asked to give a "yes"
or "no" response. In the Silent condition, subjects were told that
their memory for the words would be tested, and they were urged to
remember each word as they read the word silently to themselves.
The Aloud condition was the same as the Silent condition, except
that in addition to trying to remember the words, the subjects were
instructed to read each word aloud. During each orienting
condition, a card reminded the subject of the orienting task. In
each condition, subjects saw 36 words presented one at a time for 3
seconds; 1.5 seconds elapsed between word presentations.
Testing of all 5 subjects consisted of six practice trials on
the Letter and Object orienting conditions followed by four phases
of target-word presentation and testing. In Phase I, they saw a
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presentation list under the Letter condition for the first half of
the list and under the Object condition for the second half. Then
they were given 60 three-letter stems, one at a time, to complete
into the first word they could think of, except for proper nouns.
The stems stayed on the screen until a legal answer was supplied.
In Phase 2, subjects saw a second presentation list under the
Silent condition for the first half of the list, and under the
Aloud condition for the second half; a stem-completion test
followed. In Phase 3, subjects saw a third presentation list under
the identical conditions (Letter and Object) as in Phase 1, but
followed by tests of recall and recognition of the target words of
the third list. Immediately after seeing the presentation list,
subjects were asked to recall as many of the words seen in that
list as they could. They were encouraged to guess if uncertain.
Then, subjects were given the recognition test for the third list.
For each of the 30 target words, a horizontal display consisting of
the target word and two foils remained on the screen until the
subject selected one of the three words as having appeared on the
presentation list. Phase 4 involved the study of a fourth list, as
in Phase 2 (Silent and Aloud), followed by testing of recall and
three-choice recognition.
The 4 normal control subjects took the test once; presentation
lists were rotated among the four phases of testing across
subjects, such that each list was studied once in each phase. H.M.
received all four rotations on separate days. A testing session
lasted about 45 minutes.
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Results
For purposes of comparison, all scores were calculated as the
percentage of possible correct answers and are presented as mean
percent correct above chance (Figure IX-1).
Fact-Learning Measures
In free recall, H.M. never recalled a single item correctly
out of the 240 target words that he saw in four testing sessions;
this result has been shown as "no score" in Figure IX-1. The mean
recall score for control subjects was 7.9% of the target words
(range 3.4 - 13.3; SD = 4.5). On the three-choice recognition
test, H.M. selected 39.2% of the target words (chance = 33.3%).
The four control subjects had a mean recognition score of 78.8%
(range 76.7 - 81.7; SD = 2.49). Thus, H.M.'s recognition
performance was far below that of any control subject.
Performance Measure
Because H.M. received all four rotations of the test, he
completed every three-letter stem under both biased and unbiased
conditions. Thus, he could serve as his own control, i.e., if he
completed a stem to a target word when not biased, his completion
of the same stem to the target word under the biased condition was
not counted. H.M. completed 27.1% of stems to the biased target
words. For the 4 normal control subjects, chance completion of an
unbiased stem to a target word was taken into account by
subtracting the mean number of control stems completed to target
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words by the group from each control subject's number of stems
completed to the presented target words. After these control
measures were applied, the 4 control subjects had a mean
stem-completion-to-target of 25.8% (range 16.7 - 33.3; SD = 8.8).
Discussion
As expected, H.M.'s recall and recognition of target words
were severely impaired and were far worse than the scores of any
normal subject. Yet, following the identical encoding conditions
that lead to recall and recognition failure, H.M. completed as many
stems to the target words as did the normal subjects. This
experiment is the second instance of an entirely normal learning
phenomenon in H.M.; the other was learning to solve the Tower of
Hanoi puzzle (Cohen & Corkin, 1981). Also, these results are
consistent with those of Wlarrington and Weiskrantz (1970) and Graf
et al. (1984). These earlier studies included patients with four
different etiologies of memory impairment: unilateral temporal
lobectomy, alcoholic Korsakoff's syndrome (KS), bilateral
electroconvulsive therapy for psychiatric disorders, and anoxic
encephalopathy. The consistency of spared stem completion in the
face of impaired recall and recognition across experimental
procedures, patient groups, and laboratories is impressive.
The preservation of stem-completion priming despite amnesia is
intriguing, but its significance is uncertain. It has been shown
that amnesic patients do not demonstrate spared completion priming
for nonwords (Diamond and Rozin, 1984). Also, Graf et al. (1985)
found that spared priming in amnesia did not occur at a perceptual
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level. In order to examine the role of perceptual similarity
between the stem and the target word, Graf et al. presented
low-frequency category exemplars in a study phase (e.g., ostrich)
and later asked normal and amnesic subjects to name examples of
categories (e.g., birds). The amnesic patients and control
subjects tended equally to provide the low-frequency examplars more
often than by chance. Thus, the amnesic patients showed intact
priming when there was no perceptual overlap between the target
stimuli (ostrich) and the stimuli for response (name birds).
Besides the facts that spared stem completion does not occur for
nonwords and that it is not perceptually based, little is known
about what does occur during stem completion.
One factor that sets stem-completion priming apart from other
examples of preserved learning in amnesia is that the other
examples involve increases in skill. H.M. learned to mirror-trace,
to read words in a mirror, to read stimuli emerging from visual
noise, and to solve the missionaries and cannibals problem. All of
these examples of preserved learning featured increased efficiency
as measured by time and error rates. Stem-completion priming, on
the other hand, does not appear to include any measure of enhanced
efficiency. Subjects could just as well provide other legitimate
completions to the stems; there is nothing more efficient about
completing STA to STAMP (the target word) than to STAND or START.
The story would be somewhat different if it could be shown that
subjects do perform the task of stem completion more efficiently
when primed than when not primed. This possibility was examined in
Experiment 2.
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Experiment 2: Latency of Stem-Completion Priming
Two issues were examined in Experiment 2. First, we wanted to
see whether the stimuli and experimental procedures used for
examining stem-completion priming in patients with memory disorders
(Experiment 3) produced a dissociation between fact-learning and
priming measures in normal subjects in a balanced design
replicating Graf et al., 1982, and Graf and Mandler, 1985. Second,
we wanted to find out whether stem-completion priming is strictly a
case of bias priming without any facilitation aspect, i.e., without
any reduction in latency.
Method
Subjects
The subjects were 24 MIT undergraduate students who were paid
volunteers. They were 16 men and 8 women, aged 17 to 22.
Materials and Procedure
The same target words, fillers, and foils were used as in
Experiment 1, but in a new design. The target words were divided
into six sets of 20 words, and each of six unique study sets
included 4 filler words, 20 target words, and 4 filler words in
that order. There were two study conditions. For the Intentional
Condition, subjects were asked to read each word aloud and to try
to remember the word for a test of memory to follow. Between word
presentations, subjects saw the message, "REMEMBER THE WORD!" For
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the Incidental Condition, subjects were asked to answer a question
about an upcoming word. They had to answer "yes" or "no" to the
question "DOES THE WORD CONTAIN THE LETTER A?" (physical encoding)
for half of the questions or, "IS THE WORD THE NAME OF SOMETHING
YOU COULD TOUCH?" (semantic encoding) for the other half. The two
types of questions were mixed randomly.
For the six study lists, six three-choice recognition tests
were assembled. Each recognition test included 20 questions; each
question consisted of one previously shown target word and two
foils in a horizontal display. The two began with the same three
letters as the correct answer, and the position of the correct
answer was balanced across tests. There were three stem-completion
tests, each test including the first three letters of each target
word from two lists, mixed randomly. Following a particular study
list, the 20 items from that list constituted the stems that could
show priming, and the other 20 stems provided a control measure of
baseline completions, i.e., of how often subjects completed a
particular stem to the target word when not influenced by any
target word appearing in that list. Subjects were given four
successive rounds of target-word study and testing. The
Intentional and Incidental study conditions occurred in pairs, and
the stem completion and recall and recognition tests alternated in
the four rounds. There were 24 possible test orders that were
balanced for study condition (Intentional or Incidental) by memory
measure (stem-completion or recall/recognition) and by study list
(six lists). Following presentation of a list of words under
either the Intentional or Incidental study condition, subjects were
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given either a stem-completion test or a recall and recognition
test. For the stem-completion test, subjects were asked to say the
first word they could think of beginning with the three-letter stem
they saw before them (except for proper nouns). For the recall and
recognition test, subjects were asked to say the words they had
just seen and then to select those words from among three choices.
Results
Fact-Learning Measures
Separate repeated measures ANOVAS were carried out to examine
the influence of intentional, semantic, and physical encoding upon
recall and recognition scores (Table IX-1; Figure IX-2). For
recall, there was a significant effect of encoding condition IF(2,
46) = 21.46, MSe = 1.17, p<.01]. Focused comparisons between
conditions showed significant differences between every pair of
encoding conditions in the number of target words recalled:
physical versus semantic t (46) = 3.65, p<.01], physical versus
intentional t (46) = 6.54, p<.01], and semantic versus intentional
Et (46) = 6.54, P<.01].
There was also a significant effect of encoding condition upon
the number of target words recognized correctly [F(2, 46) = 20.17,
MSe = .98, p<.01]. There were significant differences between the
physical and semantic encoding conditions [t (46) = 5.38, <.01],
and between the physical and the intentional conditions t (46) =
5.6, (<.01]. Unlike the recall scores, however, there was no
difference between the semantic and intentional conditions,
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possibly due to ceiling effects.
Performance Measures
Prior to statistical analysis, the mean baseline score for
each condition was subtracted from the mean stem-completion score
for each condition. The type of of encoding condition had no
effect upon the number of stems completed to target words
[F(92, 46) = .92]. Focused comparisons using the Bonferroni
correction measure did not reveal any significant differences
between pairs of encoding conditions.
The mean response times to complete the stems in each of four
conditions were analyzed in a repeated measures ANOVA (Table IX-2).
There was a significance effect of target-word presentation upon
speed of stem completion [F(2, 46) = 30.44, MSe = 12221.8, p<.01].
Focused comparisons revealed that this reduction in latency was
accounted for by the primed stems completed to target words rather
than the primed stems completed to other words. Analyses of the
log transformed response times yielded the same results.
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Recall Recognition Completion
Figure IX-2. Mean percent correct above chance on three measures
of learning following physical (A), semantic (0), and intentional (I)
encoding conditions for 24 subjects in Experiment 2; a bar equals
one standard error of the mean.
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Table IX-1. THREE MEASURES OF LEARNING OBTAINED FROM 24 NORMAL
SUBJECTS IN EXPERIMENT 2
Measure Encoding Condition
Incidental Incidental Intentional
Physical Semantic
(A) (0) (I)
Recalla 10.4 22.1 30.8
Recognitiona,b 77.9 93.3 94.0
Stem-completionc 50.8 (8.3)d 57.5 (8.3) 53.5 (8.5)
amean percentage correct
bchance yields a score of 33.3
Cmean percentage of stems completed to target words
dbaseline completion to target words
Table IX-2. LATENCIES OF NORMAL SUBJECTS TO COMPLETE
STEMS INTO WORDS
Target Word Completed to Not Completed
Target Word to Target Word
Shown in study list 851.6 ms 1043.0 ms
Not shown in study list 999.8 ms 1085.3 ms
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Discussion
The results were that encoding conditions influenced
fact-learning, as measured by recall and recognition accuracies,
but did not influence stem-completion priming (Figure IX-2). This
dissociation between the two kinds of learning in normal subjects
paralleled that seen in H.M. in Experiment 1. The new finding was
that stem-completion priming did include a facilitating component;
that effect was shown by the reduced latencies when subjects
completed stems into target words.
Completions to target words occurred 210 msec faster than the
mean of all the other conditions, an unusually large facilitation
for single-word priming effects. For example, latency reductions
in repetition lexical decision experiments, with a similar interval
between two appearances of a target word are seldom over 100 msec
(e.g., Scarborough, Cortese et al., 1977); the semantic priming
effect in lexical decision experiments for consecutive words is
usually less than that (e.g., Fischler, 1978a, 1978b).
Furthermore, vocalization measures, such as the time to read words
aloud, usually show even smaller latency reductions (e.g.,
Scarborough, Cortese et al., 1977). Thus, the locus of the priming
in stem-completion must be different from that believed to enhance
lexical access during lexical decision.
Whatever the mechanism underlying stem-completion, it is now
possible to associate stem-completion priming with skill learning
from the point of view that both types of learning feature reduced
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latency. Completion occurred more efficiently with target words
seen in the study list as long as the completion was to the target
word rather than to other legitimate words.
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Experiment 3: Stem-Completion Priming in Amnesia
and in Alzheimer's disease
Two issues were explored in Experiment 3. First, the
dissociation between fact-learning and stem-completion priming was
contrasted between severely amnesic patients (H.M. and patient
#7439 with KS) and moderately amnesic patients (patients #6125,
bilateral stroke, and #4624, post-encephalitis) (Appendix A). If
stem-completion priming were truly separable from fact-learning
capacities, then severely amnesic patients should do less well than
moderately amnesic patients on tests of fact-learning, but equally
well on stem-completion tests. Second, stem-completion priming was
examined, for the first time, in patients with memory disorders due
to AD. If learning capacities spared in amnesia show a common
neural network, mildly demented patients with AD, who could learn
to mirror-trace (Chapter VI) and to do rotary pursuit (Eslinger et
al., 1985; Corkin et al., 1986) should also exhibit spared
stem-completion priming despite their memory impairments. If these
patients do not show intact stem-completion priming, the results
would provide evidence of dissociations among learning capacities
spared in global amnesia.
Method
Subjects
The three groups of subjects, described below, were
nondemented patients with global amnesia, patients with AD, and
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normal control subjects. There was no significant difference among
the groups in regards to age or educational level.
Amnesic patients. The 4 patients included 2 men and 2 women
who had a mean age of 54.5 years (range 48-61) and a mean
educational level of 13.0 years (range 12-16) (Appendix A).
AD patients. All the patients with probable AD met NINCDS and
ADRDA research criteria for the diagnosis of AD (McKhann et al.,
1984; Khachaturian, 1985). They were referred from the Memory
Disorders Unit of the Massachusetts General Hospital, and were
consecutive patients whose dementia was mild enough to permit
behavioral testing and who were willing to participate in research
studies. Only patients able to perform all aspects of the encoding
and stem-completion tasks were included in the study. The AD group
had a mean age of 67.3 years (range 53-80) and a mean educational
level of 14.3 years (range 12-10). The severity of their dementia
was mild to moderate, as indicated by their Blessed Dementia Scale
scores (Blessed et al., 1968), which ranged from 9.5 to 20.5 (mean,
14.0).
Normal control subjects. The control group consisted of 9
women and 4 men with a mean age of 60.4 years (range 48-82) and a
mean educational level of 13.2 years (range 12-16).
Materials and Procedure
The materials and procedure were identical to those in
Experiment 2 with one exception. The four study-and-test rounds in
Experiment 3 occurred at four separate times, with at least 2 hours
between rounds so that subjects, especially the normal control
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subjects, could not discern the overall organization of the
experiment.
Results
The data for the three measures of learning (recall,
recognition, and stem completion) were analyzed separately. The
main contrast of interest was among the performance of the three
groups, normal control subjects, patients with AD, and amnesic
patients. A secondary issue was the possibility of differences due
to encoding condition (physical, semantic, or intentional). For
all measures, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed. Due
to the large number of comparisons, a conservative significance
level of p<.01 was selected. Further contrasts were either focused
comparisons or, if multiple comparisons were made, a Bonferroni
correction was made to the significance level in order to avoid
spurious significant findings. The comparisons between the
moderately and severely amnesic patients were made by comparing
descriptively their mean scores.
Fact-Learning Measures
Overall, normal control subjects recalled 12.3% of the target
words, amnesic patients 2.5%, and patients with AD 2.0% (Table IX-3
and Figure IX-3). There was a significant difference among groups
in the level of recall [F(3, 27) = 10.10, MSe = .322, <.0011. A
one-tailed focused comparison between groups showed that the
control group performed significantly better than the AD group t
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(27) = 7.63, <.001] and the amnesic group t (27) = 5.21, <.01].
A two-tailed comparison between the amnesic and AD groups did not
show any differences between them. The only significant influence
of encoding upon recall occurred for the control group, between the
physical and intentional encoding conditions; the latter resulted
in significantly better recall t (66) = 3.31, p<.01]. The absence
of an influence of encoding upon the recall of the patient groups
is difficult to interpret because their very low recall scores may
have obscured any encoding effect.
Overall, the control group recognized 81.5% of the target
words, the amnesic group 56.9%, and the AD group 60.2% (Table IX-4
and Figure IX-4). The difference among groups was significant
[F(3, 27) = 7.83, Mse = 1.50, <.01]. Further analyses showed
significantly better performance by the control group than by the
amnesic group It (27) = 6.07, p<.01] and the AD group t (27) =
7.3, E<.01], but no difference between the two patient groups. The
analysis of recognition performance by encoding condition for the
normal and AD group yielded not only a main effect by group IF(1,
22) = 16.22, MSe = 4.28, p<.01] but also a significant interaction
between group and encoding condition [F(2, 44) = 5.42, MSe = 2.12,
p<.01]. This result suggested that the control group's recognition
performance benefited from the deeper, more elaborative, semantic
and intentional encoding conditions, whereas the AD group was
relatively unaffected by changes in the encoding task. This
possibility was supported by pairwise comparisons of the encoding
conditions using the pooled error term (2.84 with 66 df). The
control group recognized significantly fewer words after the
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physical encoding task than after the semantic t (66) = 4.48,
p<.001] or the intentional t (66) = 4.55, <.001J tasks. The
results for the AD group showed no significant differences among
encoding conditions; the absence of an encoding effect cannot be
attributed to a floor effect because the recognition accuracy of
the AD group was 60.2%, well above the chance score of 33.3%.
Group
Figure IX-3. Mean percentage of target words
recalled by normal control (NCS), Alzheimer's
disease (AD), and amnesic (AMN) groups in Experiment
3; a bar equals one standard error of the mean.
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Table IX-3. MEAN PERCENTAGE OF TARGET WORDS RECALLED
Group Encoding Condition
Physical Semantic Intentional Overall
Normal Control 3.9 13.9 15.9 12.3
(N=13)
Amnesic 0 7.5 1.3 2.5
(N=4)
AD 0 3.6 2.3 2.0
(N=11)
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Group
Figure IX-4. Mean percentage of target words
recognized by normal control subjects (NCS),
Alzheimer's disease (AD), and amnesic (AMN)
groups in Experiment 3; a bar equals one
standard error of the mean.
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Table IX-4. MEAN PERCENTAGE OF TARGET WORDS RECOGNIZED
Group Encoding Condition
Physical Semantic Intentional Overall
Normal Control 59.2a 89.2 88.8 81.5
(N=13)
Amnesic 55.0 57.5 57.5 56.9
(N=4)
AD 55.4 60.2 62.7 60.2
(N=11)
achance is 33
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.Group
Figure IX-5. Mean percentage of stems completed
to target words by normal control (NCS), Alzheimer's
disease (AD), and amnesic (AMN) groups in Experiment 3;
a bar equals one standard error of the mean.
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Table IX-5. MEAN PERCENTAGE OF STEMS COMPLETED TO TARGET WORDS
Group Encoding Condition
Physical Semantic Intentional Overall Baselinea
Normal 36.9 42.2 48.5 44.0 7.3
(N = 13)
Amnesic 40.0 62.5 23.6 43.8 15.0
(N=4)
AD 26.4 26.4 23.6 25.0 11.6
(N=11)
aacross conditions
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Performance Measures
Overall, the mean number of stems completed to target words
was 44.0% for the control group, 43.8% for the amnesic group, and
25.0% for the AD group (Table IX-5 and Figure IX-5). Baseline
scores were defined as the mean percentage of stems completed
randomly to target words not presented in a study list. Baseline
values were 7.3% for the normal control group, 15.0% for the
amnesic group, and 11.6% for the AD group. The differences among
them did not reach significance. For further analysis, the
baseline scores were averaged across groups but within encoding
tasks, and then subtracted from the stems completed to presented
target words. There was an interaction between group and number of
stems completed to target [F(3, 27) = 9.54, MSe = .95, p(.01].
This effect was accounted for by the AD group, who completed
significantly fewer stems to target words than either the control
group t (27) = 8.26, (p.011 or the amnesic group t (27) = 5.68,
p<.011. There was no difference between the control and amnesic
groups. There was neither a significant effect of encoding upon
completion of stems to target words nor any interaction between
group and encoding effect.
Severity of Amnesia
In order to explore the relationship between anterograde
amnesia and stem-completion, the performance of the severely and
moderately amnesic patients were examined separately and contrasted
with each other and with the performance of the AD group (Figures
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Figure IX-6. Mean percentage of target words recalled by
normal control (NCS), Alzheimer's disease (AD), severly
amnesic(SEV.AMN), and moderately amnesic (MOD.AMN) groups in
Experiment 3; a bar equals one standard error of the mean.
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Figure IX-7. Mean percentage of target words recognized
by normal control (NCS), Alzheimer's disease (AD),
severly amnesic (SEV. AMN),- and moderately amnesic
(MOD.AMN) groups in Experiment 3; a bar equals one
standard error of the mean.
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Figure IX-8. Mean percentage of stems completed to
target words by normal control (NCS), Alzheimer's (AD),
severly amnesic (SEV.AMN), and moderately amnesic (MOD.AMN)
groups in Experiment 3; a bar equals one standard error of the
mean.
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IX-6, 7, and 8). On recall tests, the severely amnesic group
was inferior to the AD group (0.12% versus 0.20%), but the
moderately amnesic patients were superior to both, obtaining a mean
score of 0.38%. On recognition tests, the AD group had a higher
mean score (60.2%) than the severely amnesic patients (40.0%) but a
lower mean score than the moderately amnesic patients (73.8%). On
stem completion, the AD group scored 25%, lower than the moderately
amnesic (42.5%) and severely amnesic (45.0%) patients, whose means
did not differ from each other.
Discussion
One main result was that amnesic patients, who were impaired
in recalling or recognizing words they had seen recently, were
normal in their bias to complete stems to those words. These
results were consistent with prior reports of preserved
stem-completion priming in amnesic patients (Warrington and
Weiskrantz, 1970; Graf et al., 1984; Rozin and Diamond, 1985;
Experiment IX-1, this thesis). The fact that the severity of
amnesia affected recall and recognition but not stem-completion
priming lends further support to the dissociation between fact
learning and priming in amnesia. This dissociation was paralleled
by the performance of the control group across encoding conditions:
The physical encoding task depressed recall and recognition for the
control group, but it did not depress their stem-completion
performance significantly.
The main new result was the impaired stem-completion priming
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exhibited by the patients with AD. This loss occurred despite the
fact that their memory impairment, as measured by recall and
recognition, was no worse than that of the amnesic group. Indeed,
the reduced priming remains evident even when the AD group is
compared to the severely amnesic patients whose recall and
recognition performance was well below the mean of the AD group.
Several factors constrain the interpretation of this priming
deficit in AD. First, all of the patients could perform the
following tasks with the target words: They could say whether the
words included the letter A and whether the words were the names of
objects that one could touch, and they could read the words aloud.
Thus, they could perform perceptual, semantic, and production
procedures with the target words. Second, the AD patients could
complete all of the stems (or nearly all) into real words.
Patients with AD often have language disorders, and this group was
no exception. Difficulty in naming is often the outstanding
language disorder early in the course of disease, but poor word
comprehension and production are also present (Bayles, 1982; Martin
and Fedio, 1983; Huff et al., 1986). Simple dismissal of the
impaired priming in AD as a result of language problems, however,
fails to address the mechanism of priming or to clarify how the
language disorder affects priming, given that, in these patients,
the language disorder did not prevent successful perceptual,
semantic, or productive processing of the word.
Evidence suggesting that language impairments do not influence
the semantic priming effect in patients with AD came from Nebes et
al. (1984), who reported that a group of patients with AD, who had
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memory and language impairments, demonstrated normal semantic
priming in a time-to-naming task. In that experiment, subjects had
to read single words aloud as quickly as possible. When a word was
preceded by a semantically related word (e.g., CHAIR followed by
TABLE), patients with AD and normal control subjects read the
second word more rapidly (versus when TABLE was preceded by a
semantically unrelated word). The enhanced latency in reading
semantically primed words was equivalent for the patient and
control groups.
Semantic priming and stem-completion priming have been
explained by the metaphor of activation of a mental representation
of a word. Graf and Mandler (1985) presented just such an
explanation of the dissociation of recall and recognition from
stem-completion priming in amnesic and normal subjects. (The same
notion is expressed in Graf et al., 1982; Graf et al., 1984). They
postulated that recall and recognition demand explicit retrieval of
elaborated memory, whereas stem-completion priming depends only
upon accessing activated representations. Such an explanation is
adequate for earlier results, but it fails to predict that subjects
could have normal semantic priming but impaired stem-completion
priming because activation and accessibility are used to describe
the mechanism of both sorts of priming.
It is important to note that the intact semantic priming and
impaired stem-completion priming occurred in two different AD
groups. A definitive dissociation between the two sorts of priming
in AD requires that the same group be examined with both sorts of
priming tasks. Nevertheless, the probability of that dissociation
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is high because the group studied by Nebes et al. was large (20)
and of the 11 patients in this study, only 2 overlapped with the
normal group in number of stems completed to target words.
We questioned whether the patients' severity of dementia, sex,
or age influenced the severity of their stem-completion priming
impairments. No such relationships were apparent. A larger group
needs to be studied in order to address questions about the
relationship of neuropathology to the selective loss and sparing of
priming effects in AD. Also, the patterns of their language
impairments may be of considerable interest in such patients.
Neither semantic nor stem-completion priming effects are of
interest in themselves. Rather, the effects are thought to reflect
the operations of processes central to the comprehension and
production of language, although the specific language capacities
revealed by the priming effects are unknown. If the loss and
sparing of priming effects in patients with AD relate to their
language deficits in specific ways, it may become possible to
discover what aspects of normal language functioning are revealed
by the study of priming effects.
These findings of neurobiological distinctions among priming
effects must be considered in relation to processing differences
between the tasks used to elicit priming. One such difference may
be the automaticity of the encoding and response. When reading
words aloud in the Nebes et al. study of semantic priming, subjects
were not performing as effortful or demanding a task as when
completing stems into words in the present experiment. More
precisely, the requirements of the response were less effortful in
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reading a word than in completing stems. Although defining
effortful is problematic, it may be worth noting that in
experiments conducted in this laboratory on college students,
unprimed reading of words required around 500-600 msec, whereas
unprimed stem completion required 1000 msec. Perhaps the 400 msec
difference represents the greater effort required for stem
completion. Another distinction between the two kinds of priming
is that semantic priming is known to be short-lived (on the order
of a few seconds; Fischler, 1977a and b), whereas stem-completion
priming lasts at least a few minutes. Perhaps only short-lasting
priming effects remain intact in early AD. Finally, it may be that
the mechanism of stem-completion priming does not include semantic
relatedness.
The results with the AD group established grounds for a
dissociation between two kinds of learning that are spared together
in global amnesia: motor learning associated with mirror-tracing
or rotary pursuit tasks and stem-completion priming (Table IX-6).
Confirmation of these results requires that more patients be
examined and that behavioral, epidemiological, and
neuropathological differences be sought. Such differences ought to
provide evidence about the separate identities of the neural
substrates and psychological mechanisms subserving these two kinds
of learning.
Table IX-6. PERFORMANCE OF 9 PATIENTS WITH AD ON TWO
KINDS OF LEARNING TASKS
Motor Learning
Preserved Impaired
Stem-completion priming
Preserved 1 patient 1 patient
Impaired 5 patients 2 patients
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Experiment 4: Nonverbal Pattern Priming
To date, cases of fully preserved priming in anterograde
amnesia have been verbal in nature: completing stems into words
(Warrington and Weiskrantz, 1970; Graf et al., 1984; Experiment 1),
providing category members (Graf et al., 1985), and spelling
homophones (Jacoby and Witherspoon, 1982). These results suggest
that examples of preserved priming in amnesia have a unique
relationship with language functions. The present experiment
examined whether priming with nonverbal material and on a
nonlinguistic task could occur in amnesia.
Method
Subjects
H.M. (aged 60 years, with 12 years of education) and 7 normal
control subjects participated in Experiment 4. There were 3 men
and 4 women in the control group, which had a mean age of 56.3
years (range 50-61) and a mean educational level of 12.7 years
(range 11-16).
Materials and Procedure
The stimuli, taken from Garner (1974), consisted of six
patterns, each incorporating 5 points from the 9 possible points in
a 3 x 3 square matrix (Appendix C). For each pattern, there were
three different figures consisting of the 5 points connected by
straight lines. Three 6-item forms of the test were made by
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randomly selecting one figure for each pattern.
There were five test sessions; consecutive sessions were
separated by at least 6 hours. In Session 1, subjects were asked
to draw any figure they thought that connected the dots in each
pattern with straight lines. The figures they drew constituted
their baseline figures. In Session 2, they were given Form 1 and
asked to copy each figure onto the corresponding dot pattern (each
figure was above a pattern on an 8 1/2 x 11 inch piece of paper)
(Appendix C). Then, the materials were removed, and subjects were
asked to write down the name of as many famous entertainers from
the 20th century as they could; this interference task was done for
3 minutes. Next, the subjects were given the dot patterns (without
any figure) and asked to draw any figure they thought of connecting
the dots in each pattern with straight lines. Session 3 was
identical in procedure, except that subjects copied figures from
Form 2 and wrote down the names of 20th century political figures
as the 3-minute interference task. Session 4 began with subjects
copying the figures from Form 3 onto the dot patterns and then
writing down the names of 20th century sports figures. In a cued
incidental recall procedure, subjects were shown the dot patterns
and asked to redraw the figures they had copied 3 minutes earlier.
In a final session, the subjects were warned, before copying the
figures from Form 3 onto the patterns, that their memory for the
figures would be tested. After copying the figures, subjects wrote
down the names of countries and states for 3 minutes before being
asked to redraw from memory the same figures onto the same dot
patterns. H.M. did not perform the final session because it was
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added to the procedure after his testing.
Results
Fact-Learning Measures
The drawings from Session 1 constituted each subject's
individual baseline; any figure that matched those baseline
drawings was not included in further analyses. Scores for all
conditions were calculated for each subject as a percentage of
figures drawn identically to the copied figures (Figure IX-9).
Following the incidental recall conditions (Session 4), the control
subjects had a mean score of 19.7% (SD = 22.3) and H.M. scored 50%.
In the intentional encoding condition (Session 5), the control
subjects had a mean score of 51% (SD = 30.5). The intentional
recall performance was significantly better than the incidental
recall performance, t (6) = 3.63, p=.01, two-tailed].
Performance Measures
The priming scores from Sessions 2 and 3 were averaged for
each subject. The mean score for the control group was 12.9% (SD =
9.1), not significantly lower than the incidental recall scores.
H.M. scored 43.5%.
Discussion
Copying the figures influenced H.M.'s subsequent free drawing
onto the dot patterns at least as much as copying influenced the
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free drawing of the control subjects (Figure IX-9). Therefore, the
results indicate that one sort of nonverbal priming is spared in
amnesia.
The surprising aspects of the results were that H.M. primed
more than the normal subjects and that he did so well on the cued,
incidental recall. The former may have occurred in part because
H.M. drew very few of the stimulus figures in his baseline session,
thereby having a larger number of possible completions than the
control subjects. H.M.'s high incidental recall score may
represent a third example of his unusually large priming effect.
Perhaps when asked to recall the figures, H.M. simply drew the
figures that came to mind, i.e., the primed figures. The best way
to examine this possibility would be to test multiple-choice
recognition and intentional recall of the figures by H.M. and other
amnesic patients.
The failure of the control subjects to incidentally recall
figures more accurately than when they were drawing freely suggests
that pattern priming was dissociable from fact-learning for those
figures in normal and impaired memory. Experiment 4 provided
strong evidence (almost too strong) that the priming spared in
amnesia is not limited to the language domain.
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Experiments 5a and 5b: Lexical Decision Repetition Priming in H.M.
Dichotomies of human memory function (Table I-1) attempt to
capture in general terms specific instances of preserved learning
in amnesia. Without recourse to a particular theory, some
conditions that seem necessary for the demonstration of preserved
learning may be noted. H.M. and other amnesic patients can show
normal learning if (1) learning is measured implicitly in terms of
changes in repeated performance with the same, or portions of the
same material; and (2) the index of learning is other than explicit
recall or recognition either of the material itself or of the event
of presentation; and, sometimes, (3) there is some premorbid mental
representation of the material and the procedures used with that
material. Given these constraints, H.M. should show a learning
effect on a test of lexical decision with repeated items. In a
lexical decision test, subjects must decide whether strings of
letters constitute real English words or nonsense words
(pseudowords). Scarborough, Cortese, and Scarborough (1977)
demonstrated that subjects were faster to confirm a word as being a
word upon the word's second presentation (repetition effect).
Lexical decisions about repeating items meet all of the above
constraints, because (1) the measure of learning is implicit as the
enhanced speed of response for repeated items; and (2) the subject
is not asked to recall or recognize either the material or any
aspect of its prior presentation; and (3) all the words are known
by H.M. premorbidly.
The examination of lexical decision for repeating words in
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H.M. bears also upon a central and unsettled issue in
psycholinguistics. Normal subjects are faster to decide that words
appearing frequently in the language are words than they are to
decide that words appearing infrequently are words. This latency
difference between high- and low-frequency words is termed the
frequency effect; it is one of the most consistent findings in
latency studies of lexical processes. Most models of the mental
representation of words and language make considerable use of this
frequency effect (e.g., Forster, 1976). Scarborough et al. (1977)
found that by the second presentation of a word, the frequency
effect was virtually absent, i.e., that there was no significant
difference between high- and low- frequency words. If a single
exposure to a word is sufficient to eliminate the frequency effect,
it seems problematic to assign stable importance to constantly
changing frequency values for words. Forster has argued that the
locus of the frequency attenuation is not in the mental lexicon
itself, but in some dissociable memory of having seen the first
presentation of the word. Forster and Davis (1984) supported this
claim by making the first presentation of each word brief and in a
visually masked condition such that the subjects could not identify
the word. Nevertheless, subjects did show a short-lasting
repetition effect with high- and low-frequency words when
subsequently making a lexical decision for those same words in full
view. The frequency effect persisted, and there was no frequency
attenuation. Depriving subjects of a conscious memory for the
first presentation of a word apparently maintained the frequency
effect.
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H.M.'s amnesia presented an even more direct test of the role
of memory in the repetition effect. His anterograde amnesia
deprived him of the sort of conscious memory for presented words
that Forster invoked as being the locus of the repetition effect
(beyond two intervening items) and of the frequency attenuation.
In some sense, one may consider H.M.'s lexical decision performance
as analogous to subliminal priming in normal subjects. Just as
Forster's normal subjects were influenced by the presentation of
words they could not consciously remember, so could H.M.'s lexical
decision latency be influenced by the presentation of words he
could not consciously remember. In this sense, whenever H.M.
demonstrated a learning effect with material perceived under
everyday conditions, it was analogous to subliminal effects in
people with intact memory.
Thus, while most theories of amnesia predicted that H.M.
should show normal repetition priming (and no theory predicts that
he should not), Forster's work suggested the opposite result, no
repetition priming.
Experiment 5a: Method
Subjects
The subjects were H.M. (60 years old, and with 12 years of
education) and a normal control group of 2 men and 1 woman with a
mean age of 57.3 years (range 55 - 62) and a mean educational level
of 13.3 years (range 12 - 16).
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Materials and Procedure
The stimuli were words of 6 to 9 letters. The high-frequency
words had a frequency ratings of 50 per million or higher, and the
low-frequency words ratings of 10 per million or lower. Half of
the words were converted to pronounceable nonwords by altering one
vowel and one consonant. The stimuli were then organized into sets
of 8, the sets being balanced for mean frequency.
The lexcial decision test consisted of four blocks. Half of
the items that appeared in each block were repetitions from the
previous block, and half were newly appearing items, except in the
first block which could not include repetitions. On the average,
32 items intervened between the repetitions (range 16-48) for each
of the three types of stimuli: high-frequency words, low-frequency
words, and nonwords. Each block contained 32 items: 8 repeated
(old) nonwords, 8 newly appearing (new) nonwords, 4 old
high-frequency words, 4 new high-frequency words, 4 old
low-frequency words, and 4 new high-frequency words. The items
were pseudorandomly interspersed with the proviso that no more than
5 items of one type (word/nonword, high frequency/low frequency,
new/old) appeared in a row. A three-choice recognition test was
prepared that included the 32 items from the last block. Each item
was matched with two foils of similar letter-length and frequency.
The mean number of intervening items was 32, which was equivalent
to the interval between repetitions for the lexical decision test.
The subjects were given lexical decision practice with 6 words
and 6 nonwords. They were instructed to decide whether each letter
string constituted a real English word, and to do so as quickly and
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accurately as possible. They were to say "Yes" to real words and
to say "No" to nonwords. A voice-activated key recorded the time
between the appearance of the stimuli and the initiation of the
subjects' vocal responses. On each trial, a row of asterisks
appeared centrally on the computer monitor simultaneous to a
computer-generated tone, and the target item appeared 350 msec
after the disappearance of the asterisks. The item disappeared
upon the subject's response, and 500 msec later the next row of
asterisks appeared, and so on. One minute after the last of 128
items, subjects were asked to recall as many words and nonwords as
possible. Then came the recognition test, in which subjects were
asked to pick which of three choices in each display they had seen
in the lexical decision test.
Results
Fact-Learning Measures
The mean number of items recalled by the normal control
subjects was 5.3 (SD = 5.5). H.M. recalled none. On the multiple
choice recognition test, the control group recognized 87.3% (SD =
5.8) of the items from the last block of the lexical decision test.
H.M. recognized 47% of the items, outside the normal range (chance
= 33%).
Performance Measures
The performance measure of interest was the repetition effect,
the influence of the first presentation of an item upon the latency
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to make the lexical decision on its second presentation. The
median response times for the first and second appearances of the
high-frequency words, low-frequency words, and nonwords are shown
in Table IX-7 (only correct items were included in the medians).
Neither the normal control group nor H.M. displayed repetition
effects with the nonwords. The normal group did not prime with
high-frequency words at this interval, but showed a 119 msec
repetition effect with the low-frequency words. H.M. may have
shown some facilitation with the high-frequency words (24 msec),
but he was 35 msec slower at the second than at the first
appearance of the low-frequency words. This finding raises the
possibility that H.M.'s decreased latency at the second appearance
of the high-frequency words was a random effect, just as his
increased latency with repeated low-frequency words was more likely
a random difference than an inhibition effect. The main
conclusion, however, is that H.M. did not show preserved lexical
decision repetition priming. Because repetition priming effects
are subtle, a second lexical decision repetition priming study was
done with H.M.
Table IX-7. MEAN OF THE MEDIAN RESPONSE TIMES (MSEC)
ON LEXICAL DECISION TEST
Normal Control
Stimulus Type Subjects (N=3) H.M.
High-frequency words
First appearance 602 930
Second appearance 601 906
Low-frequency words
First appearance 762 915
Second appearance 643 950
Nonwords
First appearance 813 1,038
Second appearance 819 1,040
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Experiment 5b: Method
Subjects
H.M. and 2 normal control subjects, a man and a woman (mean
age, 56.6 years; mean educational level, 12.0 years).
Materials and Procedure
From the word-frequency count of Kucera and Francis (1967),
100 six- to nine-letter nouns were selected. Half of the words had
a frequency of 60 or more per million and were designated the
high-frequency words. The other 50 words had a frequency of 6 or
less per million and constituted the low-frequency words. The
high- and low- frequency words were divided pseudorandomly into 5
sets of 10 words each. Mean letter length was equal for all 10
sets. The mean frequencies in each of the 5 sets of high frequency
words and each of the 5 sets of low frequency words were equal.
Half the words in each set were designated as the roots for
constructing nonwords (pseudowords). In each such word, one vowel
and one consonant were altered to another vowel and another
consonant, resulting in a pronounceable, orthographically legal
nonword. One set each of high frequency words, low frequency
words, nonwords derived from high frequency words, and nonwords
derived from low frequency words were designated randomly as the
repeating sets.
The words and nonwords were assigned to four blocks of 40
items each. Block 1 contained 10 high-frequency words, 10
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low-frequency words, and 20 nonwords. Blocks 2, 3, and 4 contained
5 high-frequency words, 5 low-frequency words, and 10 nonwords from
Block that repeated in every block. These blocks also contained
5 new high-frequency, 5 new low-frequency, and 10 new nonwords
unique to each other. Thus, in Blocks 2-4 half of the items
repeated from block to block, and half of the items were new to
each block. For each of the three kinds of repeating items, there
was a mean span of 40 items (39 intervening between repetitions)
and never less than 20 items.
Every item was presented for 3 seconds, and 1.5 seconds
intervened between items. A buzzer sounded 0.5 seconds before the
appearance of each item so as to warn the subject of the upcoming
item. A 1-minute rest was given between blocks. Subjects were
instructed to decide quickly and accurately whether each letter
string constituted a real English word or not. Subjects answered
"Yes" or "No," and a voice key recorded the latency from the
presentation of each item until the response was given. The
examiner recorded correct and incorrect responses on paper.
Results
Response latencies that were greater than 3 standard
deviations above or below the median for each subject within a
category of items were not included in the calculations. For the
normal control subjects, initial (first block) correct responses
were fastest for high-frequency words (median response time = 1032
msec), less fast for low-frequency words (1458 msec), and slowest
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for nonwords (2343 msec) (Figure IX-10). Latencies dropped from
the first to the fourth presentation for all three types of
stimuli: by 182 msec for high-frequency words, 548 msec for
low-frequency words, and 943 msec for nonwords. The difference
between median latencies for high- and low-frequency words
fell from 426 msec upon the first presentation to 82 msec upon the
fourth presentation.
H.M. gave a different pattern of results. Although upon first
presentation he was fastest in response to high-frequency words
(945 msec), less fast for low-frequency words (1002 msec), and
slowest for nonwords (1123 msec), his latencies did not decrease
with repetition; in fact, there was a mild and unsystematic
tendency for latencies to increase after the first block. This
result makes it difficult to evaluate changes in the initially
small difference between latencies for high- and low-frequency
words.
Discussion
The main result in Experiments 5a and 5b was that H.M. failed
to show a repetition priming effect at an interval where normal
subjects did show such an effect and where his recall and
recognition for the first occurrence of a word was severely
impaired. This finding is in accordance with Forster's data for
normal subjects, who failed to show a repetition priming effect at
longer intervals when deprived of conscious recollection of the
prior occurrence of words. Together, the two studies suggest that
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long-lasting (more than a few seconds) lexcial-decision repetition
priming is mediated, at least in part, by the same fact-learning
processes that underlie recall and recognition.
The results are in less good accord with theories of preserved
activational memory in amnesia (e.g., Graf et al., 1984; Diamond
and Rozin, 1984). Activation is usually cited as the mechanism
underlying repetition priming effects and would thus be expected to
occur normally in H.M. If mere exposure to a word activates the
mental representation of a word and makes that representation more
rapidly accessible for some time, H.M. should have shown a priming
effect. The results are also discordant with the prediction made
by the procedural/declarative theory. Because H.M. repeated the
same procedures with the same stimuli, he should have shown a
normal repetition priming effect. Yet he consistently failed to
show reduced latencies for words he could not remember.
These results with H.M. are in apparent contradiction with the
finding of preserved lexical-decision repetition priming in two
amnesic patients (Moscovitch, 1982), one of whom had AD. Perhaps
severity and etiology of amnesia have contrasting effects upon
lexical-decision repetition priming and stem-completion priming.
That is, severity of global amnesia may influence the
lexical-decision repetition effect but not stem-completion priming
(Experiment 3), whereas the cognitive decline characteristic of
mild AD influences stem-completion priming but not the lexical
decision repetition effect. The present results are in agreement,
however, with a study of recordings obtained from multiple
electrodes implanted bilaterally in the amygdala, hippocampus, and
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parahippocampal gyrus in 8 patients being evaluated for surgical
treatment of epilepsy (Smith et al., 1986). Recordings ere made
while the patients made lexical-decision or recognition judgments
on words and nonwords at short and long repetition intervals. The
same positive effect, 550-650 msec after the appearance of a
repeated word, was recorded for both types of tasks from the same
structures removed in H.M. These results, taken together, suggest
strongly that the repetition effect with words in a
lexical-decision task occurs as a consequence of fact-learning
processes dependent upon the integrity of medial temporal-lobe
structures.
X. CONCLUSIONS
The main aim of this thesis was to extend knowledge about the
scope and limits of preserved learning in the amnesia following
bilateral medial temporal-lobe resection (i.e., in H.M.) and to
examine whether that knowledge can be satisfactorily described or
explained by current theories of the neural organization of human
memory. The results are reviewed below as they pertain to three
main theories about distinctions in forms of knowledge that reflect
independent memory systems of the brain.
The Semantic/Episodic Distinction
The experiments in Chapter IV showed that H.M. was impaired in
learning new semantic knowledge, if semantic knowledge includes
learning (a) the meanings of words, (b) the lexical status of
words, (c) how to perceive and pronounce words, (d) the names of
public figures, and (e) the faces of public figures. Furthermore,
Wood and Kinsbourne (1982) cited the normal performance of amnesic
patients on the Fibonacci number-series problem as evidence of
intact learning of semantic knowledge. The evidence from the
number-series experiment in this thesis (Chapter VIII, Experiment
1), however, indicates that amnesic patients are impaired in
learning the rule. The tests of semantic learning in amnesia were
based upon simple views of semantic knowledge. Tulving himself
(1983) has pointed out that his earlier descriptions of semantic
memory were oversimplified, and his revisions of the
275
276
episodic/semantic distinction (1983, 1985) have moved away from
such simple distinctions. Some investigators now contend, however,
that the episodic/semantic distinction is too broad theoretically
to provide specific predictions about experimental outcomes
(McKoon, Ratcliff, and Dell, 1986; but see Tulving, 1986, for a
response).
There is little doubt that H.M. and other amnesic patients are
impaired in gaining anterograde episodic knowledge. Indeed, it is
appealing to consider H.M.'s intact learning of motor, perceptual,
and problem-solving skills, and spared priming, as evidence of
changes in the rules, associations, and principles of organized,
nonautobiographical knowledge. Furthermore, H.M.'s inability to
remember having done a task, although that experience expresses
itself in his increasingly efficient performance, can be viewed as
a dissociation between autobiographical awareness of the episode
and the rule-governed, unaware, semantic knowledge retained from
the episode (a distinction noted by Claperede in 1911). The
problem is that the episodic/semantic distinction, as it applies to
amnesia, does not set a limit for the scope of preserved learning.
There is nothing in the distinction, for example, predicting that
amnesic patients will fail to show normal learning of repeated
mirror-reversed words but will show intact learning of repeated
words emerging from visual noise (Chapter VII). The
episodic/semantic distinction is not alone in its failure to
predict the outcome of experiments with amnesic patients (discussed
below), but it also is usually taken to predict that H.M. would
learn normally the very things that he did not learn normally in
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the experiments in Chapter IV. H.M. does not have a spared memory
system for acquiring and expressing semantic knowledge.
The Content/Context Distinction
The experiments in Chapter V showed that H.M.'s amnesia cannot
be explained as a primary disorder in recording contextual
knowledge about the temporospatial reference for an event (as
proposed by Stern, 1981, and Hirst, 1982). H.M.'s performance on
the verbal ordering task (Experiment IV-1) produced exactly the
opposite results from those predicted by the content/context
theory. The theory predicted that H.M. should have been more
impaired, relative to control subjects, in recognizing recency; in
fact, it was the other way around. The theory also predicted that
H.M. should have shown intact recognition of content at an
interval when his recognition of recency was already impaired.
Such a result would demonstrate the integrity of memory for content
at a moment when memory for recency was already impaired;
impairments at longer intervals in both types of memory could then
be explained as a consequence of the earlier occurring
recency-recognition impairment. In fact, the opposite occurred:
H.M.'s recognition of recency was normal at an interval when his
recognition of content was impaired (consistent with Milner, 1971).
H.M.'s performance on the test of memory for object's names
and their spatial locations could be interpreted as supporting the
content/context distinction. H.M. could recall some object names
at a time when his recall of spatial locations was no better than
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chance. However, he was severely impaired with both types of
recall, and there was no evidence of any intact learning. The
theory also predicted that H.M. would improve his performance in
the intentional encoding procedure, because it would allow him to
use relatively preserved effortful memory processes usually invoked
for content only. His performance, however, did not improve when
he was warned to try to remember the objects' locations and then
given a multiple-choice location recognition test. H.M. does not
appear to have an intact memory system for content that is impaired
by a separable and more primary impairment of contextual memory.
The Procedural/Declarative Distinction
The results of the experiments in Chapters IV, V, VI, VII,
VIII, and IX were, in general, consistent with the broad aspects of
the procedural/declarative theory (Cohen and Squire, 1980; Cohen,
1981; Squire 1986). H.M., and other amnesic patients, were
impaired on measures of declarative knowledge, which were questions
demanding explicit recall or recognition of prior episodes or the
content of those episodes. The failure of declarative memory
remained severe despite the use of multiple-choice recognition
tests, considered to be the most sensitive measures of declarative
knowledge. Also, H.M.'s deficit was not reduced when the questions
were posed with the stimuli in the same format with which he had
gained his skill, such as the words emerging from visual noise.
Perhaps the best evidence for the dissociation between spared skill
learning and impaired declarative learning occurred in the
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experiment involving the identification of mirror-reversed words
(VII-1). H.M. failed to recognize words he read eight times before
despite his reading them a minute-per-word faster than the first
time he read them, and despite his reading them 60% faster than the
paired foils.
The performance of H.M. on the skill-learning and priming
tasks was also consistent with the broad aspects of the
procedural/declarative distinction. H.M. showed spared learning on
a motor task (mirror-tracing), a perceptual task (stimuli emerging
f"rom visual noise), and a problem-solving task (missionaries and
cannibals). The difficulty with the procedural/declarative
distinction arises with predicting what H.M. would not learn. The
theory did not predict that H.M. would not learn the solution to
the sugar-production problem (VIII-3), and that he would not
demonstrate normal repetition priming effects on the lexical
decision tests (IX-5a and IX-5b). Indeed, the lexical decision
repetition effect is often cited as an ideal candidate for
preserved learning in amnesia (e.g., Cohen, 1984).
Furthermore, the preservation of stem-completion priming in
amnesia was not predicted explicitly by the theory, because the
procedures involved in the encoding procedures were not repeated
for the completion of stems. It is possible, and actually
necessary, to invoke a hidden procedure that is repeated, such as
lexical access. Such a step, however, is inconsistent with H.M.'s
failure to show intact lexical decision repetition priming, because
lexical access is usually thought to play a central role in the
repetition effect. Even more contradictory is the failure of
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patients with AD, who demonstrated several forms of intact lexical
access in the encoding phases of the experiment, to show normal
stem-completion priming.
Thus, the procedural/declarative distinction may be best
thought of as a hypothesis about conditions under which an amnesic
patient may show spared learning. H.M., and other severely amnesic
patients, do not show intact learning by any measure of declarative
memory, i.e., explicit requests for recall or recognition of events
and materials. Some tests of declarative memory may be less
readily apparent as tests of declarative memory, such as the
Fibonacci number-series test (VIII-1). Tasks that do not require
explicit recall and recognition may or may not require the
integrity of declarative memory: The sugar-production problem
requires declarative memory, whereas the missionaries-and-cannibals
problem does not. Repetition priming in lexical decision relies
upon declarative memory, but stem-completion priming does not.
Currently, the only way to know whether a nondeclarative task
requires the contribution of fact-learning capacities is to
administer the task to amnesic patients. The
procedural/declarative distinction is a description about the
necessary conditions under which an amnesic patient may show
preserved learning. It is not a theory about the sufficient
conditions, i.e., not an explanation of why one task is learnable
and another one is not.
Nor is the procedural/declarative theory a theory about forms
of knowledge. This statement is true not only because the theory
fails to predict what procedural-type tasks can be learned by H.M.,
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but also because it does not address the topic of what is being
learned. The procedural/declarative distinction is moot to results
suggesting that learning to read mirror-inverted text occurs at a
letter-specific level (VII-3), that learning to read words emerging
from visual noise occurs at a word (or some other) level, that
amnesic patients may learn some aspects of a problem's solution but
not other aspects (VII-2), or that stem-completion priming involves
a substantial facilitating process (IX-2). A number of theorists
have speculated that procedural learning is what used to be called
stimulus-response learning (e.g., Mishkin and Petri, 1984; Tulving,
1985). Describing preserved learning capacities in amnesia as the
result of a single stimulus-response kind of learning is
undesirable, because it is already clear that the tasks learned by
H.M. and other amnesic patients involve a variety of
representations and mechanisms. Although the reduction of
procedural learning to stimulus-response associations is not
necessarily shared by the originators of the procedural/declarative
distinction, the occurrence of such reductionism indicates that the
theory does not provide insights about the diversity and character
of the mechanisms underlying spared learning in amnesia.
Two further analyses of procedural-type learning merit
reconsideration. The first is the division between spared
skill-learning and spared priming effects. Although this division
is useful for grouping tasks for purposes of discussion or
consideration, there is no deeper basis for such a division.
Consider the identification of incomplete words emerging from
noise. The more rapid reidentification on Day 2 of repeated words
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could just as easily be termed as either priming or a skill for
identifying that word. One task that did not appear to have a
facilitating component, as measured by speed or error-rate, was
stem-completion priming, but Experiment IX-2 showed that the
priming included a substantial reduction in latency. Thus, while
tasks may be designated as involving either priming or
skill-learning, there is no formal basis for distinguishing those
two consequences of prior experience with a stimulus.
The second analysis concerns whether an amnesic patient must
have premorbidly acquired semantic knowledge of a stimulus in order
to show spared learning with that stimulus. Cermak et al. (1986)
documented this requirement in patients with KS on a perceptual
task, and Diamond and Rozin (1984) reported a similar result on a
stem-completion task. The results in this thesis suggest that
amnesic patients can show spared skill learning for nonwords
(Experiment VII-2) and (at least for H.M.) spared priming for
nonverbal figures (Experiment IX-4).
Taken together, the above results suggest that the premorbid
semantic knowledge required to show preserved learning in amnesia
is related to what must be learned to solve a particular problem.
For example, the KS patients studied by Cermak had premorbid
semantic knowledge of the letters that made up the nonwords
presented very quickly. Apparently, knowledge of the letters was
not sufficient to allow amnesic patients to reduce their threshold
for rereading nonwords. Conversely, premorbid knowledge of letters
was sufficient to allow amnesic patients to learn how to read
mirror-inverted text (Cohen and Squire, 1980; Martone et al., 1984;
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perhaps H.M. in Experiment VII-1). Evidence that normal subjects
learn to read mirror-inverted text at a letter level (Experiment
VII-3) is consistent with that conclusion. The basis for learning
to read incomplete nonwords (Experiment VII-2) may be described as
semantic knowledge of the phonetic properties of letter
combinations, and the basis of nonverbal priming (Experiment IX-4)
as semantic knowledge of the constituents of shapes or patterns.
The point is that we do not yet know how to describe the learning
that occurs in these tasks. Current generalizations about the
relationship between premorbid semantic knowledge and spared
learning in amnesia are too broad to explain the variety of
findings from even the six experimental results described above.
The challenge lies in determining what knowledge is necessary to
learn a particular task.
Dichotomies in the Amnesic Syndrome
Most current theories of the neural organization of human
memory take a dichotomous approach, e.g. Table I-1. There is
little disagreement in describing what new things cannot be learned
by an amnesic patient, such as H.M. This concordance may occur
because the theories are built around the failure of learning
following damage to medial temporal-lobe (or perhaps midline
diencephalic) structures. There is more mystery surrounding what
amnesic patients can learn because that includes all other kinds of
learning. Consider what would happen if a nuclear accident
destroyed the State of Michigan, but left the other 49 states
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intact. Would it make sense to build a theory around what the
other states had in common, and would one expect to find a deep
theory associating those 49 states? Perhaps a more appropriate
example would be the case of a patient with a right parietal-lobe
lesion who displays contralateral neglect. Would it make sense to
construct a deep theory about what all other forms of attention
have in common? Consequently, problems posed by previous
dichotomies will not be clarified by proposing additional
dichotomies at the same level of description. Learning capacities
spared in amnesia share a weak association: They do not depend
upon the integrity of the medial temporal-lobe. Any deeper
association would be interesting, but there is no hint at present
that one element in a dichotomy can capture the variety of learning
capacities that share only their indifference to the status of
fact-learning.
There is a notable contrast, however, between the family of
learning processes impaired in H.M. and the variety of learning
processes that remain intact. The contrast occurs at another level
of description than the procedural/declarative, semantic/episodic,
and content/context distinctions: It appears upon consideration of
the possible uses of different kinds of learning for the person or
organism possessing them. Marr (1982) suggested that
information-processing tasks ought to be considered at three
levels. The top level is what he termed computational theory. It
concerns the goal of the computation, why the goal is appropriate,
and the logic of the strategy by which the goal can be carried out.
The second level addresses the implementation of the computational
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theory, the representations of the input and output, and the
algorithm that transforms those representations. The third and
bottom level concerns the hardware implementation that permits the
representations and algorithms to be realized physically.
Understanding memory systems of the human brain has progressed
from bottom to top. Since 1900 (as reviewed by Milner, 1966)
patients with lesions that occurred as accidents of nature or
society (such as wars), with damage to the physical basis of the
representations and algorithm, have presented documented amnesic
syndromes. With H.M.'s case, a clear relationship was established
between structures of the medial temporal lobe and the
representational and algorithmic structure of memory (i.e.,
dissociations between memory and intelligence, memory for remote
and recent events, immediate and long-term memories). Mch of the
work since that time, in humans, has focused on models of the
representation and algorithms involved in anterograde learning,
such as encoding/consolidation/retrieval (e.g., Milner, 1966;
Warrington and Weiskrantz, 1970; Butters and Cermak, 1980),
semantic/episodic (Kinsbourne and Wood, 1975), automatic/effortful
(Hirst and Volpe, 1982), and procedural/declarative (Cohen, 1981).
Little has been said at the level of computational theory, about
the diverging goals of dissociable memory systems.
One difference between learning capacities spared and impaired
in amnesia is reminiscent of the centuries-old distinction between
empiricism and rationalism. Empiricism presented the view that
experience is the only source of human knowledge, and this view was
presented in various forms by such philosophers as Hobbes, Locke,
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Hume, and Mill (reviewed in Bower and Hilgard, 1981). Rationalism
held the position that knowledge was gained by the active
interpretation of unformed experiences performed by the human mind.
Gains in knowledge, therefore, were dependent upon the properties
of the mind and not directly given by experience. This view was
articulated by Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant (reviewed in Bower and
Hilgard, 1981). Current versions of the same basic distinction in
cognitive psychology are bottom-up versus top-down or data-driven
versus concept-driven processes.
Gaining knowledge or forming memories by either empiricist or
rationalist principles has its advantages and disadvantages. The
advantage of learning empirically is that one is unlikely to learn
wrong things if experience provides corrective feedback. For
example, all subjects who can mirror-trace initially appear capable
of acquiring and maintaining greater skill in mirror-tracing. As
the subject performs the task, constant visual feedback is provided
about good and bad movements. The subject may, perhaps, begin with
some model of how to mirror-trace and, by watching good and bad
movements occur while doing the task, update that model on the
basis of experience. In terms of a learning system, closed-loop
learning occurs with constant feedback. For the two perceptual
tasks, identifying mirror-reversed text and incomplete stimuli
emerging from noise, there is also constant, on-line feedback
occurring until a correct answer is made (the examiner assures
closure of the feedback loop by refusing to accept incorrect
answers). The missionaries-and-cannibals problem also provides
constant feedback about the progress being made in getting the six
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travelers to the opposite shore. Indeed, the most error-prone
moves are those that look superficially as though they are moves
backwards from the goal-state. In all of these examples, the task
structure provides unambiguous feedback without reference to prior
episodes. Consequently, knowledge acquired while doing those tasks
can update a model of how to do them with correctness virtually
assured. Once the subject attempts the task, learning occurs as
the stored result of constant interactions between performance and
feedback. The limit of such learning is that the subject cannot
freely select to remember some aspects of the task and not others,
depending upon the motivations of the subject.
Another sort of learning could endow people with the ability
to remember in line with their motivated concerns. The more
important the event, for whatever the reason, the better it is
remembered. Such learning will not be constrained by experience as
closely as the closed-loop sorts described above. Open-loop
learning will be fallible to learning incorrect information because
there is no corrective feedback at the time of memory formation.
Amnesic patients appear able to learn and perform closed-loop
tasks that satisfy the requirements of empirical learning. These
patients are unable to learn and recollect open-loop experiences
that are learned according to the rationalist interests of the
subject. Patients with global amnesia have bilateral limbic
lesions, and limbic structures have long been known to mediate
motivation and emotion, and to play a central role in the control
of visceral responses to experience (e.g., Papez, 1937; Kluver and
Bucy, 1939; MacLean, 1949; Olds and Milner, 1954; Delgado, Roberts,
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and Miller, 1954; Nauta, 1972). It seems possible that the limbic
structures injured in amnesia play an important role in coupling
the emotions of an organism together with its perceptual
experiences, the very coupling needed to record memories on the
basis of motivation. (It is important to note that amnesia should
not be explained as a failure of motivation in performing tasks,
because H.M. is a highly motivated subjects and amnesic patients
could not demonstrate preserved learning if they did not try to do
well on tasks. Rather, it may be a matter of how motivations are
associated with experiences in memory.) The role of affect and
emotions in memory has received little attention in studies of
cognition with amnesic patients, and this thesis is no exception.
It seems unlikely to be a coincidence that the same limbic
structures critical to emotional functions are also critical to
fact-learning. Claparede (1911), in the first report of preserved
learning in amnesia, noted that the amnesic subject had lost a
sense of moitie (translated as "me-ness" by Rapaport, 1951).
Perhaps the sense of self or "me-ness" emerges from personal
motivations guiding the remembering of experiences that seem to
matter to "me."
At the level of computational theory, therefore, there may be
multiple memory systems with the goals of assimilating experience,
via empirical closed-loop feedback in the course of performance,
into later, more skilled behaviors. There may be a more singular
memory system that learns by rationalist self-interest, that is
fallible to error because it records memories in an open-loop
fashion, and that depends upon the integrity of such limbic
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structures as the hippocampus and amygdala.
The Neural Basis of Multiple Memory Systems
The functional localization of memory systems in the brain
remains challenging. Mishkin (Mishkin et al., 1984; Mishkin and
Petri, 1984) has proposed that memory systems not dependent upon
the hippocampus and amygdala rely instead upon the integrity of the
basal ganglia. A finding in favor of Mishkin's hypothesis was
reported by Martone et al. in 1984, in patients with Huntington's
diesase, a disease marked by gross degeneration of the head of the
caudate nucleus and putamen bilaterally (structures of the basal
ganglia) (Adams and Victor, 1985). A group of these patients
failed to show normal learning of the skill for reading
mirror-inverted text (possibly due to oculomotor abnormalities),
despite unimpaired recognition of the repeated words in that
experiment. Patients with Huntington's disease, however,
demonstrated normal stem-completion priming (Squire, 1986).
Consequently, it already seems unlikely that all examples of spared
learning in amnesia are dependent upon the basal ganglia. The
dissociation in AD between spared learning of the skill for
mirror-tracing and impaired stem-completion priming provides
further support for the neural heterogeneity of memory systems that
remain intact despite amnesia. At the same time, the consideration
of brain structures not traditionally associated with learning,
such as those of the basal ganglia, ought to facilitate the
identification of memory systems that include a variety of
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anatomical and neurochemical subsystems.
It is also tempting to consider the impaired stem-completion
priming of patients with AD as the consequence of degenerated
cortico-cortical connections in those patients. Damage to such
limbic structures in AD as the hippocampus (Hirano and Zimmerman,
1962; Woodard, 1962; Hyman et al., 1984) and amygdala (Kemper,
1983) cannot account for the deficit in priming because it is
exactly those structures that are removed in H.M., who demonstrated
intact priming. Perhaps the intact priming seen in H.M. and other
amnesic patients reflected intact cortico-cortical connections.
Cortical degeneration, on the other hand, is evident in AD
(Corsellis, 1976; Terry, 1980; Brun, 1983), especially in the
temporal and parietal lobes. The language impairments seen in AD
(e.g., Huff et al., 1986) are consistent with the idea that early
behavioral deficits in AD are, at least in part, indicative of
cortical dysfunction. The notion that specific cortico-striatal
and cortico-cortical connections mediate some kinds of learning
preserved in amnesia are hypotheses worthy of testing. The
dependence of fact-learning upon cortico-limbic connections is
a secure conclusion.
One more topic of speculation is the role of multiple sensory
and motor areas in the primate, and especially the human neocortex.
Studies in several modalities suggest that association cortices are
comprised of multiple representations for vision (Schiller, in
press), audition (Merzenich et al., 1977), somatosensation
(Merzenich et al., 1978; Corkin, 197.8), and motor control (reviewed
in Diamond, 1979). These secondary sensory and motor cortices have
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been thought of primarily in terms of perception and motor control.
They seem, however, to be plausible loci for subsystems storing
information about how a particular visual pattern relates to a
known word or how to move a stylus while mirror-tracing. Perhaps
what can be learned in amnesia is what can be learned entirely
within discreet neocortical and striatal subsystems without
reference to other subsystems. Several authors have suggested that
the hippocampal formation serves as an index that associates
separate neocortical or striatal subsystems involved in a
particular experiential event (Squire, Cohen, and Nadel, 1983;
Taylor and DiScenna, 1986). Subsystems that can gain their own
knowledge do not require the indexing in order to learn, and thus
may remain intact in the amnesia consequent to hippocampal damage.
When a series of such subsystems interact in the execution of a
task, they can acquire, store, and express anterograde knowledge
despite damage to cortico-limbic connections. The subsystems would
then constitute a full memory system. These speculations, however,
roam well beyond the facts.
A difficult question is how many memory systems are there?
All sorts of small and large neuronal circuits must record
experience in order to achieve their goals, and it is possible that
there may be a very large number of such systems. These systems
may be organized manageably at hierachical levels of description,
so that analysis of a particular process can be described by the
interactions at a limited number of memory systems. That process,
in turn, may be composed of subprocesses, each of which may be
analyzed as the interaction of lower-level memory systems. On the
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other hand, it may turn out that a multiple memory systems approach
will become confusing with the discovery of too many systems. In
that case, a different and better heuristic approach will be
needed.
Future Research
The above scenarios are highly speculative, and it is
difficult to confirm or disconfirm their claims experimentally.
Future research about memory systems of the human brain can
approach three topics experimentally. First, computer modeling of
spared and impaired learning processes may offer a way to construct
increasingly precise models of what is being learned by various
memory systems of the human brain. It may be too early to model
dissociable learning processes at a quasineural level, although
some are already attempting to do so (e.g., McClelland and
Rumelhart, 1986). It is not too early to construct models that
capture higher level aspects of the learning processes (Marr's
level of representation an'd algorithms). For example, the words
emerging from noise and the missionaries and cannibals problem lend
themselves to computer modeling. The value of computational models
is not so much, at present, in truly modeling learning as it is in
demanding as specific and full an articulation of hypotheses and
theories as possible.
Second, learning capacities in patients with nonlimbic lesions
ought to be systematically studied in order to discover the neural
basis of the kinds of learning spared in amnesia. Already, studies
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of patients with AD appear informative (Chapters VI and IX), and
further studies of patients with cortical lesions due to strokes or
lesions of the basal ganglia due to Parkinson's disease and other
extrapyramidal disorders should be useful.
Third, there is still much to be learned from studies of
patients with global amnesia. The pace of research in recent years
demonstrates that what is learned from these patients is limited
mostly by the imagination and ingenuity of investigators in the
field. Research in the area of amnesia has progressed around a
full cycle. Early specific knowledge about the brain organization
of human memory derived from the contrast between what amnesic
patients remembered (information presented within their digit span,
remote memories) and what those patients forgot (new information
beyond their span, and memories from times close to the onset of
the amnesia). Researchers then attempted to characterize why these
patients forgot (e.g., faulty encoding or retrieval). This was
followed by a period in which theories rested upon what amnesic
patients remembered via preserved learning capacities. The
experiments in this thesis, and more recent reports from other
researchers, have again emphasized the contrast between preserved
and impaired learning capacities for a variety of tasks that were,
by one theory or another, candidates for intact learning despite
amnesia. Such an approach may be useful in eludicating not only
whether or not an amnesic patient can learn a task, but also what
forms of knowledge may be acquired by various memory systems. The
experiments in this thesis constitute a series of early steps in
using the results of theoretically motivated experiments to reveal
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the multiple mechanisms by which dissociable memory systems of the
human brain gain knowledge from experience.
IX: References
1. Adams, R. D., & Victor, M. (1985). Principles of
neurology (3rd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
2. Adolfsson, R., Gottfries, C. G., Roos, B. E., & Winblad,
B. (1979). Changes in brain catecholamines in patients
with dementia of the Alzheimer type. British Journal of
Psychiatry, 135, 216-223.
3. Albert, M. (1978). Subcortical dementia. In R.
Katzman (Ed.), Alzheimer's Disease: Senile Dementia and
Related Disorders. (pp. 173-180). New York: Raven Press.
4. Albert, M. S., Butters, N., & Levin; J. (1979).
Temporal gradients in the retrograde amnesia of
patients with alcoholic Korsakoff's disease. Archives
of Neuroloqy, 36, 311-216.
5. Alexander, G. E., DeLong, M. R., & Strick, P. L. (1986).
Parallel organization of functionally segregated
circuits linking basal ganglia and cortex. Annual
Review of Neuroscience, 9, 357-381.
6. American Psychiatric Association. (1980).
Diagnostic and statistic manual of mental disorders,
(3rd ed). Wash, D.C.
7. Anderson, J. R. (1981). Cognitive skills and their
acquisition. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
8. Anderson, J. R. (1982). Acquisition of cognitive skill.
Psychological Review, 89, 369-406.
295
9. Arai, H., Kosaka, K., & Iizuka, R. (1984). Changes of
biogenic amines and their metabolites in postmortem
brains from patients with Alzheimer-type dementia.
Journal of Neurochemistry, 43, 388-393.
10. Baddeley, A. (1982). Amnesia: A minimal model and an
interpretation. In L. S. Cermak (Ed.), Human memory
and amnesia (pp. 305-336). Hillsdale, N J: Erlbaum
Press. 0
11. Baddeley, A. D., & Dale, H. C. A. (1966). The effect of
semantic similarity on retroactive interference in long-
and short-term memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and
Verbal Behavior, 5, 417-420.
12. Baddeley, A. D., & Warrington, E. M. (1970). Amnesia
and the distinction between long- and short-term memory.
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 9, 176-
189.
13. Ballard, D. H., & Brown, C. M. (1982). Computer vision.
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
14. Bayles, K. A. (1982). Language function in senile
dementia. Brain and Language, 16, 265-280.
15. Bekhterev, V. M. (1900). Demonstration eines Gehirns
mit Zerstorung der vorderen und inneren Theile der
Hirnrinde beider Schlafenlappen. Neurol. Cbl., 19, 990-
991.
16. Berry, D. C., & Broadbent, D. E. (1984). On the
relationship between task performance and associated
verbalizable knowledge. The Quarterly Journal of
296
Experimental Psychology, 36A, 209-231.
17. Blakemore, C. C. (1974). Developmental factors in the
formation of feature extracting neurons. In F. O.
Schmitt & F. G. Worden (Eds.), The neurosciences:
Third study program (pp. 105-113). Cambridge: MIT Press.
18. Blessed, G., Tomlinson, B. E., & Roth, M. (1968). The
association between quantitative measures of dementia
and of senile changes in the grey matter of elderly
patients. British Journal of Psychiatry, 114, 797-811.
19. Bloom, H. (1973). The anxiety of influence. New York:
Oxford University Press.
20. Bondareff, W., Mountjoy, C. Q., & Roth, M. (1981).
Selective loss of neurones of origin of adrenergic
projection to cerebral cortex (nucleus locus coeruleus)
in senile dementia. The Lancet, 1, 783-784.
21. Bowen, D. M., Allen, S. J., Benton, J. S., Goodhardt, M.
J., Haan, E. A., Palmer, A. M., Sims, N. R., & Smith, C.
C. T. (1983). Biochemical assessment of serotonergic
and cholinergic dysfunction and cerebral atrophy in
Alzheimer's disease. Journal of Neurochemistry, 41, 266-
272.
22. Bowers, G. H., & Hilgard, E. R. (1981). Theories of
learning (5th ed.). Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
23. Brooks, D. N., & Baddeley, A. (1976). What can amnesic
patients learn?. Neuropsycholgia, 14, 111-122.
297
298
24. Brun, A. (1983). An overview of light and electron
microscopic changes. In B. Reisberg (Ed.),
Alzheimer's disease (pp. 37-47). New York: Free Press.
25. Brun, A., & Englund, E. (1981). Regional pattern of
degeneration in Alzheimer's disease: Neuronal loss and
histopathological grading. Histopathology, 5, 549-564.
26. Bruner, J. S. (1969). Modalities of memory. In G. A.
Talland & N. C. Waugh (Eds.), The pathology of memory
(pp. 253-259). New York: Academic Press.
27. Butters, N., & Cermak, L. S. (1980). Alcoholic
Korsakoff's syndrome: An information-processing
approach to amnesia. New York: Academic Press.
28. Butters, N., Wolfe, J., Martone, M., Granholm, E., &
Cermak, L. S. (1985). Memory disorders associated with
Huntington's disease: Verbal recall, verbal recognition
and procedural memory. Neuropsychologia, 23, 729-743.
29. Carey, S. (1978). The child as word learner. In M.
Halle, J. Bresnan, & G. A. Miller (Eds.), Linguistic
theory and psychological reality (pp. 264-293).
Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.
30. Cermak, L. (1984). The episodic-semantic distinction in
amnesia. In L. R. Squire & N. Butters (Eds.),
Neuropsychology of Memory (pp. 55-62). New York:
Guilford Press.
31. Cermak, L. S. (1976). The encoding capacity of a
patient with amnesia due to encephalitis.
Neuropsycholoqia, 14, 311-326.
299
32. Cermak, L. S., Lewis, R., Butters, N., & Goodglass, H.
(1973). Role of verbal mediation in performance of
motor tasks by Korsakoff patients. Perceptual and Motor
Skills, 37, 259-262.
33. Cermak, L. S., & O'Connor, M. (1983). The retrieval
capacity of a patient with amnesia due to encephalitis.
Neuropsychologia, 21, 213-234.
34. Cermak, L. S., Talbot, N., Chandler, K., & Wolbarst, L.
R. (1985). The perceptual priming phenomenon in amnesia.
Neuropsychologia, 23, 615-622.
35. Claparede, E. (1951). Reconnaissance et moiite.
[Recognition and me-ness]. Archives de Psycholoqie, 11,
70-90.
36. Cohen, N. (1985). Levels of analysis in memory research:
The neuropsychological approach. In J. L. McGaugh &
G. Lynch (Eds.), Memory systems of the brain (pp. 419-
432). New York: Guilford Press.
37. Cohen, N. J. (1981). Neuropsychological evidence for a
distinction between procedural and declarative
knowledge in human memory and amnesia. Unpublished
doctoral dissertation, University of California, San
Diego.
38. Cohen, N. J. (1984). Preserved learning capacity in
amnesia: Evidence for multiple memory systems. In L.
Squire & N. Butters (Eds.), Neuropsychology of Memory
(pp. 83-103). London: Guilford Press.
39. Cohen, N. J., & Corkin, S. (1981). The amnesic patient
H.M.: Learning and retention of a cognitive skill.
Society for Neuroscience Abstracts, 7, 517-518.
40. Cohen, N. J., & Squire, L. (1980). Preserved learning
and retention of pattern-analyzing skill in amnesia:
Dissociation of knowing how and knowing that. Science,
210, 207-210.
41. Collins, A. M., & Loftus, E. F. (1975). A spreading-
activation theory of semantic processing. Psychological
Review, 82, 407-428.
42. Corkin, S. (1965). Tactually-guided maze learning in
man: Effects of unilateral cortical excisions and
bilateral hippocampal lesions. Neuropsychologia, 3, 339-
351.
43. Corkin, S. (1968). Acquisition of motor skill after
bilateral medial temporal-lobe excision.
Neuropsycholoqia, 6, 225-264.
44. Corkin, S. (1978). The role of different cerebral
structures in somesthetic perception. In E. C.
Carterett & M. P. Friedman (Eds.), Handbook of
perception (pp. 105-155). New York: Academic Press.
45. Corkin, S. (1982). Some relationships between global
amnesias and the memory impairments in Alzheimer's
disease. In S. Corkin, K. L. Davis, J. H. Growdon, &
E. Usdin (Eds.), Alzheimer's disease: A report of
progress in research (pp. 149-164). New York: Raven
Press.
300
301
46. Corkin, S. (1984). Lasting consequences of bilateral
medial temporal lobectomy: Clinical course and
experimental findings in H.M. Seminars in Neurology, 4,
252-262.
47. Corkin, S., Cohen, N. J., Sullivan, E. V., Clegg, R. A.,
Rosen, T. J., & Ackerman, R. H. (1985). Analyses of
global memory impairments of different etiologies. In
D. S. Olton, E. Gamzu, & S. Corkin (Eds.), Memory
dysfunctions: An integration of animal and human
research from preclinical and clinical perspectives.
(pp. 10-40). New York: Annals New York Academy of
Science.
48. Corkin, S., Gabrieli, J. D. E., Stanger, B. Z., Mickel,
S. F., Rosen, T. J., Sullivan, E. V., & Growdon, J. H.
(1986). Skill learning and priming in Alzheimer's
disease. Neurology, 36, 296.
49. Corkin, S., Growdon, J. H., Sullivan, E. V., Nissen, M.
J., & Huff, F. J. (1985). Assessing treatment effects
from a neuropsychological perspective. In L. Poon
(Ed.), Handbook for clinical assessment of older adults
Washington, D.C.: American Psychological
Association.
50. Correll, R. E., & Scoville, W. B. (1955). Effects of
medial temporal lobe lesions on visual discrimination
performance. Journal of Comparative and Physiological
Psychology, 60, 175-181.
51. Corsellis, J. A. N. (1976). Aging and the dementias.
In W. Blackwood & J. A. N. Corsellis (Eds.),
Greenfield's neuropathology (pp. 849-902). London:
Edward Arnold.
52. Corsi, P. (1972). Human memory and the medial temporal
region of the brain. Unpublished doctoral dissertation.
McGill University, Montreal.
53. Craik, F. I. M., & Lockhart, R. S. (1972). Levels of
processing: A framework for memory research. Journal of
Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 11, 671-684.
54. Craik, F. I. M., & Tulving, E. (1975). Depth of
processing and the retention of words in episodic
memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,
104, 268-294.
55. Cross, A. J., Crow, T. J., Perry, E. K., Perry, R. H.,
& Blessed, G. (1981). Reduced dopamine-B-hydroxylase
activity in Alzheimer's disease. British Medical
Journal, 282, 93-94.
56. Davies, P., & Maloney, A. F. J. (1976). Selective loss
of central cholinergic neurons in Alzheimer's disease.
The Lancet, ii, 1403.
57. Delgado, J. M. R., Roberts, W. W., & Miller, N. E.
(1954). Learning motivated by electrical stimulation of
the brain. American Journal of Physioloqy, 179, 587.
58. Diamond, J. T. (1979). The subdivisions of neocortex: A
proposal to revise the traditional view of sensory,
motor, and association areas. In E. Stellor & J. M.
302
Sprague (Eds.), Progress in psychobiology and
physiological psychology (pp. 1-43). New York: Academic
Press.
59. Diamond, R., & Rozin, P. (1984). Activation of existing
memories in the amnesic syndromes. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology, 93, 98-105.
60. Drachman, D. A., & Arbit, J. (1966). Memory and the
hippocampal complex. Archives of Neurology, 15, 52-61.
61. Dricker, J., Butters, N., Berman, G., Samuels, I., &
Carey, S. (1978). Recognition and encoding of faces by
alcoholic Korsakoff and right hemisphere patients.
Neuropsychologia, 16, 683-695.
62. Eich, E. (1984). Memory for unattended events:
Remembering with and without awareness. Memory and
Cognition, 12, 105-111.
63. Eslinger, P. J., & Damasio, A. R. (1985). Alzheimer's
disease spares motor learning. Society for Neuroscience
Abstracts, 11, 459.
64. Feustel, T. C., Shiffrin, R. M., & Salasoo, A. (1983).
Episodic and lexical contributions to the repetition
effect in word identification. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 112, 309-346.
65. Fischler, I. (1977a). Associative facilitation without
expectancy in a lexical decision task. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and
Performance, 3, 18-26.
303
66. Fischler, I. (1977b). Semantic facilitation without
association in a lexical decision task. Memory and
Cognition, 5, 335-339.
67. Fisk, A. D., & Schneider, V. (1984). Memory as a
function of attention, level of processing, and
automatization. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory and Cognition, 10, 181-197.
68. Forster, K. I. (1976). Accessing the mental lexicon.
In R. Wales & E. Walker (Eds.), New approaches to
language mechanisms (pp. 257-287). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
69. Forster, K. I., & Davis, C. (1984). Repetition priming
and frequency attenuation in lexical access. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 10, 680-698.
70. Freed, D. (1986). Behaviorally defined subgroups of
patients with Alzheimer's disease. Unpublished
doctoral dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Cambridge.
71. Gabrieli, J. D. E., Haimowitz, I., & Corkin, S. (1984).
Constraints upon the acquisition of cognitive skills in
amnesia: Studies with H.M. and patients with
Alzheimer's disease. Society for Neuroscience Abstracts,
11, 458.
72. Garner, W. (1974). The processing of information and
structure. Maryland: Erlbaum.
73. Godden, D. R., & Baddeley, A. D. (1975). Context-
dependent memory in two natural environments: On land
304
and underwater. British Journal of Psychology, 66, 325- 305
332.
74. Godden, 0. R., & Baddeley, A. D. (1980). When does
context influence recognition memory?. British Journal
of Psychology, 71, 99-104.
75. Gollin, E. S. (1960). Developmental studies of visual
recognition of incomplete objects. Perceptual and Motor
Skills, 11, 289-298.
76. Graf, P., & Mandler, G. (1984). Activation makes words
more accessible, but not necessarily more retrievable.
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 23, 553-
568.
77. Graf, P., Mandler, G., & Haden, P. E. (1982).
Simulating amnesic symptoms in normal subjects. Science,
218, 1243-1244.
78. Graf, P., & Schacter, D. L. (1985). Implicit and
explicit memory for new associations in normal and
amnesic subjects. Journal of Experimental Psychology,
Learning Memory and Cognition, 11, 501-518.
79. Graf, P., Shimamura, A. P., & Squire, L. R. (1985).
Priming across modalities and priming across category
levels: Extending the domain of preserved function in
amnesia. Journal of Experimental Psychology, Learning
Memory and Cognition, 11, 386-396.
80. Graf, P., Squire, L. R., & Mandler, G. (1984). The
information that amnesic patients do not forget.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory
306
and Cognition, 10, 164-178.
81. Greene, R. L. (1984). Incidental learning of event
frequency. Memory and Cognition, 12, 90-95.
82. Hasher, L., & Zacks, R. (1979). Automatic and effortful
processes in memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology,
108, 356-388.
83. Hirano, A., & Zimmerman, H. M. (1962). Alzheimer's
neurofibrillary changes; a topographic study. Archives
of Neurology, 7, 227-242.
84. Hirst, W. (1982). The amnesic syndrome: Descriptions
and explanations. Psychological Bulletin, 91, 435-460.
85. Hirst, W., Johnson, M. K., Kim, J. K., Risse, G.,
Phelps, E. A., & Volpe, P. T. (1986). Recognition and
recall in amnesics. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 12, 445-451.
86. Hirst, W., & Volpe, B. T. (1982). Temporal order
judgements with amnesia. Brain and Cognition, I, 294-
306.
87. Hirst, W., & Volpe, B. T. (1984). Automatic and
effortful encoding with amnesia. In M. S. Gazzaniga
(Ed.), Handbook of Cognitive Neuroscience (pp. 369-386).
New York: Plenum Press.
88. Huff, F. J., Corkin, S., & Growdon, J. H. (1986).
Semantic impairment and anomia in Alzheimer's disease.
Brain and Language, 28, 235-249.
89. Hyman, B. T., Van Hoesen, G. W., Damasio, A. R., &
Barnes, C. L. (1984). Alzheimer's disease: Cell
specific pathology isolates the hippocampal formation.
Science, 225, 1168-1170.
90. Inglis, J. (1959). A paired associate learning test for
use with elderly psychiatric patients. Journal of
Mental Science, 105, 440-443.
91. Iverson, S. (1976). Do hippocampal lesions produce
amnesia in animals?. International Review of
Neurobiology, 19, 1-49.
92. Jacoby, L. J. (1984). Incidental versus intentional
retrieval: Remembering and awareness as separate issues.
In L. R. Squire & N. Butters (Eds.), Neuropsychology
of Memory (pp. 145-155). New York: Guilford Press.
93. Jacoby, L. J., & Witherspoon, D. (1982). Remembering
without awareness. Canadian Journal of Psychology, 36,
300-324.
94. Jacoby, L. L. (1983). Perceptual enhancement:
Persistent affects of an experience. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition,
9, 21-38.
95. Jacoby, L. L., & Dallas, M. (1981). On the
relationships between autobiographical memory and
perceptual learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General, 3, 306-340.
96. Kandel, E. R. (1976). Cellular basis of behavior. San
Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
307
308
97. Katzman, R. (1976). The prevalence and malignancy of
Alzheimer's disease. Archives of Neuroloqy, 33, 217-218.
98. Keane, M. M., Milberg, W., Cronin-Golomb, A., Corkin,
S., & Gabrieli, J. D. E. (1986). Priming in amnesia and
commissurotomy: Duration, task, and neural
characteristics. Society for Neuroscience Abstracts, 12,
745.
99. Kemper, T. L. (1983). Organization of the
neuropathology of the amygdala in Alzheimer's disease.
Biological Aspects of Alzheimer's Disease. Banbury
Reports, 15, 31-35.
100. Khachaturian, Z. S. (1985). Diagnosis of Alzheimer's
disease. Archives of Neuroloqy, 42, 1097-1105.
101. Kimura, D. (1963). Right temporal-lobe damage. Archives
of Neurology, 8, 264-271.
102. Kinsbourne, M., & Wood, F. (1975). Short term memory
processes and the amnesic syndrome. In D. Deutsch &
J. A. Deutsch (Eds.), Short-Term Memory (pp. 258-291).
New York: Academic Press.
103. Kluver, H., & Bucy, P. C. (1939). Preliminary analysis
of the temporal lobes in monkeys. Archives of Neurology
and Psychiatry, 42, 979-1000.
104. Kolers, P. A. (1975). Specificity of operations in
sentence recognition. Cognitive Psychology, 1, 289-306.
105. Kolers, P. A. (1976). Pattern-analyzing memory. Science,
191, 1280-1281.
309
106. Kolers, P. A. (1979). A pattern-analyzing basis of
recognition. In L. S. Cermak & F. I. M. Craik (Eds.),
Levels of Processing in Human Memory (pp. '363-384).
Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlhorn Associates.
107. Korsakoff, S. S. (1889). Etude medico-psychologique sur
une forme des maladies de la memoire. Revue
Philosophique, 28, 501-530.
108. Kucera, M., & Francis, W. (1967). Computational
Analysis of Present-Day American English. Providence,
RI: Brown University Press.
109. Lashley, K. S. (1950). In search of the engram. In
(Ed.), Symposium of the Society of Experimental Biology
(pp. 454-482). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
110. Lees, A. J., & Smith, E. (1983). Cognitive deficits in
the early stages of Parkinson's disease. Brain, 106,
257-270.
111. Lynch, G., McGaugh, J. L., & Weinberger, N. M. (1984).
Neurobiology of Learning and Memory. New York: The
Guilford Press.
112. Mahut, H. Y., Mois, M., & Zola-Morgan, S. (1981).
Retention deficits after combined amygdala-hippocampal
and selective hippocampal resections in the monkey.
Neuropsycholoqia, 19, 201-225.
113. Mandler, J. M., Seegmiller, D., & Day, J. (1977). On
the coding of spatial information. Memory and Cognition,
5, 10-16.
310
114. Mann, D. M. A., Lincoln, J., & Yates, P. 0. (1980).
Changes in monoamine containing neurons of the human
CNS in senile dementia. British Journal of Psychiatry,
136, 533-541.
115. Marcel, A. J. (1982). Conscious and unconscious
perception: Experiments on visual masking and word
recognition. Cognitive Psychology, 15, 197-237.
116. March-Benjamin, M., & Jonides, T. (1986). On the
automaticity of frequency coding: Effects of competing
task load, encoding strategy, and intention. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition,
12, 376-386.
117. Marr, D. (1982). Vision. New York: W. H. Freeman and
Company.
118. Marslen-Wilson, W. D., & Teuber, H. L. (1975). Memory
for remote events in anterograde amnesia: Recognition
of public figures from news photographs.
Neuropsycholoqia, 13, 353-364.
119. Martin, A., & Fedio, P. (1983). Word production and
comprehension in Alzheimer's disease: The breakdown of
semantic knowledge. Brain and Langauqe, 19, 124-141.
120. Martone, M., Butters, N., Payne, M., Becker, J., & Sax,
D. S. (1984). Dissociations between skill learning and
verbal recognition in amnesia and dementia. Archives of
Neurology, 41, 965-970.
311
121. Matison, R., Mayeux, R., Rosen, R., & Fahn, S. (1982).
"Tip-of-the-tongue" phenomenon in Parkinson's disease.
Neurology, 32, 567-570.
122. McClelland, J. L., & Rumelhart, D. E. (1986). Amnesia
and distributed memory. In J. L. McClelland & D. E.
Rumelhart (Eds.), Parallel distributed processing (pp.
503-527). Cambridge: MIT Press.
123. McKhann, G., Drachman, D., Folstein, M., Katzman, R.,
Price, D., & Stadlan, E. M. (1984). Clinical diagnosis
of Alzheimer's disease: Report of the NINCDS-ADRDA work
group under the auspices of HHS Task Force on
Alzheimer's disease. Neurology, 34, 939-945.
124. McKoon, G., Ratcliff, R., & Dell, G. S. (1986). A
critical evaluation of the semantic-episodic
distinction. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 12, 295-306.
125. Merzenich, M. M., Kaas, J. H., Sur, M., & Lin, C. S.
(1978). Double representation of the body surface
within cytoarchitectonic areas 3b and 1 and "SI" in the
owl monkey (Aotus trivirgatus). Journal of Comparative
Neurology, 181, 41-74.
126. Merzenich, M. M., Roth, G. L., Anderson, R. A., Knight,
P. L., & Colwell, S. A. (1977). Some basic features of
organization of the central auditory nervous system.
In E. F. Evans & J. P. Wilson (Eds.), Psychophysics
and physiology of hearing (pp. 1-11). New York:
Academic Press.
312
127. Meudell, P. R., Mayes, A. R., Ostergaard, A., &
Pickering, A. (1985). Recency and frequency judgements
in alcoholic amnesics and normal people with poor
memory. Cortex, 21, 487-511.
128. Milner, B. (1958). Psychological defects produced by
temporal-lobe excision. Research Publications of the
Association for Research in Nervous and Mental Disease,
35, 244-257.
129. Milner, B. (1962). Les troubles de la memoire
accompagnent des lesion hippocampiques bilaterales.
[Disturbance of memory accompanying bilateral
hippocampal lesions]. In P. Passouant (Ed.),
Physiologie de L'Hippocampe (pp. 247-272). Paris: Cntr.
Nat'l.de La Rech.Scientifique.
130. Milner, B. (1963). Effects of different brain lesions
on card sorting: The role of the frontal lobes.
Archives of Neurology, 9, 90-100.
131. Milner, B. (1964). Some effects of frontal lobectomy in
man. In J. M. Warren & K. Akert (Eds.), The Frontal
Granular Cortex and Behavior. (pp. 313-331). New York:
McGraw-Hill.
132. Milner, B. (1965). Visually-guided maze-learning in man:
Effects of bilateral hippocampal, bilateral frontal,
and unilateral cerebral lesions. Neuropsychologia, 3,
339-351.
133. Milner, B. (1966). Amnesia following operation on the
temporal lobes. In C. W. M. Whitty & 0. L. Zangwill
(Eds.), Amnesia (pp. 109-133). London: Butterworths.
134. Milner, B. (1968). Disorders of memory after brain
lesions in man. Neuropsycholoqia, 6, 175-179.
135. Milner, B. (1970). Memory and the medial temporal
regions of the brain. In K. H. Pribram & D. E.
Broadbent (Eds.), Biology of memory (pp. 29-50). New
York: Academic Press.
136. Milner, B. (1971). Interhemispheric differences in the
localization of psychological processes in man. British
Medical Bulletin, 27, 272-277.
137. Milner, B. (1978). Clues to the cerebral organization
of memory. In (Ed.), Cerebral correlates of conscious
experience (pp. 139-153). New York: Elsevier North-
Holland.
138. Milner, B., Corkin, S., & Teuber, H. -. L. (1968).
Further analysis of the hippocampal amnesia syndrome:
14-year follow-up study of H.M. Neuropsycholoqia, 6,
215-234.
139. Milner, B., & Kimura, B. (1964). Dissociable visual
learning defects after unilateral temporal lobectomy in
man. Paper presented at the Eastern Psychological
Association Meeting, Philadelphia, PA.
140. Mishkin, M. (1978). Memory in monkeys severely impaired
by combined but not by separate removal of amygdala and
hippocampus. Nature, 273, 297-298.
313
141. Mishkin, M. (1982). A memory system in the monkey.
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of
London, 298, 85-95.
142. Mishkin, M., Malamut, B., & Bachevalier, J. (1984).
Memories and habits: Two neural systems. In G. Lynch,
J. L. McGaugh, & N. M. Weinberger (Eds.), Neurobioloqy
of learning and memory (pp. 65-77). New York: Guilford
Press.
143. Mishkin, M., & Petri, H. L. (1984). Memory and habits:
Some implications for the analysis of learning and
retention. In L. R. Squire & N. Butters (Eds.),
Neuropsycholoqy of memory (pp. 287-296). New York: The
Guilford Press.
144. Morton, J. (1969). The interaction of information in
word recognition. Psychological Review, 76, 165-178.
145. Moscovitch, M. (1982). Multiple dissociations of
function in the amnesic syndrome. In L. S. Cermak
(Ed.), Human memory in amnesia (pp. 337-370). Hillsdale,
N J: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
146. Murray, E. A., & Mishkin, M. (1984a). Severe tactual as
well as visual memory deficits follow combined removal
of the amygdala and hippocampus in monkeys. Journal of
Neuroscience, 4, 2565-2580.
147. Murray, E. A., & Mishkin, M. (1984b). Amygdalectomy
impairs cross-modal association in monkeys. Science,
228, 604-605.
314
148. Nauta, W. J. H. (1972). The central viscero motor
system: A general survey. In C. H. Hockman (Ed.),
Limbic system mechanisms and autonomic function (pp. 21-
33). Springfield, ILL: Charles C. Thomas.
149. Nebes, R. D., Martin, D. C., & Horn, L. C. (1984).
Sparing of semantic memory in Alzheimer's disease.
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 93, 321-330.
150. Nissen, M. J., Cohen, N. J., & Corkin, S. (1981). The
amnesic patient H.M.: Learning and retention of
perceptual skills. Society for Neuroscience Abstracts,
7, 517.
151. O'Keefe, J., & Nadel, L. (1978). The hippocampus as a
cognitive map. London: Oxford University Press.
152. Oakley, D. A. (1981). Brain mechanisms of mammalian
memory. British Medical Bulletin, 37, 175-180.
153. Olds, J., & Milner, P. (1954). Positive reinforcement
produced by electrical stimulation of septal area and
other regions of rat brain. Journal of Comparative and
Physiological Psychology, 47, 419-427.
154. Olton, D. S., Becker, J. T., & Handelmann, G. E. (1979).
Hippocampus, space, and memory. Behavioral Brain
Science, 2, 13-65.
155. Orbach, J., Milner, B., & Rasmussen, T. (1960).
Learning and retention in monkeys after amygdala-
hippocampus resection. Archives of Neurology, 3, 230-
251.
315
156. Oscar-Berman, M. (1973). Hypothesis testing and
focusing behavior during concept formation by amnesic
Korsakoff patients. Neuropsychologia, 11, 191-198.
157. Osterreith, P., & Rey, A. (1944). Le test de copie
d'une figure complexe. Archives of Psychology, 30, 205-
220.
158. Papez, J. W. (1937). A proposed mechanism of emotion.
Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, 38, 725-743.
159. Parkinson, J. (1817). Essay on the Shaking Palsy.
London: Whittingham and Rowland, 1-66.
160. Penfield, W., & Mathieson, G. (1974). An autopsy and a
discussion of the role of the hippocampus in
experimental recall. Archives of Neurology, 31, 145-154.
161. Penfield, W., & Milner, B. (1958). Memory deficit
produced by bilateral lesions in the hippocampal zone.
American Medical Association Archives of Neurology and
Psychiatry, 79, 475-497.
162. Perry, E. K., Perry, R. H., Blessed, G., & Tomlinson, B.
E. (1977). Necropsy evidence of central cholinergic
deficits in senile dementia. The Lancet, 1, 189.
163. Perry, E. K., Tomlinson, B. E., Blessed, G., Bergmann,
K., Gibson, P. H., & Perry, R. H. (1978). Correlation
of cholinergic abnormalities with senile plaques and
mental test-scores in senile dementia. British Medical
Journal, 2, 1457-1459.
316
164. Pezdek, K., & Evans, G. W. (1979). Visual and verbal
memory for objects and their spatial locations. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory,
5, 360-373.
165. Pope, A., Hess, H. H., & Lewin, E. (1964).
Microchemical pathology of the cerebral cortex in pre-
senile dementias. Transactions of the American
Neurological Association, 89, 15-16.
166. Rey, A. (1942). L'exam psychologique dans les cas
d'encephalopathie traumatique. Archives of Psychology,
28, 286-340.
167. Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. San Francisco:
Hutchinson.
168. Sagar, H. J., Sullilvan, E. V., Gabrieli, J. D. E.,
Corkin, S., & Growdon, J. H. (1986). Specific cognitive
deficits in Parkinson's disease: Poor temporal ordering,
bradyphrenia, and impaired non-verbal recognition.
Unpublished manuscript.
169. Salasoo, A., Schiffrin, R. M., & Feustel, T. C. (1985).
Building permanent memory codes: Codification and
repetition effects in word identification. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 114, 50-77.
170. Salthouse, T. A. (1982). Adult cognition: An
experimental psychology of human aging. New York:
Springer-Verlag.
171. Sanders, H. I., & Warrington, E. K. (1971). Memory for
remote events in amnesic patients. Brain, 94, 661-668.
317
318
172. Scarborough, D. L., Cortese, C., & Scarborough, H. S.
(1977). Frequency and repetition effects in lexical
memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Perception and Performance, 3, 1-17.
173. Schacter, D. L. (1985). Multiple forms of memory in
humans and animals. In N. M. Weinberger, J. L.
McGaugh, & G. Lynch (Eds.), Memory systems of the brain
(pp. 351-379). New York: Guilford Press.
174. Schacter, D. L., Harbluck, J. A., & McLachlan, D. R.
(1984). Retrieval without recollection: An experimental
analysis of source amnesia. Journal of Verbal Learning
and Verbal Behavior, 23, 593-611.
175. Schacter, D. L., & Tulving, E. (1982). Memory, amnesia,
and the episodic/semantic distinction. In R. L.
Isaacson & N. E. Spear (Eds.), Expression of knowledge
(pp. 33-65). New York: Plenum.
176. Schiller, P. H. (in press). The central visual
system. Brain Research,
177. Schulman, A. I. (1973). Recognition memory and the
recall of spatial location. Memory and Cognition, 1,
256-260.
178. Scoville, W. B., Dunsmore, R. H., Liberson, W. T.,
Henry, C. E., & Pepe, A. (1953). Observations on medial
temporal lobotomy and uncotomy in the treatment of
psychotic states. In (Ed.), Proceedings of the
Association for Research in Nervous and Mental Disease
(pp. 347-369). Baltimore, MD: Williams and Wilkins.
319
179. Scoville, W. B., & Milner, B. (1957). Loss of recent
memory after bilateral hippocampal lesions. Journal of
Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry., 20, 11-21.
180. Shimamura, A. P., & Squire, L. R. (1984). Paired-
associate learning and priming effects in amnesia: A
neuropsychological study. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 113, 556-570.
181. Shimamura, A. P., Squire, L. R., & Graf, P. (1985).
Strength and duration of priming affects in amnesic
patients and normal subjects. Society for Neuroscience
Abstracts, 11, 459.
182. Smith, M. E., Heit, G., & Halgren, E. (1986).
Repetition effects in intracranial event related
potentials recorded during lexical decision. Society
for Neuroscience Abstracts, 12, 1446.
183. Smith, M. L., & Milner, B. (1981). The role of right
hippocampus in the recall of spatial locations.
Neuropsychologia, 19, 781-793.
184. Smith, S. M., Glenberg, A. M., & Brooks, R. A. (1978).
Environmental context and human memory. Memory and
Cognition, 6, 342-353.
185. Squire, L. R. (1981). Two forms of human amnesia: An
analysis of forgetting. Journal of Neuroscience, 1, 635-
640.
186. Squire, L. R. (1986). Mechanisms of memory. Science,
232, 1612-1619.
320
187. Squire, L. R., & Cohen, N. J. (1984). Human memory and
amnesia. In G. Lynch, J. L. McGaugh, & N. Weinberger
(Eds.), Neurobiology of learning and memory (pp. 3-64).
New York: Guilford' Press.
188. Squire, L. R., Cohen, N. J., & Nadel, L. (1983). The
medial temporal region and memory consolidation: A new
hypothesis. In H. Weingartner & E. Parker (Eds.),
Memory consolidation (pp. 114-132). Hillsdale: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
189. Squire, L. R., Shimamura, A., & Graf, P. (1985).
Independence of recognition memory and priming effects:
A neuropsychological analysis. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 11, 37-44.
190. Starr, A., & Phillips, L. (1970). Verbal and motor
memory in the amnesic syndrome. Neuropsychologia, 8, 75-
88.
191. Stern, L. D. (1981). A review of the theories of human
amnesia. Memory and Cognition, 9, 247-262.
192. Talland, G. A., Sweet, W. H., & Ballantine, H. T.
(1967). Amnesic syndrome with anterior communicating
artery aneurysm. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease,
145, 179-192.
193. Taylor, L. (1969). Localization of cerebral lesions by
psychological testing. Clinical Neurosurgery, 16, 269-
287.
194. Taylor, T. J., & DiScenna, P. (1986). The hippocampal
indexing theory. Neuroscience, 100, 147-154.
195. Terry, R. D. (1980). Structural changes in senile
dementia of the Alzheimer type. In L. Amaducci, A. N.
Davison, & P. Antuono (Eds.), Aging of the Brain and
Dementia (pp. 23-32). New York: Raven Press.
196. Teuber, H. L., Milner, B., & Vaughan, H. G. (1968).
Persistent anterograde amnesia after stab wound of the
basal brain. Neuropsychologia, 6, 267-282.
197. Thompson, R. F., Clark, G. A., Donegan, N. H., Lavond,
D. G., Lincoln, J. S., Madden, J., Mamounas, L. A., &
Mauk, M. D. (1984). Neuronal substrates of learning and
memory: A "multiple-trace" theory. In G. Lynch, J. L.
McGough, & N. M. Weinberger (Eds.), Neurobiology of
learning and memory (pp. 137-164). New York: Guilford
Press.
198. Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In
E. Tulving & W. Donaldson (Eds.), Organization of
memory (pp. 381-403). New York: Academic Press.
199. Tulving, E. (1983). Elements of episodic memory. London:
Oxford University Press.
200. Tulving, E. (1985). How many memory systems are there?.
American Psychologist, 40, 385-398.
201. Tulving, E. (1986). What kind of a hypothesis is the
distinction between episodic and semantic memory.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition, 12, 307-311.
321
202. Tulving, E., Shacter, D. L., & Stark, H. A. (1982).
Priming effects in word-fragment completion are
independent of recognition memory. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 8, 336-342.
203. Victor, M., Adams, R. D., & Collins, G. H. (1971). The
Wernicke-Korsakoff Syndrome. Philadelphia: F. A. Davis,
Co.
204. Warrington, E. K., & Weiskrantz, L. (1968). A new
method of testing long-term retention with special
reference to amnesic patients. Nature, 217, 972-974.
205. Warrington, E. K., & Weiskrantz, L. (1970). The amnesic
syndrome: consolidation or retrieval?. Nature, 228, 628-
630.
206. Warrington, E. K., & Weiskrantz, L. (1974). The effect
of prior learning on subsequent retention in amnesic
patients. Neuropsychologia, 12, 419-428.
207. Warrington, E. K., & Weiskrantz, L. (1982). Amnesia? A
disconnection system?. Neuropsychologia, 20, 233-248.
208. Watson, J. B. (1925). Behaviorism. New York: Norton.
209. Wechsler, D. (1981). Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale -
Revised. New York: Psychological Corporation.
210. Wechsler, D., & Stone, C. P. (1945). Wechsler memory
scale. New York: The Psychological Corporation.
322
211. Weingartner, H., Burns, S., Diebel, R., & LeWitt, P. A.
(1984). Cognitive impairments in Parkinson's disease:
Distinguishing between effort-demanding and automatic
cognitive processes. Psychiatry Research, 11, 223-235.
212. Wernecke, C. (1881). Lehrbuch der gehirnkrankheiten, II.
Berline:, 229.
213. Whitehouse, P. J., Price, D. L., Coyle, J. T., & De
Long, M. R. (1981). Alzheimer's disease: Evidence for
selective loss of cholinergic neurons in the nucleus
basalis. Annals of Neurology, 10, 122-126.
214. Whitehouse, P. J., Price, D. L., Struble, R. G., Clark,
A. W., & Coyle, J. T. (1982). Alzheimer's disease and
senile dementia: Loss of neurons in the basal forebrain.
Science, 215, 1237-1239.
215. Whitty, C. W. M., & Lishman, O. L. (1966). Amnesia in
cerebral disease. In C. W. M. Whitty & O. L.
Zangwill (Eds.), Amnesia (pp. 36-76). London:
Butterworth.
216. Wickelgren, W. A. (1979). Chunking and consolidation: A
theoretical synthesis of semantic networks, configuring
in condition, S-R versus cognitive learning, normal
forgetting, the amnesic syndrome and the hippocampal
arousal system. Psychological Review, 86, 44-60.
217. Winblad, B., Adolfsson, R., Carlsson, A., & Gottfries,
C. G. (1982). Biogenic amines in brains of patients
with Alzheimer's disease. In S. Corkin, K. L. Davis,
J. H. Growdon, & E. Usdin (Eds.), Alzheimer's disease:
323
A report of progress in research (pp. 25-34). New York:
Raven Press.
218. Winocur, G., Oxbury, S., Roberts, R., Agnetti, V., &
Davis, C. (1984). Amnesia in a patient with bilateral
lesions of the thalamus. Neuropsychologia, 22, 123-144.
219. Winograd, T. (1975). Frame representations and the
declarative-procedural controversy. In D. G. Bobrow
& A. M. Collins (Eds.), Representation and
understanding: Studies in cognitive science (pp. 185-
210). New York: Academic Press.
220. Winston, P. (1977). Artifical intelligence. Reading:
Addison-Wesley.
221. Wood, F., Ebert, V., & Kinsbourne, M. (1982). The
semantic-episodic memory distinction in memory and
amnesia. In L. Cermak (Ed.), Human Memory and Amnesia
(pp. 195-217). Hillsdale, N J: Erlbaum Press.
222. Woodard, J. S. (1962). Clinicopathologic significance
of granulovacular degeneration in Alzheimer's disease.
Journal of Neuropathology and Experimental Neurology,
21, 85-91.
223. Yates, C. M., Simpson, J., Gordon, A., Maloney, A. F.
H., Allison, Y., Ritchie, I. M., & Urgohart, A. (1983).
Catecholamines and cholinergic enzymes in presenile and
senile Alzheimer-type dementia and Down's syndrome.
Brain Research, 280, 119-126.
224. Zangwill, O. L. (1966). The amnesic syndrome. In O. L.
Zangwill & C. W. M. Whitty (Eds.), Amnesia (pp. 77-91).
324
London: Butterworth.
225. Zola-Morgan, S., & Squire, L. R. (1984). Preserved
learning in monkeys with medial temporal lesions:
sparing of motor and cognitive skills. Journal of
Neuroscience, 4, 1072.
226. Zola-Morgan, S., Squire, L. R., & Amaral, D. G. (1985).
Human amnesia and the medial temporal region: Memory
impairment following a bilateral lesion limited to the
CAI field of the hippocampus. Society for Neuroscience
Abstracts, 11, 149.
325
Appendix A
326
Descriptions of Patients with Global Amnesia
Four patients with different etiologies of amnesia were
studied in the experiments reported in this thesis. Brief
descriptions of the etiology and locus of brain injury, so far as
they are known, are provided below for three of the patients;
H.M.'s lesions are described in detail in the thesis (Chapter II).
Also, the patients' scores on standard tests of memory are shown
(Tables 1-4), together with cut-offs for deficits on each test.
The cut-off scores were derived from normative data and the scores
of patients with focal lesions who had demonstrated selective
mnemonic deficits in particular tests (the method for deriving the
cut-off scores is described in detail in Corkin et al., 1985). All
of the patients demonstrated global memory impairments, those of
H.M. and the patient with KS being more severe than those of the
patients with herpes simplex encephalitis and bilateral stroke.
Patient #7439
This 48-year-old woman became amnesic in 1984 following a
Wernicke's psychosis, had a history of chronic alcoholism, and was
diagnosed as having Wernicke-Korsakoff's syndrome. While her loci
of brain injury were unknown, it is likely that she had brain
lesions distributed around the lateral, third, and fourth
ventricles (Victor et al., 1971). Critically affected areas may
have included the dorsomedial nucleus of the thalamus, the
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peritineum, and the mamillary bodies, but other affected areas
could have included the massa intermedia, the periaqueductal region
at the level of the third cranial nerve nuclei, the midbrain
reticular formation, the posterior colliculi, and other lesions
consequent to chronic alcoholism.
Patient #6125
This 61-year-old woman became amnesic in 1982 following a
bilateral stroke during an arteriogram. The arteriogram report
described possible emboli at the origins of both posterior cerebral
arteries following a vertebral-basilar injection. A CT scan
obtained 1.5 years after the onset of the amnesia showed tissue
loss along the infero-medial aspect of the left temporal lobe,
extending as far forward as the anterior horn of the left
temporal-lobe. Also, the right temporal horn was enlarged
(consistent with some diffuse neuronal loss). There was cortical
tissue loss prefrontally and in the parietal regions, and atrophy
of the superior cerebellar vermis was noted. An MR scan obtained 4
years later, and near the time of mirror-tracing, showed major
tissue loss involving the anterior tips of the right temporal-lobe,
the mid- and posterior left temporal-lobe, and the left
parieto-occipital region.
Patient #4624
This patient was a 50 year-old male whose amnesia followed a
herpes simplex encephalitis infection. After resolution of the
encephalitis, the patient received a craniotomy for drainage of a
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porencephalic cyst and implantation of a ventricular shunt. A CT
scan performed 27 years after onset of the disease revealed
dilitation of the ventricular system, an enlarged left temporal
horn, and an enlarged right lateral ventricle. Tissue loss was
evident in the posterior, inferior aspect of the left temporal
lobe, which corresponds to the left medial temporal-lobe region.
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Global Estimates of Intelligence and Memory (Table 1)
The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - Revised (Wechsler,
1981) ws used to derive global estimates of verbal, performance,
and general (full-scale) intelligence. The Wechsler Memory Scales
(Wechsler and Stone, 1945), Form I and II, provided a global rating
of orientation, arousal, and memory function.
Immediate Memory (Table 2)
Immediate verbal and nonverbal memory capacities were assessed
by digit span (Wechsler, 1981) and block span (Corsi, 1972),
respectively.
Recall of Verbal and Nonverbal Material (Table 3)
The verbal recall tasks assessing long-term memory capacities
required subjects to learn to criterion three word pairs (Inglis,
1959; Corkin et al., 1985), and to recall the two prose passages
and 10 paired associates from the Wechsler Memory Scale after a
one-hour delay (Milner, 1958). A composite score was calculated
from the score for the prose passages divided by two plus the
number of paired associates recalled correctly. The nonverbal
recall tasks involved redrawing the Wechsler Memory Scale figures
one hour after the initial recall test (Milner, 1958) and redrawing
the Rey or Taylor complex figure one hour after making the initial
copy (Rey, 1942; Osterreith and Rey, 1944; Taylor, 1969).
Recognition of Verbal and Nonverbal Material (Table 4)
The tests of long-term verbal recognition memory included
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continuous recognition of words, nonsense syllables, and numbers
(Verbal Recurring Figures Test; Milner and Kimura, 1964), and
forced-choice recognition of 30 words that had been processed at
different levels of meaning (Craik and Lockhart, 1972).
Recognition of nonverbal material was evaluated with 52 geometric
figures and 52 nonsense shapes (Nonverbal Recurring Figures Test;
Kimura, 1963). A nonverbal paired-associate learning task with
three pairs of geometric shapes required learning to criterion with
a three-choice recognition procedure (Corkin et al., 1985).
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Table 1. CHARACTERISTICS OF PATIENTS WITH GLOBAL AMNESIA DUE TO
DIFFERENT ETIOLOGIES: WECHSLER INTELLIGENCE AND MEMORY SCALES
Verbal Performance Full Scale Memory
I.Q. I.Q. I.Q. I.Q.
Deficit Criterion < 90 < 90 < 90 < 90
Patient
H.M. 88 101 92 69
(Medial temporal-
lobe resection)
#7439 87 92 88 72
(Korsakoff's
syndrome)
#4624 93 92 92 84
(Herpes simplex
encephalitis)
#6125 119 109 117 94
(Bilateral
stroke)
Source of deficit criterion: normative data
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Table 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF PATIENTS WITH GLOBAL AMNESIA DUE TO
DIFFERENT ETIOLOGIES: IMMEDIATE MEMORY
Digit Span Block Span
Deficit criterion
Patient
H.M.
(Medial temporal-lobe resection)
#7439
(Korsakoff's syndrome)
#4624
(Herpes simplex encephalitis)
#6125
(Bilateral stroke)
Source of deficit criterion: normative data
< 5 (4
5 5
5 5
5 6
7 4
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Table 3. CHARACTERISTICS OF PATIENTS WTIH GLOBAL AMNESIA DUE TO
DIFFERENT ETIOLOGIES: RECALL OF VERBAL AND NONVERBAL MATERIAL
Rey Verbal Paired Delayed
Recall Associates WMSa Items
(trials to
(max.=36) criterion) Verbal Nonverbal
Deficit Criterion < 18b,c > gb < 12b < 6b
Patient
H.M. 0 49 1 0
(Medial temporal-
lobe resection)
#7439 3.5 42 0.8 0
(Korsakoff's
syndrome)
#4624 8.5 16 2 0
(Herpes simplex
encephalitis)
#6125 3 17 4 0
(Bilateral
stroke)
aWechsler Memory Scale
Source of deficit criterion: bnormative data, Cperformance of
focal lesion groups
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Table 4. CHARACTERISTICS OF PATIENTS WITH GLOBAL AMNESIA DUE TO
DIFFERENT ETIOLOGIES: RECOGNITION OF VERBAL AND NONVERBAL MATERIAL
Recurring Figures Nonverbal Verbal
Paired Depth of
Verbal Nonverbal Associates Processing
(trials to
(max.=60) (max.=56) criterion) (max.=30)
Deficit Criterion < 37b < 31b > 6a < 20a
Patient
H.M. 19 3 75 12
(Medial
temporal-lobe
resection)
#7439 13 15 37 13
(Korsakoff's
syndrome)
#4624 48 21 21 23
(Herpes
simplex
encephalitis)
#6125 28 11 33 18
(Bilateral
stroke)
Source of deficit criterion: anormative data, bperformance of
impaired focal lesion groups
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Appendix B
Stimuli and H.M.'s Answers From Experiments in Chapter IV
Table 1. NEW WORDS FOR EXPERIMENTS 2A AND 2B AND THE YEARS IN
WHICH THEY WERE ADDED TO THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY
1954
apartheid
beanie
bikini
blooper
charisma
cinerama
corti sone
detergent
dramamine
floozy
gimmick
huckster
juggernaut
kayak
lox
telethon
1971
afro
amniocentesis
chicano
freebie
hologram
mod
pizzazz
zonked
1976
condo
granola
grungy
hassle
kudo
motocross
reggae
scam
stagflation
1959
stereo
1966
bionics
honcho
psychedelic
quasar
telex
Added for Experi-
ment 2b
cellulite (1974)
gonzo (1971)
gulag (1984)
nerd (1965)
palimony (1979)
scuzzy (1968)
wimp (1963)
yucky (1970)
yuppie (not yet
in dictionary)
1981
ayatollah
disco
jacuzzi
laetrile
nuke
336
Table 2. H.M.'S DEFINITIONS FOR WORDS ENTERING THE DICTIONARY
AFTER ONSET OF HIS AMNESIA
H.M.'s recall of word meanings
a person who controls acid in a criminal
way
a heavy rain, heavier than a thunderstorm
angel dust dust made by angels, we call it rain
biodegradable
brownie point
closet queen
cut-offs
fastback
fat farm
flower child
halfway house
jet lag
jet set
nuke
pap smear
two grades
a cookie with a pointed shape
moths
amputations
something that comes back fast
a dairy
a young person who grows flowers
a house that's half way there
when jet planes are slowed down
people who dance
neutral
a smear doctors make to test blood types
forgiveness
Word
acid head
acid rain
soul food
a city or town in Pennsylvania or Ohio
covering
Watergate
xerox
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Table 3. H.M.'S MUJLTIPLE-CHOICE RECOGNITION FOR WORD MEANINGS
the performance of dangerous stunts high in
the air
amniocentesis
apartheid
boat people
brain wash
closet queen
cut-off's
disco
an infectious, inflammatory disease of the
intestines...
the separation of young cows that have not
yet given birth to calves
people who cater bon voyage parties on
ocean liners
the fluid that surrounds and bathes the
brain...
a deposed royal personage living abroad in
exile
amputated limbs
the 12-pound disk-shaped object used in
Olympic competition by discus throwers
encounter group
granola
honkie
hot pants
a military detachment detailed to go in
advance ... and search out the enemy
a portable keyboard wind instrument...
a person who honks his automobile horn with
unpleasant frequency
forced, difficult breaths resulting from an
excessive rate and depth of
respiration...
aerobics
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a member of the Muza Republic of the USSR
nitty gritty
reggae
sit-com
software
Watergate
one of the minute subdivisions of matter
one who governs a kingdom...
military abbreviation for 'situation
commander'
expensive clothing made of a soft twilled
fabric...
a summit or boundary line separating the
drainage districts of two streams or
coasts
l
muzak
Appendix C
Stimuli Used in Experiment IX-4
Dot Patterns
0 *
Figures Copied Onto Dot Patterns
Iil
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0
I
